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Abstract 
The thesis examines Chinese Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs): their practice, 
motivations, and implications to corporate governance. The sample used in the 
empirical analysis contains all Chinese SEOs from 1994 to 2009 (excluding the 
financial sector). The thesis consists of three empirical chapters. Chapters 3&4 use 
rights issues and public offerings to examine the application of four mainstream theories 
concerning SEO motivations, namely the trade-off theory, the information asymmetry 
theory, the agency theory, and the financing under growth theory. The difference 
between these two chapters is that Chapter 3 examines the impact of SEO motivations 
on the SEO decision by using firms’ pre-issue characteristics, while Chapter 4 examines 
SEO motivations by checking the use of proceeds from SEOs and firms’ post-issue 
long-term stock and operating performance. Chapters 3&4 document that the 
mainstream SEO theories in general also apply to Chinese SEOs.  In addition Chapter 4 
also provides evidence regarding the agency conflict between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders which is particularly relevant to the Chinese stock market.  In 
Chapter 5 we examine the impact of private placements on corporate governance by 
focusing on firms’ shareholder contestability. We show that firms whose shareholder 
contestability improves to a larger extent due to private placements experience better 
market reactions to the private placement announcement, suggesting that private 
placements could help Chinese firms improve corporate governance to reduce the 
agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Overall, 
the thesis contributes to the existing literature by first examining the application of four 
mainstream theories concerning SEOs in Chinese stock market which is a immature 
market. We find evidence supporting all four theories, although the agency cost in 
China is more complicated due to the agency conflict between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 The motivation of the thesis 
In order to finance firms’ operation and investment, firms can choose internal sources as 
well as external sources of funding. Internal sources of funding mainly refer to profit or 
retained earnings. External sources of funding mainly refer to debt financing and equity 
financing. In determining firms’ financing decision, Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 
1963) propose that capital structure (or the choice between equity and debt) is irrelevant 
to firm value (or investors’ wealth). However, this conclusion relies on a set of strong 
assumptions of a perfect capital market, which implies: for example, (1) firms are 
ranked according to risk classes and firms among the same risk class have same return. 
(2) There is no tax, bankruptcy cost, or transaction costs. (3) There is similar lending 
and borrowing interest rates available to both private investors and corporations. In 
other words, investors can privately and at no cost mimic any capital structure chosen 
by a given corporation. However, in reality, interest expenses are tax deductible and 
debt financing has the benefit of a tax shield, but the cost of distress associated with 
debt financing will stop firms from completely replacing equity financing with debt 
financing (Modigliani and Miller 1963; Brennan and Schwartz 1978). In addition to tax 
shield and financial distress, there are also other costs associated with debt or equity 
financing such as the cost of information asymmetry and the cost of agency conflict. 
These costs will also have an impact on firms’ financing decision. The cost of 
information asymmetry exists between the buyer and the seller of any assets including 
financial assets of debt and equity (Akerlof 1970). Hence, according to the information 
asymmetry theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest a pecking order theory. The theory 
suggests that firms should first use internal sources of financing, debt financing as a 
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second choice, and equity financing as a last resort. This is because equity financing 
suffers the most severe cost of information asymmetry between firms and their 
shareholders while internal sources suffer the least. The cost of agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders may also be more prominent in equity financing. Managers 
might use equity as a cheap source with less discipline (compared to debt) for their own 
perquisites, which impair shareholders’ value (Jensen 1986). In this case, debt financing 
bears less cost in terms of agency conflict than equity financing. Hence, there are 
multiple factors influencing firms’ capital structure such as the benefit of a tax shield, 
the cost of financial distress, the cost of information asymmetry, and the cost of agency 
conflict.  
 
Empirically, Eckbo and Masulis (1995) show that internal sources have remained the 
dominant funding source for U.S. nonfinancial corporations for a sample from 1946 to 
1991. This phenomenon remains valid for 7 other economies for a sample from 1970 to 
1985. Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2005) obtained international evidence from 
over 50 economies for a period from 1990 to 2001. They show that debt financing is 
more popular than equity financing. This evidence seems to support the pecking order 
theory. However, according to Graham and Harvey (2001), managers give value to 
financial flexibility, but their desire for flexibility is unrelated to the degree of 
information asymmetry.  In other words, authors comment that firms’ financing 
behaviour might be consistent with the behaviour described by the pecking order theory, 
but the reasoning for each is very different. There are also other empirical work, which 
provides evidence for the violation of the pecking order theory such as Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) and Fama and French (2005). Explicitly, equity issue is more popular 
than that predicted by the pecking order theory. However, regardless whether equity is 
the most popular financing channel for firms or not, equity issue is still an important 
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topic to investigate for firms, regulators, and investors. The internal sources are limited 
and firms cannot borrow as much as they want. Firms will need to ultimately rely on 
equity financing after reaching the limit for all other sources of funding. For regulators, 
helping firms raise equity is an important function of the stock market. Hence, a good 
understanding of firms’ equity financing behaviour would help regulators to facilitate 
market practice. For investors, they are also concerned with how firms’ equity issue 
would affect their wealth. For example, equity financing could be the result of the 
agency conflict between managers and shareholders which could impair firms’ value. 
Hence, we think equity financing is an important topic to investigate.  
 
How exactly can a firm raise funds by issuing equity? Initial Public Offering (IPO) is 
definitely an important event for firms. After the IPO, the nature of the firm changes 
significantly from a private to a public firm. Firms’ share can be publicly traded in the 
stock exchange after the IPO. At the same time, firms can also raise some equities 
during the IPO process. To an extent, equity issue may be of greater importance to firms 
after the IPO. This is because a firm is likely to conduct only one IPO in its life, but 
might need many more equity issues in its potentially infinite life of listing according to 
its demand of equity financing. Firms might also have incentives to raise equity after 
rather than during the IPO, because there is underpricing during the IPO before which 
firms’ information is available to the public (Welch 1996). Hence, we think that equity 
issues after the IPO deserve as much attention as the IPO. All equity issues after the IPO 
can be termed as Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs), which is the research objective of 
this thesis. There are three main SEO method including rights issues, public offerings, 
and private placements. Rights issue refers to when existing shareholders are granted 
priority subscription to the new shares, and new shares will be allocated to existing 
shareholders on a pro rata basis; public offering refers to when new shares are directly 
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issued to public investors; private placement refers to when shares are issued only to a 
certain group of investors such as institutional investors.  
 
With regards to existing research on SEO studies, one main stream of research 
considers the change in the wealth of shareholders during SEOs, including short-term 
market reaction study (which examines the abnormal return in the window period by 
comparing issuing firms’ real return with its hypothetical return predicted by the market 
model) and post-issue long-term performance study (which examines the difference 
between the performance of issuing firms and benchmark performance of non-issuing 
firms). The market reaction to rights issue or public offering announcements is likely to 
be negative (Asquith and Mullins 1986; Masulis and Korwar 1986; Eckbo and Masulis 
1992). The market reaction to private placements is likely to be positive (Wruck 1989). 
In the long-term, stock and operating performance of issuing firms are likely to be 
worse than that of non-issuing firms (Loughran and Ritter 1995, 1997; Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves 1995). The long-term underperformance also holds for the case of 
private placements (Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees 2002). Then, the question is 
what causes the pattern of market reaction and long-term underperformance of issuing 
firms?   A popular explanation is from the perspective of the signalling effect of the 
SEO event (Leland and Pyle 1977). This is because there is always information 
asymmetry between the seller and the buyer of the shares, and firms tend to sell the new 
shares when the cost of information asymmetry associated with the issue is low. Hence, 
firms might be able to “time the market” to take advantage of a period of low cost of 
information asymmetry which is also sometimes called a “window of opportunity” to 
conduct equity issue. Hence, the negative market reaction might mean that investors 
believe that the SEO event conveys a message of share overvaluation.  On the other 
hand, the positive market reaction to the private placement announcement could be due 
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to that private placements could lower the information asymmetry. This is because 
during the negotiation of new placements, firms could provide potential investors with 
more inside information about firms which has not been or cannot be released to the 
market (Hertzal and Smith 1993). Hence, outside investors believe that if (institutional) 
investors with more investigation and more private information of the issuing firm are 
still willing to subscribe to the newly issued shares, this willingness could be a signal of 
the quality of the issuing firm. With regards to long-term stock underperformance, one 
possible explanation is that investors and analysts are systemically over-optimistic 
about the future prospect of issuing firms before SEOs (Jegadeesh 2000). This over-
optimism is sometimes associated with firms’ earnings management before SEOs 
(Rangan 1998; Shivakumar 2000; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998). Accounting for long-
term operating underperformance, one possible explanation is that insiders of the 
issuing firms understand that firms’ current earnings perspective is not sustainable, so 
they take advantage of this information asymmetry to conduct the equity issue before 
the decline of firms’ performance (Kahle 2000; Clark, Dunbar, and Kahle 2004). The 
long-term underperformance could also be explained by other theories. For example, the 
equity issue might be the result of agency conflict between managers and shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986). Managers could use equity as a cheap 
resource for their own perquisites, whilst the wealth of shareholders will be impaired 
(Walker and Yost 2008). 
 
When the market reaction and long-term performance studies mentioned above use 
different theories to explain patterns of performance, in return through these studies, 
SEO motivations can also be substantiated. Apart from the motivation of information 
asymmetry and agency conflict mentioned in the paragraph above, in this research we 
are particularly interested in four mainstream theories behind SEOs. (1) The trade-off 
12 
 
theory which suggests that the firm adjusts its capital structure to an “optimal” level to 
balance the benefits of tax shield and the costs of financial distress (Modigliani and 
Miller 1958 and 1963). (2) The information asymmetry theory which proposes that the 
firm issues equity when the cost of doing so due to information asymmetry is low 
(Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984). (3) The agency theory which puts forward that 
the equity issue decision is affected by the agency conflict between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986). We will also discuss the impact 
of another aspect of the agency conflict on the equity issue decision: the conflict 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer 2000). (4) The financing under growth theory which suggests 
that firms with growth potential prefer equity financing due to the agency conflict 
between shareholders and debtholders (Myers 1977; Smith 1970), or, more generally, to 
avoid future possible financial distress since growth is normally associated with great 
uncertainty. We will discuss these four theories in more detail in Chapter 3. There is 
also other empirical research which explicitly focuses on SEO motivations (without 
focusing on performance). Kim and Weisbach (2008) test the market timing motivation 
from a perspective of the use of proceeds after SEOs. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz 
(2010) and Jung, Kim, Stulz (1996) test the market timing motivation by using a 
binominal model to examine the timing of the SEO decision by firms. 
  
Although there is a fair amount of research on the topic of SEOs, these are largely based 
on mature markets.  We think that the Chinese stock market deserves more investigation, 
because (1) China is an emerging market, but plays an important role in the global 
economy. After economic reform lasting 30 years, the Gross Domestic Production 
(GDP) of China surpassed that of Japan after the second quarter of 2010 becoming the 
second-largest economy in the world. According to Reuters (11 Jan 2011), China 
13 
 
mainland A-share market capitalisation totalled 26.35 trillion RMB ($3,981 billion) at 
the end of 2010 becoming the second-biggest stock market in the world, which is 12 
percent higher than the Japanese stock market. (2) Another important reason is that it 
might not be appropriate to directly borrow the research results from a mature market 
and apply it to the Chinese stock market because there are differences. The Chinese 
stock market (i.e. Shanghai stock market and Shenzhen stock market) was founded in 
1990, and was initially used to partially privatise some state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
On one hand, the Chinese government wanted to privatise some shares to the public. On 
the other hand, the government still wanted to firmly control these SOEs. As a result, 
one important feature of the Chinese stock market is that the nation controls over two-
thirds of shares of these SOEs, making these shares non-tradable (before 2005). World 
widely, state-owned shares seem to be inferior in comparison to private shares in 
determining firms’ performance in terms of productivity, profitability, and market 
valuation (Megginson and Netter 2001; Djankov and Murrell 2002). In China, state-
owned shares are also expected to impair firm value (Sun and Tong 2003; Qi, Wu, and 
Zhang 2000). This is because state shareholders are not competent to maximise the 
value of firms, nor do they aim to maximise the value of firms from the beginning due 
to its other social responsibilities. The second feature of the Chinese stock market is the 
heavy regulation on market practices. The heavy regulation is largely the result of a lack 
of market mechanisms to govern the market. For example, firms who want to conduct 
SEOs need to satisfy certain profitability requirements. The Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Committee (CSRC) wants to protect minority shareholders by trying to 
ensure that the new shares, which flow into the stock market through SEOs for 
(minority) shareholders to buy, come from firms with good profit generating potential 
and good corporate governance. However, before security companies began to play a 
role like an investment banking system in a mature market, the CSRC faced with a 
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substantial number of SEO applications and time constraints did not have the capacity 
to investigate each application in great detail. Hence, the CSRC imposed the 
profitability requirement as one of the most important requirements, to try to restrict 
firms with inferior performance from raising more money from (minority) shareholders. 
However, the effectiveness of such a heavy regulative measure is controversial. Allen, 
Qian, and Qian (2005) summarise other features of the Chinese stock market 
institutional environment including: the lack of trained professionals, the lack of 
institutional investors, and limited financial markets and products. These lead to weak 
corporate governance in China, and consequently weak protection of minority 
shareholders. For example, according to Bai, Liu, Lu, Song, and Zhang (2004), poor 
Chinese corporate governance could be summarised in the following aspects: (1) the 
executive compensation scheme is not well designed; (2) financial transparency of firms 
is low, and information disclosure of firms is inadequate; (3) the ownership structure 
contains a large proportion of non-tradable shares and state-owned shares which are 
believed to have a negative impact on corporate governance (before 2005); (4) the 
corporate control (or takeover) market is nearly absent in China; (5) the legal 
infrastructure and the protection of minority shareholders are weak. The weak corporate 
governance might make the agency conflict (between managers and shareholders) 
particularly important in the Chinese SEO decision. Additionally, as a result of the 
dominant position of controlling shareholders, the agency conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer 2000) is also believed to play an important role in the Chinese SEOs, which is 
neglected in the mature market. Within the context of SEOs, Aharony, Lee, and Wong 
(2000) suggest that in China, the interests of minority shareholders might be conflictive 
with the interests of controlling shareholders, who usually are state-owned enterprises 
(SOE). Controlling shareholders could transfer some benefits exclusively to themselves 
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at the expense of minority shareholders. Such a transfer could be achieved via, for 
example, related party transactions. Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) also provide a few 
examples of how controlling shareholders could take advantage of minority 
shareholders. In conclusion, we need more research that focuses on China, as it is 
interesting and different from a mature market.  
 
The Chinese SEO features mentioned in the paragraph above have inspired some 
existing literature on China. For example, regarding the effectiveness of heavy 
regulation, it is argued that the SEO profitability requirement can be achieved through 
earnings management on one hand (Yu, Du, and Sun 2006). Whilst on the other hand, 
the SEO profitability requirement seems to be able to distinguish the post-issue 
performance of firms (Dang and Yang 2007; Chen and Wang 2007). In other words, the 
SEO profitability requirement might be suitable as a market mechanism to certify 
issuing firms’ corporate governance and quality. Research into Chinese SEOs seems to 
focus with great interest on the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders (afore mentioned). Empirically, Jian and Wong (2004) find that 
firms have more related party transactions after Chinese rights issues. The more related 
party transactions a firm has, (a) the lower the market valuation is; (b) the more negative 
stock reaction to related party transaction announcements. Other research has suggested 
that dividends following SEOs might also be the evidence of such an agency conflict 
(Lee and Xiao 2006). Although the agency conflict is important in China, we believe 
other theories are also equally as important and deserve attention, because they could 
affect the value to the shareholder. However, we deem there to be a lack of literature 
regarding Chinese SEO motivations apart from the two types of agency conflicts. Bo, 
Huang, and Wang (2011) extend some knowledge of Chinese SEOs by examining the 
four main theories concerning SEOs mentioned above and provide support to the 
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information asymmetry theory (or the market timing motivation) and the financing 
under growth theory.  Our research aims to fill a research gap by providing additional 
evidence with regards to mainstream theories concerned with SEO motivations. 
Furthermore, an explicit examination into SEO motivations is important (even in a 
mature market). As mentioned above, the impact of SEOs on shareholder wealth is 
likely to be negative either in the short-term market reaction or in the long-term stock 
and operating performance. Hence, the question is that since SEOs tend to lead to the 
dilution of shareholder wealth whether SEOs generally mean a bad thing for investors, 
and whether SEOs should be scrutinised or even avoided?  There is no straightforward 
answer by simply examining the change in the wealth of shareholders. We need to go 
beyond merely analysing performance but explicitly focusing on SEO motivations to 
provide useful knowledge to Chinese investors and regulators. 
 
This thesis aims to empirically examine Chinese Seasoned Equity Offerings: their 
practice, motivations, and implications for corporate governance. Our research has two 
main contributions. Firstly, as mentioned above, our research contributes to existing 
literature through examining Chinese SEO motivations.  It is interesting to see how the 
theories concerning SEO motivations in mature markets are applied to the Chinese 
stock market, with features such as heavy regulation, high state ownership, and weak 
minority shareholder protection. In other words, with the Chinese economy having gone 
through 30 years of transition, our research contributes to the knowledge that to what 
extent the Chinese stock market has converged towards or diverged from a mature 
market. We find evidence supporting all four theories, although the agency cost in 
China is more complicated due to the agency conflict between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders. Secondly, as far as we are concerned, we are the first to 
empirically investigate Chinese private placements, which is a recent development of 
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Chinese SEOs. There exists a gap in research into private placements in China due to its 
newness in the Chinese stock market. Even though it has a short history, private 
placements are important and have become the most popular SEO method since its 
introduction in 2006. In essence, the reason for its popularity could be that private 
placements are not restricted by the profitability requirement imposed on rights issues 
and public offerings. Private placements could improve the agency conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, because in practice, private 
placements could introduce more block shareholders who could improve not only 
monitoring over managers but also monitoring over controlling shareholders. Our study 
will provide evidence on the impact of private placements on shareholder contestability 
(i.e. substantiate the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders). The impact of private placement on shareholder contestability is a 
research gap even within mature markets. The Chinese stock market with severe agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders provides a unique 
opportunity to study such a phenomenon.   
 
1.2 Sub-topics chosen for empirical analysis of the thesis 
In order to achieve our research objectives, we chose the following three research 
objectives/topics to constitute this thesis: (1) why do Chinese firms conduct SEOs? (2) 
How do Chinese firms use proceeds from SEOs? (3) Do private placements improve 
shareholder contestability in China?  
 
One observation regarding Chinese SEOs is that Chinese SEO activity has been very 
frequent. 936 firms have conducted 1508 SEOs during the period from 1994 to 2009, 
while we have 1700 listed firms at the end of 2009. The question is why are there so 
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many SEOs in China? Different theories could provide different explanations. For 
example, SEOs are frequently needed because the fast paced growth of the Chinese 
economy could bring firms large expansion opportunities and external financing is 
needed to fund these opportunities. SEOs could also be the result of manager incentives 
due to agency conflict. Hence, we are interested in how these SEOs could reflect SEO 
motivations. Our first topic of research focuses on SEO motivations from the following 
perspective: how SEO motivations determine firms’ SEO decisions. SEO motivations 
are considered to be applicable to the Chinese stock market if SEO decisions can be 
predicted or explained from SEO motivations. More specifically, SEO decisions are 
taken to mean which types of firms conduct SEOs and in which years. SEO motivations 
are measured by firms’ pre-issue characteristics. For example, the difference between 
firms’ leverage and firms’ (estimated) optimal leverage is used to measure firms’ 
incentive to use SEOs to adjust their capital structure, a reflection of the trade-off theory. 
We will use a binominal model to study the SEO decision, which is similar to 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) and Jung, Kim, Stulz (1996). 
 
There is another interesting phenomenon regarding the use of proceeds from Chinese 
SEOs.  From usage information provided within our sample of Chinese SEOs, 31.7% of 
final real proceeds are identified as general corporate use which is usage excluding 
investment and debt repayment. The question is why there is such high general 
corporate use in SEOs? Previous research has shown a negative relationship between 
general corporate use and firms’ post-SEO performance (Jeanneret 2005; Autore, Bray, 
and Peterson 2009; Walker and Yost 2008). We believe that general corporate use helps 
to mask SEO motivations, for example, enabling managers (or existing shareholders) to 
hide their true intentions or SEO motivations such as agency conflict motivation (or 
information asymmetry motivation) from shareholders (or new shareholders 
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respectively). In this subtopic, SEO motivations are measured by different kinds of 
firms’ post-issue spending (such as cash, investment, and leverage). We borrow the 
model by Kim and Weisbach (2008) to examine the relationship between the (general) 
use of proceeds and post-issue spending. We also make linkages between SEO (general) 
proceeds and firms’ post-issue performance to check whether the value of firms is 
impaired by the use of proceeds from SEOs (Walker and Yost 2008). Hence, if we 
could show that general corporate use is in some way reflective of SEO motivations, we 
might be able to verify and draw conclusions on their application. For example, if we 
can show that general corporate use has been utilised for related party transactions, we 
may conclude that one SEO motivation for firms could be the agency conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This is because there is evidence to 
suggest that controlling shareholders use related party transactions to expropriate 
minority shareholders in China (Jian and Wong 2004). 
 
The first topic is closely related to the second topic: (1) both topics explicitly examine 
Chinese SEO motivations. Additionally, the empirical design in both topics allows us to 
test the four theories concerning SEO motivations at the same time. (2) The empirical 
work in the first topic uses firms’ per-issue characteristics to derive SEO motivations, 
while the empirical work in the second topic uses firms’ post-issue information (the use 
of proceeds from SEOs) to review SEO motivations. (3) With regards to the results, the 
empirical work in the first topic provides evidence supporting all four theories 
mentioned above while the empirical work in the second topic provide evidence 
supporting the information asymmetry theory and the agency theory.   
 
The third topic is related to the first and second topics in two ways. (1) The third topic 
provides more substantial evidence on the SEO motivation of the agency conflict 
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between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. As mentioned above, the 
agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders might be 
particularly severe in China as a result of the institutional environment. Private 
placements provide another good opportunity to investigate and verify such an agency 
conflict. This is because shareholder contestability tends to change after private 
placements. (2) The SEO sample in the first topic is from 1994 to 2006, and the SEO 
sample in the second topic is from 1998 to 2003. A recent development in Chinese 
SEOs is that firms rely heavily on private placements as the main SEO method after 
their introduction to the Chinese stock market in 2006. According to our data, 209 
private placements have been implemented as a financing channel and 181 private 
placements for other purposes from 2006 to 2009.  There have also been 107 rights 
issues and public offerings made during the same period. Hence, while the sample in the 
first two topics concentrates mainly on rights issues and public offerings, private 
placements also deserve our attention.  
 
We are motivated to choose this topic (private placements) due to the following 
considerations. As far as we know, there has not been research (even in a mature market) 
which links private placements with shareholder contestability. As mentioned above, in 
a mature market, the market reaction to SEOs (mainly public offerings in US market) is 
likely to be negative (Asquith and Mullins 1986; Masulis and Korwar 1986; Eckbo and 
Masulis 1992). However, the market reaction to private placements is likely to be 
positive (Wruck 1989). One explanation to this positive reaction is that since new shares 
are issued to a small number of investors in private placements, they are likely to 
introduce more block shareholders, which could be good for firms’ corporate 
governance (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Grossman and Hart 1980). Existing literature 
only focuses on the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. We, on the 
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other hand, want to extend analysis to the impact of private placements on the agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in China. The 
monitoring effect over controlling shareholders from other block shareholders is 
regarded as the question of shareholder contestability (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi 
1997; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2000). In China, since the establishment of the stock 
market, the ownership level of controlling shareholders (who is likely to be the state-
owned enterprise) has always been quite large compared to the other block shareholders. 
Hence, low shareholder contestability has always been an impediment to better 
corporate governance for Chinese firms. Bo, Sun, and Wang (2011) investigate the 
impact of the split-share reform (which means the reform to transfer non-tradable shares 
into tradable shares) on shareholder contestability of Chinese firms. During the reform 
non-tradable shareholders gave shares to tradable shareholders to compensate for their 
loss of privilege of being tradable before the reform. As a result, ownership by non-
tradable shareholders was reduced, and as a consequence, shareholder contestability 
increased. The results show that firms’ value increases due to the increased shareholder 
contestability. Private placements in China have a significant impact on firms’ 
shareholder contestability because more block shareholders are introduced into firms. 
For example, in our sample of 209 private placements from 2006 to 2009, the 
ownership of the largest shareholder as a percentage of the total ownership by the 10 
largest shareholders decreased from 66.4% to 55.7%.This figure measures the lack of 
shareholder contestability. Hence, private placements in China provide us with a unique 
opportunity to contribute to not only standard literature from a perspective of the 
relationship between private placements and shareholder contestability, but also to 
Chinese literature on the evidence of the agency conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. The relationship between the market reaction to 
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private placement announcements and shareholder contestability will be examined 
through empirical means.  
 
1.3 A summary of findings of the thesis 
To summarise our main findings in short, Chinese SEO behaviour is similar to that in a 
mature market, and the severe agency conflict between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders as a result of Chinese institutional environment also plays a role 
in Chinese SEO behaviour. We will illustrate our main findings from the following 
three aspects: the results on SEO motivations, the agency conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders, and short-term and long-term SEO 
performance. 
 
In summary, with regards to the motivations behind Chinese SEOs, we find evidence 
supporting all four mainstream theories. (1) Regarding the trade-off theory, we show 
that firms are more likely to conduct SEOs in the years where their leverage is higher 
compared to the estimated optimal leverage level. This supports the trade-off theory, 
which predicts that firms could use SEOs to adjust (reduce) their leverage. However, the 
theory is weakened by evidence that the size of SEOs or general corporate use from 
proceeds does not have an impact on the leverage of firms after SEOs. (2) Regarding the 
information asymmetry theory, firms are more likely to conduct SEOs in the years 
where their pre-issue stock returns are higher than that in other years. This is support for 
the information asymmetry theory, which predicts that firms are more likely to conduct 
SEOs in a window of opportunity where there is a low information asymmetry cost. 
Furthermore, the amount of increase in cash after SEOs is significantly positively 
related to the amount of general corporate use. In other words, cash creation is one 
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purpose of general corporate use. We believe this supports the information asymmetry 
theory or the market timing motivation that predicts when the cost of information 
asymmetry is low, firms will raise extra money and keep it as cash. (3) Regarding 
financing under growth theory, we show that firms are more likely to conduct SEOs 
when their revenue growth is strong. This supports the theory of financing under growth, 
which predicts that firms prefer equity financing to debt financing when they experience 
growth. Furthermore, we show that the size of SEOs or general corporate use from 
proceeds has a significant positive impact on firms’ post-issue investment. (4) 
Regarding the agency conflict (between managers and shareholders), we show that 
higher ownership concentration (measured in different ways) will lead to lower 
probability from conducting SEOs. We are inclined to conclude that the agency conflict, 
which is affected by some corporate governance mechanisms such as ownership 
concentration, will have an impact on firms’ SEO decision. Furthermore, we show that 
the size of SEOs or general corporate use from proceeds has a significant positive 
impact on firms’ post-issue administrative expenses which is a proxy of managerial 
perquisites at the expenses of the benefit of shareholders (Bo, Huang, and Wang 2011). 
In other words, SEOs might be a cheap resource for managerial perquisites, a reflection 
of the agency conflict. In conclusion, we believe that although the Chinese stock market 
is immature and under heavy administrative intervention from regulators, firms’ SEO 
behaviour is not hugely different from that of mature markets.  
 
We also provide evidence regarding the relationship between (Chinese) SEOs and the 
agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. There is 
very weak evidence to show that general corporate use from proceeds will be used in 
related party transactions after SEOs (rights issues and public offerings). These are 
believed to help controlling shareholders to tunnel benefits exclusively to themselves. 
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We further examine this issue by putting this type of agency conflict into a context of 
private placements, because shareholder contestability will change significantly in 
private placements. We show that if shareholder contestability indeed increases during 
private placements, the market reaction will be better for firms with severe agency 
conflict represented by the absence of institutional investors within the top 3 
shareholders or measured by higher related party transactions. The positive market 
reaction reflects belief by investors that firms with greater agency conflict will gain 
more benefit from better corporate governance after SEOs, improving monitoring over 
controlling shareholders and reducing the incentive of controlling shareholders to use 
equity as a cheap resource for their “tunnelling”.  In conclusion, we believe that the 
agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders plays a role 
in Chinese SEO decisions. Investors are concerned by such an agency conflict, and will 
react positively if certain SEOs such as private placements reduce such an agency 
conflict motivated by the improvement in the corporate governance of firms. 
 
Finally, the market reaction and long-term performance of Chinese firms undergoing 
SEOs is also consistent with that of mature markets. (1) In a sample of 209 private 
placements from 2006 to 2009, there is a significant positive cumulative abnormal 
return of 3.6%, 4.8% or 5.5% during an event window of [-5,5], [-10,10], and [-20,20] 
respectively. We calculate the market reaction for 80 public offerings during the same 
period. The market reaction to public offerings is not significant for the different event 
windows. This result is consistent with literature on mature markets, which states that 
private placements have a better market reaction compared to public offerings. A 
detailed method of the market reaction calculation will be provided in Chapter 5. (2) 
Regarding long-term performance, in a sample of 677 rights issues and public offerings 
from 1998 to 2003, the average pre-issue return on assets (ROA) of issuing firms is 
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8.8% while the average ROA of a pool of non-issuing firms is 1.2%. In a three-year 
period after SEOs, the average ROA of issuing firms gradually declines to 1.8%, while 
the average ROA of non-issuing firms fluctuates in a range of 0.8% to 1.8%. In other 
words, the performance of issuing firms declines significantly after SEOs, a similar 
phenomenon to that in a mature market. A detailed method of the post-issue long-term 
performance calculation will be provided in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 2: SEO practice in China 
 
2.1 Introduction to the Chinese stock market 
This chapter aims to provide some background to the Chinese stock market and the 
SEO practice in China. The Chinese financial system is dominated by a large banking 
system which is lead by four big state-owned banks. Although the size of the Chinese 
stock market is small compared to that of the banking system, a healthy stock market 
which could efficiently allocate resources is none-the-less essential for the long-term 
economic growth of China (Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005). Our research objective is 
Seasoned Equity Offerings which are an important equity market function to help listed 
firms raise more equity. Chinese listed firms are traded in either the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), which are the main 
components of the Chinese financial market. Table 2.1 is extracted from the Shanghai 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange fact book to show the number of securities traded in 
the two stock exchanges as at the end of 2009. Both stock exchanges, which were 
founded in 1990, have 1,700 listed firms in total by the end of 2009. Moreover, by the 
end of 2010, the Chinese stock market became the world’s second largest stock market 
in terms of market capitalisation. We can also see from Table 2.1 that the Chinese 
corporate bond market is still much smaller than the Chinese stock market. Our research 
aims to provide more knowledge about Chinese SEOs, which are the main components 
of the Chinese financial market and are essential to facilitate Chinese long-term 
economy growth1.  
 
                                                 
1 Please refer to Section 6.4 and Appendix 1 for information of H shares and American Depository 
Receipts which may be relevant to this study. 
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Table 2.1 Number of securities in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 2009 
Shanghai Stock Exchange     Shenzhen Stock Exchange   
       
Stocks (No. of listed company: 
870)  
Stocks (No. of listed company: 
830) 
 A-shares 860   Main board A-shares 455 
 B-shares 54   Main board B-shares 54 
     SME 327 
     ChiNext 36 
Bonds   Bonds  
 Treasury Bonds 160   Treasury Bonds 168 
 Corporate Bonds 183   Corporate Bonds 66 
  Convertible Bonds 9    Convertible Bonds 3 
 
Data source: Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange fact book 
Table 1Table 2.1 Number of securities in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 2009 
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Most shares in the Chinese stock market are A-shares. A-shares are open to all domestic 
investors and became open to Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors2 (QFIIs) in 2006. 
Compared to A-shares, B-shares were only open to foreign investors until 2001 when 
domestic investors with a foreign currency account could also trade B-shares. 
Additionally, B-shares are priced in Chinese currency but traded in foreign currency. 
Historically, B-shares only played a transitional role for foreign investors to participate 
in the Chinese stock market. With the development in the Chinese stock market such as 
QFIIs and the entry to the WTO, to some extent, B-shares are no longer important in the 
Chinese stock market. The stock return used in this thesis is A-share stock return. There 
are two special types of shares under A-shares: state-owned shares (owned by, for 
example, government or government related organisations such as the State Assets 
Management Bureau and the Minister of Finance) and legal person shares (owned by, 
for example, state-owned enterprises, non-state-owned enterprises, and financial 
institutions). These two types of shares constitute about two-thirds of total shares in 
China, which could not be traded before 2005.  The so-called split-share reform began 
in 2005, which aimed to transform non-tradable shares into tradable shares. Over 50% 
of listed firms finished their reforms by mid-2006. Although reforms have been 
completed, it takes up to 5 years for all non-tradable shares to become tradable, because 
every 6 months only a certain quantity of non-tradable shares (which is equal to 5% of 
total shares) can actually become tradable.  There used to be different rules in relation to 
the selling of state shares and legal person shares (by auctions and private placements). 
After all non-tradable shares ultimately become tradable, the different classifications of 
A-shares to some extent are no longer important in the Chinese stock market. During 
the split-share reform, state-owned shares and legal person shares as a percentage of 
                                                 
2 The CSRC aims to select QFIIs as investors who focus on long-term investments rather than short-term 
speculations. The criteria of QFIIs include institutional investors’ size, financial strength, track record, 
and reputation.  
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total shares were reduced because the owners of non-tradable shares were required to 
give some of their shares to the holders of tradable shares to compensate for the loss of 
their shares’ privilege as being tradable. However, in most cases, the split-share reform 
did not change the ultimate owner of the firms. In other words, to this day, state-owned 
firms still dominate the Chinese stock market. However, an increasing number of non-
state firms have been listed in the stock market in recent years, whilst the number of 
state-owned firms as a percentage of the total number of listed firms is declining.  
 
What is the difference between main board, SME, and ChiNext? First of all, there is no 
SME or ChiNext in SHSE. The whole SHSE could also be considered as main board 
compared to the main board in SZSE. SME which was established in 2004 stands for 
Small and Medium Enterprise board (Zhongxiao ban in Chinese). ChiNext which was 
established in 2009 stands for China Next, and is also known as Growth Enterprise 
Market (GEM) (Chuangye ban in Chinese). Main board has the strictest listing rule (or 
IPO rule) such as size and profit of the firm. ChiNext has the least strict listing rule, and 
SME’s rule sits in the middle of main board and ChiNext. The main purpose of SME 
and ChiNext is to give the opportunities of listing to firms who cannot be qualified to 
list on the main board. Firms in SME and ChiNext are usually described as small and 
low profit firms but with high growth opportunities. The role of SME and ChiNext may 
be comparable to that of the American stock exchange and NASDAQ exchange in the 
U.S. The establishment of SME and ChiNext reflects the efforts by regulators to further 
develop the Chinese equity market to facilitate Chinese firms’ growth.  In this thesis, we 
do not restrict our SEO sample to any specific exchange or board.  
 
In the rest of this chapter, we will first briefly summarise Chinese SEO activities. Then 
we will briefly summarise Chinese IPO regulations because both IPOs and SEOs have 
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the same function of helping firms raise capital from the stock market. After presenting 
IPO regulations, we will introduce some regulations of Chinese SEOs.  
 
2.2 SEO activities in China 
The information on Chinese SEO activities was collected from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database also known as the Sinofin database. The main 
data includes: basic SEO information (announcement date, proceeds, issue volume etc.), 
firm-year financial information (profit and loss statement, balance sheet, cash flow 
statement, ownership structure etc.), and firms’ monthly/daily stock return information. 
We also hand collected some data. For example, for private placements, we required 
more detailed buyers’ information and the first board meeting date when the private 
placement decision was made. The date provided by the CCER database was used to 
look up firms’ original private placements documents from www.juchao.com, an 
official website for announcements designated by the CSRC. We hand collected data 
from these announcement documents.  
 
Table 2.2 summarises SEO activities in China during the period from 1994 to 2009. 
During this timeframe, there were 539 firms who conducted only one SEO, 257 firms 
who conducted two SEOs, 111 firms who conducted three SEOs, 23 firms who 
conducted four SEOs, and 6 firms who conducted five SEOs. In total, we have 936 
firms who conducted 1,508 SEOs during the period, while we have 1700 listed firms at 
the end of 2009. We can see from Table 2.2 that the number of SEOs reduced 
significantly in 2002 and stayed low thereafter until 2006, though SEO regulations have 
been relaxed since 1999. There are some possible explanations: (1) Due to the fixed PE  
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Table 2.2: A summary of SEO activities in China 
 Rights issues Public offerings Private placements Total SEOs 
 No. of issues 
Capital 
raised 
(bn 
RMB) 
No. of 
issues 
Capital 
raised 
(bn 
RMB) 
No. of 
issues 
Capital 
raised 
(bn 
RMB) 
No. of 
issues 
Capital 
raised 
(bn 
RMB) 
         
1994 66 6.0 - - - - 66 6.0 
1995 66 11.3 - - - - 66 11.3 
1996 51 10.0 - - - - 51 10.0 
1997 111 25.2 - - - - 111 25.2 
1998 155 40.2 7 3.0 - - 162 43.3 
1999 121 28.6 5 5.5 - - 126 34.1 
2000 182 58.4 24 22.6 - - 206 81.0 
2001 84 31.2 13 10.4 - - 97 41.6 
2002 20 5.8 31 19.3 - - 51 25.1 
2003 24 6.2 15 9.8 - - 39 16.0 
2004 21 9.9 12 16.1 - - 33 26.1 
2005 - - 3 26.4 - - 3 26.4 
2006 - - 7 11.1 42 79.0 49 90.1 
2007 7 23.4 32 99.5 136 215.4 175 338.2 
2008 8 14.3 27 52.3 106 156.8 141 223.4 
2009 13 12.2 15 32.8 104 208.7 132 253.7 
         
Total 929 283 191 309 388 660 1508 1252 
 
Data source: SEO data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database 
Table 2Table 2.2: A summary of SEO activities in China 
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ratio method for the price of the IPO shares before March 1999, firms could be 
undervalued during the IPO process and might have incentive to conduct SEOs after 
IPOs when the price adjusted to reflect firms’ value. Hence, the firms who conducted 
their IPOs after March 1999 lacked the incentive mentioned above, and the effect is 
shown by the reduced SEO activities since 2002 3 . More details will be provided 
regarding this particular IPO regulation further on in this chapter. (2) Securities firms 
began to take more responsibilities in both IPOs and SEOs since the introduction of the 
sponsor system4 in 2001. Hence, it is possible that after securities firms conducted the 
due diligence investigations, and they were lead to believe that it was no longer 
appropriate for some firms to issue more equity. Or, due to the role of securities firms, 
this may have lead to fewer firms applying for SEOs since 2002. We will provide more 
details regarding the sponsor system later on in this chapter. (3) Figure 2.1 shows that 
during the period from 2002 to 2005, the market index return is lower than during the 
period from 1994 to 2001. The reason for the low return from 2002 to 2005 could be 
ambiguous. Unlike a mature market, Chinese stock market is sometimes characterised 
as an irrational market where the whole market could fluctuate without an obvious 
reason. Some superficial reasons for the fall in the Chinese stock market since 2002 and 
later 2007 could be related to the collapse in the U.S. market following “.com” bubble 
and the financial crisis. This is probably because export is an important aspect of 
Chinese economy and U.S. is one of the main trading partners with China. More details 
regarding the factors influencing the Chinese stock market in the last 15 years require 
deeper research which goes beyond the current research. If the information asymmetry  
                                                 
3 The SEO activity in 2000 and 2001 could be still high even though the removal of fixed PE ratio rule 
began to have an impact on SEO activity since 1999. The reason is that the SEO activity in 2000 and 
2001 could be the result of the IPO firms’ activity who conducted their IPOs before 1999. Figure 2.2 
shows that the SEO activity for firms who conducted their IPOs in 1999 is significantly reduced 
compared to firms with IPOs in 1998.  
4 The sponsor system is similar to the investment banking system in a mature market. A sponsor has to 
conduct due diligence investigation upon issuing firms, and take responsibility on issuing firms’ corporate 
governance and post-issue performance. A sponsor also needs to promote issuing firms to potential 
investors.  
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Figure 2.1: Shanghai composite index movement during the period 1994 to 2009 
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Data source: monthly index return from www.yahoo.com 
Figure 1Figure 2.1: Shanghai composite index movement during the period 1994 to 2009 
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theory as mentioned in the introduction applies, firms tend to issue less equity during 
the period from 2002 to 2005. For example, the average SHCI index in 2001 was nearly 
2,000, but it stayed just over 1,000 throughout year 2005. Hence, the bear market is 
particular relevant to be the main reason of low number of SEOs in 2005 (where there 
were only 3 SEOs in 2005).  (4) As shown in Table 2.2, private placements (as the most 
popular SEO method since it was introduced to the Chinese stock market in 2006) 
contribute to the high SEO activity from 2006 to 2009.  
 
One possible reason of the popularity of private placements is that they are not subject 
to profitability requirement. We will discuss SEOs’ profitability requirement in more 
details later on in this chapter. Basically, firms who apply for rights issues or public 
offerings should achieve a certain level of pre-issue profitability. Firms who cannot 
satisfy the profitability requirement could turn to private placements to raise capital. 
There is another reason why the number of private placements remained high from 2006 
to 2009. Private placements could be used for state-owned enterprise restructuring in 
China, but rights issues or public offerings would be inappropriate to serve this purpose. 
In the following IPO regulation section, we will mention that due to the quota system in 
IPO regulation a state-owned listed firm could only be part of a state-owned industrial 
group. For example, in a private placement, a listed firm could issue new shares only to 
its parent firm. The parent firm uses its assets rather than cash to purchase the newly 
issued shares from the listed firm which is the subsidiary of the parent firm. The effect 
of this process is that the listed firm’s parent firm (and parent firm’s subsidiaries) 
becomes listed in the stock market as a consequence of private placements. In a mature 
market, this process is also sometimes known as a “reverse acquisition”. (In China, this 
particular type of reverse acquisition between listed firms and their parent firms is call 
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zhengti shangshi in Chinese.) In Chapter 5, we will show the further breakdown of 
private placements statistics.  
 
Table 2.3 Panel A shows the summary statistics of (non-financial) SEO firms based on 
their pre-issue year-end financial statement5. Their profitability is calculated by earnings 
before interest and taxes divided by total assets. Leverage is measured by total short-
term and long-term interest-bearing liabilities divided by total assets. Market-to-book 
ratio is calculated by firms’ market capitalisation6 divided by the book value of equity. 
It appears that Chinese SEO firms are high profitable and high growth firms. In Chapter 
5, there is a detailed comparison between issuing firms and non-issuing firms. 
                                                 
5 SEOs in 1994 are excluded because we do not have financial information for firms in 1993.  
6 Market capitalisation is equal to the market price multiplied by total number of shares. In other words, it 
is not adjusted for the discount of value for non-tradable shares.  
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics of SEO firms in China 1994 to 2009 
Table 3Table 2.3: Summary statistics of SEO firms in China 1994 to 2009 
Panel A: summary statistics 
Profitability is measured by earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. Leverage is measured by the total of short-term and long-term interesting-bearing liabilities 
divided by total assets. Market-to-book ratio is measured by firms’ market capitalisation divided by book value of equity. 
  
Total Assets (bn 
RMB) Profitability (%) Leverage (%) 
Market-to-book 
ratio (x) 
Reveune Growth 
(%) 
Mean 3.06 9.08% 22.48% 4.23 29.33% 
StDev 7.85 5.52% 13.86% 2.66 38.74% 
Median 1.21 8.41% 22.06% 3.59 21.17% 
 
Panel B: industry distribution 
Industry 
code Industry description 
No. of 
rights 
issues 
No. of 
public 
offerings 
No. of 
private 
placements 
Total no. of 
SEOs 
As % of 
total  SEOs 
No. of SEO 
firms 
No. of 
listed firms 
at 2009 
SEO firms 
as % of 
average 
listed firms 
A Agriculture 18 1 10 29 1.9 23 40 57.5 
B Mining 7 2 11 20 1.3 17 34 50.0 
C Manufacturing 487 126 221 834 55.3 545 985 55.3 
D Utility 41 9 13 63 4.2 37 65 56.9 
E Building 17 3 11 31 2.1 22 39 56.4 
F Transportation 25 2 23 50 3.3 33 68 48.5 
G Information Technology 37 11 16 64 4.2 45 116 38.8 
H Wholesale & Retail 121 5 14 140 9.3 79 96 82.3 
I Financials 9 5 7 21 1.4 14 31 45.2 
J Real Estate 41 13 35 89 5.9 50 79 63.3 
K Service 26 4 8 38 2.5 25 53 47.2 
L Media 9 2 2 13 0.9 10 13 76.9 
M Others 91 8 17 116 7.7 63 81 77.8 
Total   929 191 388 1508 100.0 963 1700 56.6 
 
Data source: SEO and financial data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database 
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics of Chinese listed firms’ ownership type 
Table 4Table 2.4: Summary statistics of Chinese listed firms’ ownership type 
  
SEOs All listed firms 
  State-Owned 
Non-
State-
Owned 
Missing 
data Total 
State-
owned 
as % of 
total 
State-
Owned 
Non-
State-
Owned 
Missing 
data Total 
State-
owned 
as % of 
total 
1994 - - 66 66 - - - 287 287 - 
1995 - - 66 66 - - - 311 311 - 
1996 - - 51 51 - - - 514 514 - 
1997 - - 111 111 - - - 720 720 - 
1998 11 4 147 162 - 72 8 745 825 - 
1999 108 14 4 126 85.7 768 122 33 923 83.2 
2000 181 23 2 206 87.9 869 154 37 1060 82.0 
2001 74 20 3 97 76.3 928 177 34 1139 81.5 
2002 39 11 1 51 76.5 935 235 36 1206 77.5 
2003 28 11 - 39 71.8 927 325 14 1266 73.2 
2004 30 3 - 33 90.9 938 422 2 1362 68.9 
2005 1 2 - 3 33.3 938 426 1 1365 68.7 
2006 33 16 - 49 67.3 921 493 4 1418 65.0 
2007 107 67 1 175 61.1 928 574 14 1516 61.2 
2008 88 51 2 141 62.4 961 605 10 1576 61.0 
2009 81 46 5 132 61.4 961 700 39 1700 56.5 
Total 781 268 459 1508             
 
Data source: corporate governance data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database 
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Table 2.3 Panel B shows the industry distribution of Chinese SEOs and SEO firms. We 
can see that over half of SEOs are from firms engaged in manufacturing. This is because 
over half of Chinese listed firms are manufacturing firms (based on 2009 figure). All 
industries have been active in SEO activities in term of the SEO firms as a percentage of 
total number of firms in a sector. For example, 38.8% of firms in the Information 
Technology sector have conducted at least one SEO, this represents the sector with the 
lowest SEO activity, while the wholesale and retail sector has the highest percentage 
(82.3%) of SEO firms.  
 
Table 2.4 shows the distribution of state-owned listed firms. Before an accounting 
regulation reform in 1998, firms were not required to disclose information such as the 
nature of their owners or cash flow statements. This is the reason why we do not have 
the information of firms’ ownership type before 1998. We can see from Table 2.4 that 
state-owned firms dominate the Chinese stock market. With the increasing number of 
non-state-owned firms that became listed in the stock market, the percentage of state-
owned firms reduced to 56.5% in 2009. The percentage of state-owned firms 
conducting SEOs each year is in line with the total number of state-owned firms as a 
percentage of the total number of listed firms. In other words, state-owned firms are not 
particularly more active in the SEO market.  
 
2.2 The Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) regulations in China 
Although our research objective focuses on SEO behaviour in the Chinese stock market, 
we still need to discuss the Chinese IPO process because (1) the Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Committee’s (CSRC’s) regulation regarding SEOs has evolved in a way 
similar to the IPO regulation. Reliance on the market forces within the IPO/SEO 
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process was the principle of the reform; (2) the pricing of new shares in the IPO process 
might have influenced firms’ SEO decision to avoid massive IPO underpricing prior to 
1999; (3) the quota system in the old IPO process could have created the incentive of 
“tunnelling” (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2000) which will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
 
The reform of firms’ listing process reflects the reform of the Chinese stock market as 
well as the Chinese economy. The principle of the reform was to build and improve 
market mechanisms to replace the heavily administration-oriented regulation. During 
the period from 1993 to 2004, the so-called “quota system” was implemented, but had 
different implications. During the period from 1993 to 1995, of the shares that were 
issued, the State Planning Committee allocated them to different provinces and 
industries to balance the inequality of development between different provinces and 
industries. The local government below the provincial level and its industry 
administration departments selected and recommended candidate firms for IPOs. The 
local government at the provincial level made the final decision and submitted those 
applications to the central government. The CSRC would then have the final vote on 
each IPO application. During the period from 1996 and 2000, the quota system was 
changed to restrict the total number of IPO firms rather than the total number of shares. 
During the period from 2001 to 2004, the quota of the number of IPO firms was 
allocated to different “Security Companies”. Before this period, the main role of 
security companies was just to underwrite the shares.  With the quota, security 
companies became responsible for selecting and recommending IPO firms after they 
received firms’ IPO applications. The reputation of security firms began to be linked to 
the performance of their recommended and underwritten IPO firms, because security 
companies carry out the due diligence investigation for IPO firms. From 2004 to present, 
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a “sponsor system” has been implemented whilst quota allocation has ceased. The 
sponsor not only has to underwrite and conduct the due diligence for IPO firms, but also 
responsible for helping IPO firms improve their corporate governance. Sponsors have to 
take on the responsibility for firms’ post-IPO performance, because this performance 
influences sponsors’ reputation, which is essential to compete for future IPO deals. 
Since the reform in 2004, sponsors and security firms have become more functionalised 
as investment banks within the mature market.  
 
The implication of these IPO regulations on SEO practice could be numerous. For 
example, before 1995, since the number of new shares was restricted, the size of firms 
going public was also restricted. Hence, it was only possible for a small proportion of a 
state-owned enterprise/industrial group to become listed. It was possible that only 
relatively profitable firms within an industrial group would be able to successfully 
compete for the limited number of IPO quotas. Hence, after firms’ IPOs, the parent firm 
of a listed firm might have a strong incentive to redistribute resources from the better 
performing listed firm to help its other underperforming divisions (Aharony, Lee, and 
Wong 2000). Another impact of this partial listing is that these listed firms could later 
use private placements (after it became available in 2006) to complete the listing of their 
parent firms and parent firms’ subsidiaries (Zhengti shangshi in Chinese). 
 
Regarding the pricing of new shares in IPOs, during the period from 1991 to 1995, the 
CSRC determined all price based on certain formulae. During the period from 1996 to 
1999, the price was set to make Price Earnings ratio (PE ratio) (price divided by 
earnings per share) between 12 and 14. From March 1999 to June 2001, the PE ratio 
requirement was abandoned. The price was based on a series of bidding by institutional 
investors. However, the problem was that the PE ratio based on the IPO price in the 
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primary market was too high, for example, as high as 88 for a utility firm 
(MinDongDianLi case). Hence, from 2001 to 2004, the maximum PE ratio was set to 20 
by the CSRC, and the price was determined by bidding. In December 2004, the PE ratio 
ceiling was removed again, and the price was determined by road play and bidding. The 
fixed PE ratio before March 1999 might have made many IPO firms’ shares heavily 
underpriced during the IPO process. Therefore, we believe that due to the fixed PE ratio 
before March 1999, firms who conducted before this time might have had the incentive 
to raise limited funds during the IPO process to avoid the heavy IPO underpricing, and 
to raise funds through SEOs in the following years after the market price was adjusted 
to reflect the value of firms (Welch 1996). Figure 2.2 summarises the number of firms 
who conducted their SEOs in the following 4 years since their IPOs. For example, the 
tallest bar (in purple) can be interpreted as: 48.1% of all firms who conducted IPOs in 
1998 conducted SEOs in 2000 (2 years after IPOs). The figure shows that SEO activity 
was more frequent in the years following IPOs for the firms who conducted these 
between 1994 and 1999, as compared to the firms who conducted their IPOs after that 
period. The fixed PE ratio could be one of the possible explanations.  
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Figure 2.2: the analysis of the number of firms who conducted SEOs in the 
following 4 years since their IPOs 
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Data source: SEO and IPO data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database 
Figure 2Figure 2.2: the analysis of the number of firms who conducted SEOs in the following 4 
years  
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2.3 SEO regulations in China  
There are similarities and differences between the SEO regulation reform and IPO 
regulation reform. The similarity is that security companies started to play an important 
role in the due diligence investigation for SEOs since 2001, and the sponsor system 
became a compulsory procedure of SEOs since February 2004. The difference is that 
there is no quota system for SEOs, but a strict and continuously changing profitability 
SEO requirement instead. The CSRC intends to protect minority shareholders by trying 
to ensure that the new shares, which flow to the stock market through SEOs, come from 
firms with profit generating potential and good corporate governance. However, before 
security companies began to play a role, the CSRC was not capable of investigating 
each of the applications in great detail. Hence, the CSRC imposed the profitability 
requirement as one of the most important requirements, trying to restrict firms with 
inferior performance to raise more money from (minority) shareholders.  
 
Table 2.5 summarises the profitability requirements for SEOs in China from 1992 to 
2009. We first take the rights issue regulation as an example, and then go onto discuss 
public offering regulations. It can be seen in Table 2.5 that the requirement of 
profitability was 10% of the previous 3 years’ average return on equity (ROE) since 
1994. Until March 1999, the strictness of regulation for rights issues had been 
increasing. Since then, there has been a decrease in the strictness, which corresponds to 
the implementation of more market driven mechanisms such as the sponsor system. The 
total number of new shares was restricted to 30% of the total number of pre-issue shares 
throughout this time. Since 2006 new regulation has made it compulsory for controlling 
shareholders to disclose their subscription information before rights issues (, public 
offerings, and private placements). If the final subscription rate (by the total of non-
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tradable shareholders and tradable shareholders) is lower than 70% then the whole 
rights issue would be cancelled. The new SEO regulation gives minority shareholders 
more power in determining the rights issue decision.  
 
The CSRC has been much more prudent towards the regulation of public offerings. 
Public offerings were very rare before 1998. From 1998 to 2000, the CSRC began to 
introduce public offerings to the stock market, but only firms who needed funds to 
reconstruct firms’ assets were able to issue equity through public offerings. During the 
period from May 2000 to June 2001, two additional categories of firms were allowed to 
conduct public offerings. These included (1) firms with independent intellectual 
property rights over their research and development of core products as well as having 
the ability to outperform and outgrow other firms within the industry, (2) firms who 
issued B shares or shares in a foreign market. Other general requirements associated 
with public offerings included (1) firms which were profitable in the previous three 
years; (2) the total number of new shares which constituted to less than 25% of existing 
shares, or less than 15% of existing shares if the total number of existing shares 
exceeded 400 million. Since March 2001, public offerings were formally introduced to 
the stock market. The profitability requirement for public offerings was always higher 
than (or equal to) that for rights issues. During the period from 2002 to 2006, when the 
total number of new shares exceeded 20% of existing shares, the public offering 
decision had to be approved by over half of the non-tradable shareholders who attended 
the shareholders’ meeting for the decision. This regulation was the first to give minority 
shareholders an equal opportunity to determine the SEO decision as controlling 
shareholders. However, what caused the CSRC to be more prudent when dealing with 
public offerings? We think it may be due to two possible reasons: rights issues without  
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Table 2.5: Summary of the profitability requirement for SEOs in China from 1992 
to 2009 
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 Present
ROE over 10% in each of the last 
3 yrs
3 yrs average ROE over 10%, over 
6%  in each of the last 3 yrs
3 yrs average ROE over 10%, 
profitable in each of last 3 yrs
3 yrs average ROE (lower of net 
income excluding/not 
extraordinary items) over 6%
Increase in profit for last two years 
16/06/04 
~ 
27/09/04
Profitable for last three years 
(lower of net income excluding/not 
extraordinary items)
Profitable  for last two years
A stable profitability record
No. of new shares less than 30% 
of existing shares Applies
Approvel by over 2/3 SHs' voting 
rights who attended the meeting
A failure issues - if the subsription 
less than 70%
3 yr average ROE over 10%, and 
last yr ROE over 10% (lower of net 
income excluding/not 
extraordinary items) 
3 yrs average ROE (lower of net 
income excluding/not 
extraordinary items) over 6%
The capital raised cannot exceed 
the last year's total equity
Approvel by over 1/2 tradeable 
SHs who attended the meeting if 
new shares are over 20% of 
existing shares
Approvel by over 2/3 SHs' voting 
rights who attended the meeting
Issue price no less than last 20 
trading days' arg or last trading 
day's arg
Rights 
Issues
08/05/06 ~ 
present
Transition 
period
08/05/06 ~ 
present
08/05/06 ~ 
present
15/03/01 ~ 07/05/06
19/02/92 
~ 
16/12/93
08/05/06 ~ 
present
24/01/96 ~ 
16/03/99
08/05/06 ~ 
present
08/05/06 ~ 
present
24/07/02 ~ 07/05/06
17/03/99 ~ 
14/03/01
29/09/94 ~ 
23/01/96
Le
ss
 s
tri
ct
  <
---
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t -
---
> 
 s
tri
ct
er
17/12/93 ~ 
15/06/04
Public 
Offerings
24/07/02 ~ 07/05/06
Public Offerings were very rare.
24/07/02 ~ 07/05/06
15/03/01 
~ 
23/07/02
Applies
No more than 30% unless 
controlling SH subscribes 
all allocated shares
 
SH stands for shareholders 
ROE stands for return on equity 
Data source: regulation release from www.juchao.com 
Table 5Table 2.5: Summary of the profitability requirement for SEOs in China from 1992 to 2009 
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warrants and issue volume difference between rights issues and public offerings. The 
next two paragraphs will concentrate in detail on these two reasons.  
 
The direct consequence of rights issues without warrants7 is that for investors without 
funds to subscribe to the allocated shares, the best strategy would be to sell shares rather 
than to continue holding them. Otherwise their wealth would be diluted because other 
investors are able to buy shares at a (usually heavily) discounted issue price. The impact 
of this imperfection on non-tradable shareholders (before 2005 when the reform of non-
tradable shares began) is significant. If non-tradable shareholders do not have funds, 
they can do nothing but suffer from the dilution, because their shares are non-tradable. 
On the other hand, even if they have funds to subscribe to the allocated shares, they 
would lose wealth regardless. This is due to illiquidity. The price of non-tradable shares 
is discounted when they are sold through a public auction or a private placement (about 
75% to 85% discount according to Chen and Xiong 2002). During a SEO, they have to 
pay the full price for the shares that are only worth part of their cash payments8. Hence, 
non-tradable shareholders’ wealth would be diluted during a rights issue. The discount 
for new shares in a public offering is low due to its nature of offering to the public. This 
is because if the issue price is much lower than the market price, existing shareholders 
will sell their shares and buy the cheaper new shares later. This process will continue 
until the equilibrium is restored at which issue price is close to the market price. Hence, 
non-tradable shareholders suffer much less dilution in a public offering than in a rights 
                                                 
7 In 1992, the Chinese equity market began to issue warrants, mainly call warrants. This warrant could be 
used in a rights issue to prevent investors from dilution. However, the Chinese investors at that time were 
not sophisticated enough to understand warrants and their value. Warrant prices collapsed. Hence, the 
CSRC stopped all warrant issue in the case of rights issue since June 1996. 
8 A special warrant was issued to prevent state-owned shares as non-tradable shareholders from dilution. 
The rights issue attached with this special warrant (which will be sold to the public rather than the 
original state-owned shareholders) is called trans-rights issue. Its special feature is that although the 
allocated shares of state-owned shares are sold to the public, the shares bought through the special 
warrants remain non-tradable since the original shares are non-tradable. The trans-rights issues started 
from May 1994, and were stopped in 1998. The total volume (3 bn shares) of these rights issue shares 
remain small relative to the total equity issue. The implication of this trans-rights issue is that non-
tradable shareholders could avoid the dilution to some extent in this case.  
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issue. Therefore, non-tradable shareholders should have incentive to use public 
offerings rather than rights issues to raise new funds. The impact of rights issues 
without warrants may be linked to the phenomenon mentioned above: why the CSRC 
has been prudent with regards to public offerings. The CSRC tries to avoid equity raised 
through SEOs becoming a cheap and undisciplined resource as the result of the two 
types of agency conflict. Being prudent over public offerings implies that if firms with a 
high proportion of non-tradable shares need more funds but they are not qualified for 
public offerings, which have stricter issuing criteria than rights issues, they should turn 
to rights issues. However, non-tradable shareholders could suffer wealth dilution in a 
rights issue. Being prudent over public offerings should help the CSRC achieve its goal 
of protecting minority shareholders by turning firms to rights issues and forcing those 
who want to conduct rights issues to be more precautious about the financing decision: 
whether the financing decision creates enough value for non-tradable shareholders to at 
least offset the wealth dilution during a rights issue or whether SEOs are used by 
managers for their own benefit. 
 
We mentioned that non-tradable shareholders might prefer public offerings to avoid the 
dilution of their wealth. In this paragraph, we believe that the issue volume difference 
between rights issues and public offerings might make firms with a larger funding 
demand choose public offerings. Before public offerings were officially introduced in 
2001, rights issue was the only SEO method available9. During 2001 and 2005 as shown 
in Table 2.2, when both methods were available, 33% of SEOs were conducted by 
public offerings, which constituted 61% of the total amount of funds raised. The lower 
number of public offerings could have been due to regulatory difference where public 
offerings suffered stricter profitability requirements than right issue. In other words, 
                                                 
9 Between 1998 and 2001, certain types of firms were also allowed to conduct public offerings as 
mentioned above. 
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firms had to choose rights issues if their profitability could not satisfy public offerings’ 
requirements. The higher amount of funds raised by public offerings might have been to 
result of two factors. (1) Public offerings’ issue price was higher than that of rights 
issues10. Low issue price in rights issues reduced the probability of issue failure (Eckbo 
and Masulis 1995). Additionally, in rights issues, lower than market price issue price 
should not affect shareholders’ wealth because new shares with low price were allocated 
on a pro rata basis. For public offerings, lower than market price issue price should 
dilute existing shareholders’ wealth. Hence, public offerings’ issue price ought to be set 
close to the market price. Otherwise, shareholders would sell their shares after the 
public offerings’ announcement and would at a later date expect to buy back the same 
share in public offerings at a cheaper price. This process would continue until the 
equilibrium is restored. Like many other countries, Chinese SEO regulation sets a lower 
issue price boundary for public offerings which is no less than the previous 20 trading 
days’ average or previous trading day’s average prior to ex-right date in China. (2) The 
new shares in public offerings would be issued to the public, while the new shares in 
rights issues would only be issued to the existing shareholders. Non-tradable shares 
constitute a large part of Chinese listed firms’ total shares (before 2005). When these 
non-tradable shareholders were allocated with these new shares, they did not necessarily 
have enough funds to subscribe to all shares11. Additionally, according to Chinese rights 
issues’ regulation, the newly issued shares could not be higher than 30% of the existing 
number of shares, while the restriction for public offerings just stipulates that new 
capital could not exceed current capital. Hence, the actual number of newly issued 
shares would be low for rights issues. Plus the lower issue price of rights issues would 
mean that fund limit raised via rights issues would be much lower than that via public 
                                                 
10 To give a rough idea regarding Chinese rights issues’ issue price, according to 894 rights issues from 
1994 to 2004, the average issue price was 61% of the previous month-end price prior to ex-right date.  
11 To give a rough idea regarding non-tradable shareholders’ subscription in rights issues, according to 
894 rights issues from 1994 to 2004, non-tradable shareholders’ average subscription was on average 
25.8% of total allocated shares.  
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offerings. In other words, firms with larger funding demand would need to choose 
public offerings as the issuing method.  
 
 
We have described the SEO profitability requirement presented in Table 2.2. The 
question remaining is whether the profitability requirement is sufficient and effective to 
distinguish low performance firms from higher performing firms. Firms could respond 
to the profitability requirement by earnings management to achieve the requirement (Yu, 
Du, and Sun 2006). To help the listed state-controlled firms owned by local 
governments to raise more funds through SEOs, local governments might want to 
facilitate firms’ earnings management by fiscal transfer and tax rebate to enhance firms’ 
performance (Chen, Lee, and Li 2003). The earnings management facilitated by local 
governments or other enterprises as controlling shareholders might induce “tunnelling” 
(Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2000) of some benefits back to 
controlling shareholders after SEOs.  However, earnings management remains only a 
temporary solution. The error in estimating accrual, provisions, and other liability 
should be reversed following the earnings management before SEOs. Even worse, if 
more earnings managements were conducted before previous ones were reversed, the 
cumulated misrepresentation would become serious accounting fraud. In the case of 
SEOs in China, for example, the profitability requirement during the period from 1996 
to 1999 was the strictest throughout the period: firms’ return on equity had to be higher 
than 10% in each of the three years prior to the SEO applications. If a firm could only 
produce ROE at 8% each year, it had to “manage” its earnings, increasing 25% for three 
consecutive years. This kind of earnings management was difficult to achieve without 
external help or accounting fraud. Dang and Yang (2007) investigate 232 rights issues 
and 75 public offerings from 2000 to 2004. They find that firms who use the issuing 
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method (rights issues or public offerings) with a stricter profitability requirement suffer 
less in the market reaction during the announcement period, and they also experience a 
higher buy-and-hold abnormal long-term return in the following two years than firms 
who use the issuing method with a less strict profitability requirement. Such findings 
suggest that the profitability requirement might be a suitable alternative mechanism to 
certify firms’ quality. Chen and Wang (2007) document similar result of which the 
market reacts positively to new SEO accounting regulation. 
 
Some other SEO regulations which apply to firms who want to conduct rights issues or 
public offerings are also worth mentioning: (1) firms or firms’ senior managers cannot 
have any accounting fraud, tax invasion, inside trading, corruption, or other illegal 
activities for a three-year period prior to the SEO application; (2) in the 12 month period 
prior to the SEO application, there cannot be any case that controlling shareholders or 
related parties take control over any listed firms’ cash or asset, or make an illegal loan 
guarantee through the candidate SEOs firms; (3) in the 12 month period prior to the 
SEO application, there cannot be any case of controlling shareholders or related parties 
not fulfilling their promises (of any kind) to minority shareholders; (4) the proposed use 
of the capital raised through the last SEOs cannot be changed unless there is a plausible 
explanation; (5) the realised return rate for the last equity financed project cannot be 
significant lower than the proposed rate of return unless there is a plausible explanation; 
(6) since 2001, one of the new requirements for the SEO application is that firms have 
to conduct at least one dividend payment for a three-year period prior to SEO 
applications. Since 2006, the requirement changed to that candidate firms have to pay at 
least 20% of its prior three years’ total profit as dividends in a three-year period prior to 
the SEO application. It can be seen that all these regulations or requirements aim to 
protect minority shareholders from dishonest controlling shareholders, or force 
51 
 
controlling shareholders to pay more attention to monitor managers and prevent them 
from being dishonest to shareholders and consequently undermining the firms’ 
reputation. These regulations could also be used to control the agency conflict in the 
process of SEOs as mentioned in the introduction: the agency conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders.12 
                                                 
12 Please refer to Appendix 2 as a summary of major Chinese stock market regulation changes mentioned 
in this Chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Why do Chinese firms conduct SEOs13 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the introduction of the thesis, we believe that it is worthwhile to 
explicitly examine firms’ SEO motivations to provide investors and regulators with 
useful knowledge on SEOs. We also mentioned that: (1) The Chinese stock market is 
not mature and experiencing transition, including the Chinese economy as a whole. For 
example, minority shareholder protection is generally weak in China. (2) Chinese SEOs 
are often under some administrative intervention such as the profitability requirement of 
SEO applications, issue volume and issue method restrictions. Hence, we may be unable 
to apply research results based on mature markets directly onto the Chinese market. 
There is a lack of literature, which explicitly focuses on the motivations of Chinese 
SEOs. The limited research that exists on Chinese SEO motivations focuses on the 
agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. In China, SEOs are 
believed to provide resources or cash for a wealth transfer or so called “tunnelling” to 
controlling shareholders (Aharony, Lee, and Wong 2000; Chen, Lee, and Li 2003). We 
think that the focus should be extended to the other three theories as mentioned in the 
introduction chapter, which has been overlooked in previous research. Hence, we want 
to contribute to the literature by discussing the application of the four main motivations 
of SEOs in China. A comprehensive discussion is essential to provide investors or 
regulators with useful knowledge. For example, investors should pay attention to SEOs, 
because SEOs could affect firms’ value in many ways. SEOs could help firms to finance 
good investment opportunities and help them grow. SEOs could also add value to 
shareholders by way of improving firms’ capital structure to an ‘optimal’ level in order 
                                                 
13 This chapter is co-authored with Dr. Hong Bo.  
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to balance the benefits of the tax shield and the costs of financial distress. SEOs might 
also impair shareholder’s wealth if the newly raised funds as a cheap resource are used 
by entrenched managers for their own benefits at the expenses of shareholders due to 
the agency conflict between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Jensen 1986). Hence, it is important for investors to understand the impact of SEOs on 
themselves. For regulators, a better understanding of Chinese SEOs will help them 
enhance the protection of minority shareholders and investors.  
 
In this chapter, we aim to discuss and test the motivation of conducting Seasoned Equity 
Offerings (SEOs) by Chinese listed firms. In the introduction chapter, we identified four 
main theories concerned with SEO motivations in a mature market: (1) the trade-off 
theory suggests that a firm adjusts its capital structure to an ‘optimal’ level to balance 
the benefits of tax shield and the costs of financial distress (Modigliani and Miller 1958 
and 1963); (2) the information asymmetry theory suggests that a firm issues equity 
when the cost of issuing equity due to information asymmetry is low (Myers 1984; 
Myers and Majluf 1984); (3) the agency theory suggests that the equity issue decision is 
affected by the agency conflict between managers and shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986); We will also discuss the impact of another aspect of the 
agency conflict on the equity issue decision: the conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer 2000); (4) due to the agency conflict between shareholders and debtholders, a 
firm with growth potential prefers equity financing  (Myers 1977; Smith 1970), or, more 
generally, since growth is associated with great uncertainty, it is to avoid potential 
future financial distress. 
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In this Chapter, our empirical models compare firms’ non-issuing years’ characteristics 
with issuing years’ characteristics, and compare non-issuing firms who have never 
conducted SEOs between 1994 and 2006 with firms who have at least once during the 
sample period. Our empirical design is similar to the binominal model used by 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) and Jung, Kim, Stulz (1996). The main 
empirical finding of this is that all four main theories explaining SEOs are applicable to 
Chinese SEOs. However, we cannot distinguish between the two types of agency theory. 
Such a differentiation needs further research in the future. More specifically, we find 
that (1) firms are more likely to conduct SEOs when their leverage is higher than the 
estimated optimal leverage. (2) Firms are more likely to conduct SEOs when their pre-
issue share returns are high. (3) Firms are more likely to conduct SEOs when their 
growth is high. (4) Higher ownership concentration or higher managerial ownership will 
reduce the likelihood of SEOs. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: in Section 2, we review literature in the context of 
a mature market; Section 3 discusses the impact of Chinese stock market features on 
SEO decisions; the hypotheses and measurement of variables are summarised in Section 
4; Section 5 presents our data, and Section 6 presents the empirical models used in this 
paper; the results will be discussed in Section 7; Section 8 summarises. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
Four theories of the motivation behind conducting Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) 
will be discussed in this section: the trade-off theory, the information asymmetry theory, 
the agency theory, and the financing under growth theory. 
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3.2.1 The trade-off theory 
The trade-off theory suggests that the firm could use equity issue to adjust its capital 
structure in order to achieve an ‘optimal’ level of leverage to balance the benefits of tax 
shield and the costs of financial distress (Modigliani and Miller 1958 and 1963; 
Brennan and Schwartz 1978; Miller 1977; DeAngelo and Masulis 1980). Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) provide a review of the empirical evidence regarding the trade-off 
theory. Although the trade-off theory is often studied in capital structure studies, some 
authors provide evidence that the trade-off theory also motivates firms’ SEO decisions 
(Marsh 1982; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001). Within the context of SEOs, 
Marsh (1982) uses the logit regression technique to study selected 748 equity/debt 
issues in UK between 1959 and 1970. An equity issue is defined as one and a debt issue 
is defined as zero. It is found that firms with higher than target leverage ratios are more 
likely to issue equity. The estimation of target leverage ratio in the regression includes 
the firm’s ten-year moving average of the leverage ratio and the residuals from a 
prediction model. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) use a similar logit regression 
to analyse 39,387 firm-year observations in the U.S. between 1979 and 1997. They find 
similar results to March (1982)’s findings. They define an equity (debt) issue as an over 
5% increase in the book value of equity (debt). The estimation of target leverage ratio in 
the regression includes the industry average leverage ratio and the residuals from a 
prediction model. 
 
3.2.2 The information asymmetry theory 
In the Akerlof (1970) framework, the buyers of the second hand car tend to pay 
somewhere between the value of good cars (“cherries”) and bad cars (“lemons”), 
because they do not know the (true) value of the car. In the financial market, investors 
tend to pay less for the shares than their true value claimed by the firm since there is 
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information asymmetry between investors and the issuer. Hence, Myers (1984) and 
Myers and Majluf (1984) propose a “Pecking Order Theory” which states that the order 
of the firm’s financing choice should be firstly self-financed (internal cash flow or 
retained earnings), risk-free debt, risky debt, and, as a last resort, equity. The reason is 
that equity suffers the most severe information asymmetry problem or the highest cost 
of information asymmetry. In some literature, the phrase “market timing” is used to 
describe the behaviour when firms issue new equity when the cost of information 
asymmetry is low.  
 
Within the context of SEOs, in brief, the cost of information asymmetry ( IAC ) in an 
equity financing case could be largely measured by the true value of the firm (or its true 
value per share) trueV minus its market capitalization (or its share price)  marketV which is 
the value investors would like to pay for the firm. Hence,  IAC = markettrue VV  . The 
information asymmetry theory is supported by four streams of empirical study: (1) In 
the study of the stock market reaction to the SEO announcement, Asquith and Mullins 
(1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986), and Eckbo and Masulis (1992) use the pre-issue 
stock return as the proxy of the information asymmetry theory, because they believe that 
IAC  is low when the pre-issue stock return is high. The significant negative market 
reaction to the SEO announcement provides evidence supporting the signalling effect 
due to information asymmetry. In addition, Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) and De Jong, 
and Veld (2001) find that pre-issue stock return is higher before SEOs compared to that 
before debt issues. All five studies confirm the positive relationship between pre-issue 
stock return and the likelihood of the SEO decision. (2) In the study on the impact of 
business cycle (Hot/Cold market), Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) and Choe, Masulis, 
and Nanda (1993) find more equity issues compared with debt issues in the 
expansionary phases than that in the contractionary phases of the business cycle. They 
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conclude that the difference in SEO activities results from the difference in IAC during 
the different periods, because the expansionary period is associated more with 
investment and growth opportunities which lead to a less adverse selection situation. (3) 
Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), and Hertzel, 
Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002) provide evidence supporting the decline in long-term 
operating and stock performance following SEOs. Two of the possible explanations for 
this phenomenon include: (a) investors and analysts are systemically over-optimistic 
about the issue firms’ future prospect before SEOs, and issuers take this window of 
opportunity to issue equity (evidence for this explanation: Jegadeesh 2000; evidence 
against this explanation: Brous, Datar, and Kini 2001); (b) issuers manage their earnings 
before SEOs to enhance the share price (Rangan 1998; Shivakumar 2000; Teoh, Welch, 
and Wong 1998). The explanations of the overoptimistic investors and the earnings 
management by issuers are motivated by the information asymmetry theory.   (4) In the 
study of the time-varying information asymmetry, Dierkens (1991), Korajczyk, Lucas, 
and McDonald (1991, 1992), and Guo and Mech (2000) argue that the information 
asymmetry between outside investors and business insiders (managers)  continually 
accumulates before a sharp decrease associated with any firms’ major announcement, 
such as financial results, dividend policy, or the plan of new projects. Hence, they 
predict that SEOs should happen immediately after any firms’ major announcements 
rather than before. They find evidence supporting the information asymmetry theory. 
Finally, in the survey study of 392 CFOs, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that one out 
of two of the most important factors in the SEO decision is the pre-issue stock 
appreciation.  
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3.2.3 The agency theory  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the choice of equity or debt in a decision to 
raise new capital depends on the agency costs of equity and debt at that time. Managers 
in the agency theory models tend to over-invest after all profitable projects have been 
undertaken to build their own empires. There is an agency conflict between managers 
and shareholders. Hence, Jensen (1986) suggests that managers tend to avoid debt so as 
to avoid the discipline of debt. For the shareholders’ benefit, debt financing is the most 
efficient way to take “Free Cash Flow” from managers’ hands to prevent over-
investment. Debt financing increases firms’ value simply by forcing managers to pay 
more attention to their investment decisions. Empirically, Walker and Yost (2008) find 
that regardless of the proposed use of funds (before SEOs), firms change the use of 
funds to capital expenditure, research and development expenditure. The level of long-
term debt also increases after SEOs even though the proposed use of funds is debt pre-
payment. The authors conclude that the change in the use of proceeds in SEOs might 
reflect the motivation of the agency theory where managers tend to over-invest to 
expand the business quickly.  
 
Another agency conflict, the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders, has been suggested as a motivation behind SEOs in China. Within the 
context of SEOs, there does not seem to be any theoretical or empirical work on mature 
markets that suggests this is a kind of agency conflict has any standing. The agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders means that 
controlling shareholders tend to expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth by 
transferring the wealth exclusively to themselves. Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2000) define “Tunnelling” as “the transfer of resources out of a company 
to its controlling shareholder”. This tunnelling can be achieved through a variety of 
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methods, such as the expropriation of corporate opportunities, transfer pricing issue, 
using a low price for deprived assets, and loan guarantees. Huang’s (2007) dissertation 
provides a good review on the effect of expropriation by large shareholders.  
 
3.2.4 The theory of financing decision under growth 
A firm facing growth opportunities prefers equity financing. The argument was initially 
explained by the increased agency costs of equity issue due to debtholder-shareholder 
conflict during the growth period (theoretical work: Myers 1977; Smith 1970; Myers 
and Smith 1987; empirical work: Smith and Watt 1992; Gaver and Gaver 1993). Myers 
(1977) suggests an underinvestment problem, which under the condition that the debt of 
the firm is risky, the firm might want to give up positive net present value (NPV) 
projects (needing external financing). This is due to the agency cost between 
shareholders and debtholders. If the new project is financed with debt, it is actually the 
shareholders who bear nearly all the cost involved when the project fails because 
debtholders have senior claim over the entire firm’s value. On the other hand, the value 
of debt will increase if the project succeeds since the debt becomes less risky. To 
prevent the wealth transfer from shareholders to debtholders, relinquishing of positive 
NPV investment, or using equity financing could be options to consider. However, the 
value of the firm will also decrease because of high agency cost reflected by giving up 
on a profitable investment. Hence, the new project should be financed by equity. The 
problem is particularly serious when the firm is under growth which means the firm 
needs more external financing for investment.  
 
The argument has been largely extended to the more general case of growth. The 
uncertainty is associated with the growth. The uncertainty (of firms’ future earnings) 
could also be interpreted as the future risk of earnings. If a firm’s earning is very 
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unstable, the firm tends to use equity finance since the firm suffers high cost of financial 
distress, which is induced by a greater chance of default on the annual payment imposed 
by the debt (the trade-off theory). Hence, the prediction is that growth firms will have a 
greater likelihood of issuing equity. Empirically, within the context of SEOs, Pilotte 
(1992) and Denis (1994) provide empirical evidence supporting the positive relationship 
between investment opportunities and the market reaction to SEOs by using a variety 
(ten) of proxies for investment opportunities. Harjoto and Garen (2003) find the firm’s 
unanticipated growth (within four years after IPO), measured by the firm’s stock return 
drift and annual net income growth, increases the firm’s likelihood of conducting SEOs 
and increases the relative size of a SEO.  
 
3.3 Literature on Chinese SEOs 
As mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, the features of the Chinese stock market 
include a large portion of state-owned shares, heavy administrative regulations, and 
weak minority shareholder protection. In this sub-section, we will discuss whether and 
in what way these Chinese features affect SEO motivations.  
 
3.3.1 The trade-off theory and the stock Chinese market 
There are some literatures suggesting that the trade-off theory applies to the Chinese 
stock market14. For example, Huang and Song (2006) find that a firm facing a 33% 
corporate tax rate has 1.6% more debt than a firm facing a 15% corporate tax rate, 
ceteris paribus. In other words, the evidence is consistent with the prediction made by 
the trade-off theory that firms will borrow more when the marginal benefit of tax shield 
                                                 
14 The capital structure studies for the Chinese listed firms include: Chen (2004), Zou and Xiao (2006), 
and Huang and Song (2006). These studies put the leverage ratio on the left hand side of the regression, 
and the independent variables are proxies for the theories explaining firms’ capital structure choice.  
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is higher than the marginal cost of financial distress. The benefit of tax shield in China 
is not very different from that in a mature market because similar to that in a mature 
market, interest expenses are tax deductible in China as well. The Chinese features 
might affect the costs of financial distresses more. The cost of financial distress might 
be expected to be relatively low in the Chinese market, compared with that in a mature 
market, especially for the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The main reason for the low 
costs of financial distresses is SOEs’ low possibility of bankruptcy due to the special 
relationship between SOEs and the commercial banks in China which are also state-
owned. For example, non-performing loans (NPLs) in state-owned banks granted to 
SOEs is a well-known phenomenon in China’s banking system to prevent SOEs from 
going bankrupt. Generally, SOEs have better access to bank loans than non-SOEs, with 
these loans becoming non-performing later on (Wei and Wang 1997). According to the 
agreement with the WTO, China’s state-owned banks should stop NPLs to SOEs by 
2000, but it is believed that SOEs continued to gain access to NPLs until 2003 (Xu and 
Lin 2007). Zou and Xiao (2006) make a similar point that for social and political 
reasons, the Chinese government (national and local) tries to prevent SOEs from going 
bankrupt. On the other hand, Chen (2004) argues that the cost of financial distresses is 
high, because (1) company law is ambiguous about debtholders’ rights, and debtholders 
are not given any control rights in liquidation; (2) bankruptcy which involves SOEs and 
state-owned banks can become inefficient, and the costs associated with this 
inefficiency could be high.  
 
3.3.2 Information asymmetry theory in the Chinese market 
First of all, there is a lack of literature regarding the information asymmetry theory or 
market timing motivation in the Chinese stock market. We hope our research can fill the 
gap in this field.  
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Figure 3.1: Chinese listed firms’ market-to-book ratio from 1994 to 2006 
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Data source: financial and share price data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database 
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In general, the market valuation in China is high. For example, the market-to-book ratio 
averaged around 3.78 from 1994 to 2006. The high valuation may motivate Chinese 
listed firms to conduct SEOs. Figure 3.1 shows the average market-to-book ratio in 
different years. Compared to the SEO activity, the period with higher valuation is also 
the period with more active SEO practice. This phenomenon is also consistent with the 
prediction made by the information asymmetry theory that firms conduct SEOs when 
the valuation is high. How do Chinese features affect the application of the information 
asymmetry theory in China? Controlling shareholders in China who are in many cases 
state-owned or state-related may not have an incentive to time the market for low 
information asymmetry cost because their shares are non-tradable (before 2005) and 
they may not be competent enough to maximise their share value. 
 
3.3.3 Agency theory in the Chinese stock market 
Generally speaking, corporate governance is poor in China. According to Bai, Liu, Lu, 
Song, and Zhang (2004), poor Chinese corporate governance can be summarised in the 
following aspects: (1) the executive compensation scheme is not well designed; (2) 
firms’ financial transparency is low, and firms’ information disclosure is inadequate; (3) 
Ownership structure contains a large proportion of non-tradable shares and state-owned 
shares which are believed to have a negative impact on corporate governance; (4) 
corporate control (or takeover) market is nearly absent in China; (5) the legal 
infrastructure and protection of minority shareholders remain weak. Within the context 
of the SEO decision, the agency conflict between managers and shareholders mentioned 
above applies. Apart from this, it is suggested that another aspect of agency conflict also 
exists in China: the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
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In this sub-section, we will elaborate more on the impact of these two types of agency 
conflict on the SEO decision.  
 
In the Chinese stock market, a large proportion of shares (over 65%) were non-tradable, 
prior to 2005. The non-tradable shareholders mainly consisted of two types of 
shareholders: state shares which were owned by the State Asset Management Bureau 
(SAMB) or local governments, and legal person shares which were owned by 
institutional investors or other firms including State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). 
However, in our discussion, the shares owned by SOEs were believed to have a similar 
impact on the agency conflicts as state shares. Hence, the state-owned shares in the 
following discussion include the shares owned by the SAMB, local governments, and 
SOEs. According to Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002), 
state-owned shares seem to be inferior to private shares in determining the firms’ 
performance in terms of productivity, profitability, and market valuation15.  
 
In a mature market, higher ownership concentration is theoretically expected to reduce 
the agency conflict between managers and shareholders through stronger monitoring. 
Empirically, while researchers can easily find the negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and agency conflict, sometimes they may also find a positive 
one (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988; McConnell and Servaes 1990). In China, high 
ownership concentration is largely the result of the high proportion of state-owned 
shares. Theoretically, high ownership concentration or a high proportion of state-owned 
shares can expect to increase the agency conflict in China, because (1) profit or loss due 
to management competency cannot be distinguished from the profit or loss influenced 
                                                 
15  In China, research on the relationship between state-owned firms and firm performance (mainly 
measured by Tobin’s Q) has provided mixed results. For instance Sun and Tong (2003) and Qi, Wu, and 
Zhang (2000) find a negative relationship; Xu and Wang (1999), no relationship; Wei, Xie, and Zhang 
(2005) a U-shaped relationship; and Sun, Tong, and Tong (2002), an inverse U-shaped relationship. 
65 
 
by policy16. Therefore there is ineffective monitoring over managers (Lin, Cai, and Li 
1998). (2) The SAMB workforce is not competent in the role as board of directors (Mi 
and Wang 2000). In addition, their salary as well as incentives are low. (3) The 
political-connected CEOs in state-controlling firms are not competent (Fan, Wong, and 
Zhang 2004). (4) Sometimes, local governments and their officials are responsible for 
the monitoring/voting rights over a firm, but all dividends go to the Ministry of Finance, 
so they do not have the incentive to monitor the firm. On the other hand, being SOEs 
may also reduce the agency conflict, because (1) highly political-connected CEOs have 
political constraints to behave in a disciplined manner on behalf of the organisation that 
appoint them. (2) Being SOEs also means that there is a high ownership concentration, 
which creates the incentive for controlling shareholders to monitor, a situation similar to 
that in a mature market. Therefore, the relationship between agency conflict and state 
ownership as well as ownership concentration is not clearly determined in China.  
 
In China, it is suggested that SEOs can be considered as “tunnelling” because SEOs 
provide the resources for future tunnelling. There are three main reasons why 
large/controlling shareholders who tend to be state-share holders in China have 
incentives to expropriate. (1) Because of the previous quota system mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the listed firm has assets, which are relatively superior within a group of 
industrial firms controlled by one parent firm. Hence, the parent firm needs to retrieve 
some benefits from its listed subsidiary to help its other subsidiary firms to operate 
(Aharony, Lee, and Wong 2000). (2) To maintain a level of profitability to meet the 
SEO profitability requirement or to avoid being delisted, the parent firm or other related 
parties might use related party transactions to improve the listed firm’s financial 
                                                 
16 An example of loss created by the policy is that the petrol price in domestic China is much lower than 
that in other countries. The state-owned petrol refinement and distribution firm, Petrol China, makes a 
loss due to the policy. On the other hand, compared to private sector, state-owned firms are likely to be 
privileged to gain contract or business from the nation. 
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situation. After the success in issuing equity or avoiding being delisted, the parent firm 
might want to retrieve the benefits back (Chen, Lee, and Li 2003). Empirically, Jian and 
Wong (2004) find that firms have more related-party transactions after rights issues. 
The more related party transactions a firm has, (a) the lower the market valuation is; (b) 
the more negative stock reaction to the related-party transaction announcement. (3) For 
state-owned shareholders, apart from selling a small amount of shares with permission 
from the SAMB, the only way to realise return is to receive dividends. In China, there is 
20% personal tax and 33% corporate tax on dividends, while there is no capital gain tax. 
Hence, minority shareholders who are likely to be tradable-share holders prefer a no 
dividend policy, while non-tradable shareholders prefer cash dividends. In this conflict 
of interest, large shareholders (non-tradable shareholders) pay dividends without 
considering minority shareholders’ preference. Cheng, Fung, and Leung (2006) show 
that the holders of non-tradable shares prefer cash dividends to no dividends. Hence, it 
is argued that paying dividends is also a way of expropriation. Both Lee and Xiao (2006) 
and Chen, Jian, and Xu (2009) find that firms increase dividend payouts after rights 
issues, arguing that non-tradable shareholders use dividends as a way to tunnel. Higher 
ownership concentration will lead to higher dividend payouts17.  
 
3.4 Hypotheses and measurement of variables 
In this section we shall summarise our hypotheses and measurement of variables used in 
this research. 
 
H1: higher leverage (compared to optimal level leverage) will increase the likelihood of 
SEOs. 
 
                                                 
17 Other studies concerning this motivation include Liu and Lu (2004) and Lin, Chiou, and Chen (2007). 
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According to the trade-off theory, the firm whose leverage ratio is higher than its 
optimal level tends to issue equity to adjust its leverage ratio. The firm whose leverage 
ratio is lower than its optimal level tends not to issue more equity, because it can borrow 
more to take advantage of the benefits of tax shield. In this Chapter, we shall proxy the 
trade-off motive by comparing the difference between the firms’ leverage and their 
estimated optimal leverage. The optimal leverage is measured by the GICS 4-digit 
industry average leverage or the residuals from a prediction model (i.e. the actual 
leverage minus predicted leverage). The leverage is measured by the total interesting-
bearing liability divided by total assets.  
 
H2: higher pre-issue stock return will increase the likelihood of SEOs. 
 
According to the information asymmetry theory, firms issue equity when the cost of 
information asymmetry is low. The high stock return will create a window of 
opportunity of the low cost of information asymmetry as discussed in the literatures 
above. In this Chapter, we shall proxy the market-timing motive by the firms’ pre-issue 
stock market returns. Pre-issue stock return (PSR) is measured by the pre-issue six 
month’s cumulative return. For non-issuing years, the measurement is the accumulative 
return of the second half year. The alternative measurement of non-issuing years’ return 
is the geometric half year return of annual return for non-issuing years.  
 
H3: if there is a significant relationship (positively or negatively) between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the SEO decision, we tend to conclude that these corporate 
governance mechanisms have an impact on the firms’ agency conflicts and the agency 
conflicts have an impact on the firms’ SEO decisions.  
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We use ownership structure (including ownership concentration and managerial holding) 
as the proxy for corporate governance mechanisms. The reason why we cannot predict 
the relationship (positively or negatively) between ownership structure and the SEO 
decision is that ownership structure can influence the agency conflict in different ways. 
For example, regarding the agency conflict between managers and shareholders, 
theoretically, (1) high ownership concentration can reduce the agency conflict by 
stronger monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Grossman and Hart 1980). (2) High 
managerial holdings can reduce the agency conflict by goal congruence (Berle and 
Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976). (3) However, when the managerial holding is 
beyond a certain point, managers tend to have more control and are less effectively 
controlled and monitored (Stulz 1988 management entrenchment). Empirically, Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) find non-linear 
relationships between ownership concentration and market valuation, and between 
managerial holding and market valuation. The relationships between managerial holding 
and firm performance also include: positive (Kim and Lyn 1988; Leech and Leachy 
1991), U-shape (Short and Keasey 1999), inverse U-shape (Chen, Hexter, and Hu 1993), 
and no relationship (Himmleberg, Hubbard, and Palia 1999). 
 
Regarding the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) find that higher concentration of 
cashflow (vote) rights can lead to higher (lower) market valuation in East Asian 
(excluding China) where the separation of control rights and cashflow rights is quite 
common. Meaning, higher dispersion between cashflow rights and voting rights lead to 
lower market valuations. On the contrary, Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2006) find that 
the abnormal returns to the announcement of related party transactions are more 
negative for higher percentage holdings by the largest shareholders in the Hong Kong 
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market. In other words, higher ownership concentration gives large shareholders greater 
tunneling ability.  
 
The measures of ownership concentration include the largest shareholder’s holding 
(LH), ten largest shareholders’ holding (TH), and the percentage of non-tradable shares 
(NTH). The measures of managerial holding include the board of directors’ holding 
(BoDH), the chairman’s holding (CH), and the CEO’s holding (CEOH).  
 
H4: firms facing growth opportunities tend to conduct SEOs. 
 
In this Chapter, the growth opportunity is measured by firms’ pre-issue revenue growth 
(RevG). 
 
In this Chapter, we also include some other factors in our model which can influence 
firms’ SEO decision. These control variables include size, tangibility, time dummy, 
years since last equity issue, profitability and a state dummy variable. Size ( size ) is 
measured by natural log of a firm’s total assets. Large firms are more diversified and 
have more a stable income stream, so large firms are capable of possessing more debts, 
and have a reduced probability of issuing equity. Tangibility ( TANG ) of assets is 
measured by the net book value of fixed assets divided by total assets (Williamson 
1988). Firms with lower tangibility, such as pharmaceutical firms and hi-tech firms, 
tend to use equity financing since their assets are intangible or not deployable. A time 
dummy variable (TIME ) is one if the year is during the period from 1994 to 2001 and 
zero if the year is during the period from 2002 to 2006 in reflection of the diminished 
amount of SEO activity in the second period due to possible reasons as mentioned 
above. The number of years since last equity issue including IPOs and SEOs (YrEI ) is 
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an ordinal variable. The fewer the years since last equity issue, the less likely firms are 
to conduct additional equity financing or another equity issue. Profitability ( profit ) is 
measured by the earnings before interest and taxes ( EBIT ) divided by total assets. 
Regarding the relationship between profitability and the SEO decision, the Pecking 
Order Theory (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984) predicts that firms with high 
profitability will have low incentive to issue equity, because the firm has the ability to 
generate more internal cash. The negative relationship between profitability and the 
SEO decision can also be explained by the fact that higher profitability means higher 
exposure to tax. The profitable firm should have more debt to increase the benefit of tax 
shield. At the same time, profitability also reduces the cost of financial distresses. 
Profitability also means greater “free cash flow” (Jensen 1986), so the firm should have 
more debt to reduce the agency conflict18. On the other hand, in China, the relationship 
between profitability and the SEO decision may be positive because of the profitability 
requirement, which means only profitable firms, or firms during their profitable years 
are able to conduct SEOs. Additionally, in China, we think being a state-controlled firm 
may also have an effect on the financing decision (Huang and Song 2006; Zou and Xiao 
2006). Hence, in our research, we have a state-owned/state-controlled dummy variable 
( SD ). This dummy variable takes the value of one if the controlling shareholder of the 
firm is the state. According to the Chinese annual report disclosure regulation, a 
shareholder is defined as the controlling shareholder, if he/she, an institution, an 
enterprise, or any organisation satisfies one of the following conditions: (1) is the 
largest shareholder unless a contradictory situation applies; (2) has the most voting 
rights; (3) controls over 30% of the voting rights (through pyramid and cross holding) 
unless a contradictory situation applies; (4) has the control of the appointment over 50% 
of the board members; (5) is considered as the controlling shareholder by the CSRC. 
                                                 
18 The negative relationship between profitability and leverage ratio is supported by empirical studies: 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999), and Titaman and Wessels (1988). 
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3.5 Data 
The data is retrieved from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) for all 
Chinese listed firms during the period from 1994 to 2006. The financial service sector is 
excluded from the regression analysis. We have a sample of 12,288 firm-year 
observations (excluding financial sectors). The information regarding the ownership 
structure only became available after 1998 following the new accounting reporting 
regulation, but 90% of the data regarding the type of controlling shareholders is still 
missing in 1998. Please refer to Chapter 2 for the summary statistics of SEO activities 
during this period. Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics of Chinese listed firms from 
1994 to 2006 (excluding financial sectors). On average 85.1% of the listed firms are 
described as state-controlled firms in the period from 1998 to 2001, and on average 
71.1% of the listed firms are described as state-controlled firms in the period from 2002 
to 2006. Ownership concentration (measured by LH, TH, NTH) decreases and 
managerial ownership (measured by BoDH, CH, CEOH) increases from the 1998-2001 
period to 2002-2006 period. We exclude top and bottom 1% of observations in each 
variable as outliers19.  
                                                 
19 Please refer to Appendix 3 for the definition of variables in this Chapter and Chapter 4 and 5. Please 
refer to Appendix 4 for the structure of data in this Chapter and Chapter 4 and 5.  
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of Chinese listed firms from 1994 to 2006 
Table 6Table 3.1: Summary statistics of Chinese listed firms from 1994 to 2006 
Tangibility (TANG) of asset is measured by the net book value of fixed assets divided by total assets. Leverage (Lev) is measured by the total interesting-bearing liability divided by 
total assets. Profitability (profit) is measured by the earnings before interests and tax (EBIT) divided by total assets. 
 
  94-97 98-01 02-06 Total 
  Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev 
Ln(Total Assets) (SIZE) 20.4 0.9 20.8 0.9 21.2 1.0 20.9 1.0 
Tangibility (TANG) 22.2% 15.3% 28.3% 16.2% 31.4% 18.0% 29.0% 17.4% 
Leverage ratio (Lev) 21.4% 13.6% 21.6% 14.1% 23.8% 15.4% 22.7% 14.7% 
Profitability (profit) 6.5% 5.9% 4.3% 7.3% 2.5% 7.9% 3.7% 7.6% 
Revenue Growth (RevG) 21.3% 78.8% 18.0% 60.3% 21.8% 59.6% 20.5% 62.3% 
State-owned dummy (SD) - - 85.1% 35.6% 71.1% 45.3% 75.6% 43.0% 
Largest shareholder's holding (LH) - - 44.9% 17.8% 40.8% 16.7% 42.3% 17.2% 
Top 10 shareholders' holding (TH) - - 61.9% 13.1% 60.1% 13.3% 60.8% 13.2% 
Non-tradable shares (NTH) - - 63.0% 12.4% 58.1% 12.9% 59.9% 12.9% 
Board of directors' holding (BoDH) - - 0.054% 0.528% 0.272% 1.922% 0.190% 1.554% 
Chairman of BoD holding (CH) - - 0.013% 0.225% 0.090% 0.770% 0.061% 0.624% 
CEO holding (CEOH) - - 0.006% 0.027% 0.018% 0.163% 0.013% 0.130% 
 
Data source: financial and corporate governance data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database 
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3.6 Empirical models 
We use two empirical models in this Chapter. (1) For firms who conducted SEOs at 
least once during the period from 1994 to 2006, we want to compare firms’ 
characteristics in issuing years (defined as one in the dependent variable in logistic 
regression) with the characteristics in non-issuing years (defined as zero). We use the 
firm clustered logistic regression (Chamberlain 1980) for this comparison. (2) We also 
want to compare the difference in firms’ characteristics between those who have 
conducted at least one SEO (define as one) and firms who have never conducted SEOs 
(defined as zero). For this, we use cross-section logistic regression with an industry 
dummy. Figure 3.2 summarises our empirical strategies. We believe that the two 
comparisons complement each other very well. The cross-section regression has an 
advantage in testing, for example, the agency theory. We will test the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and the SEO decision. Corporate 
governance is a firm’s qualitative feature and cannot be measured easily by quantitative 
proxies. For a single firm during a period, even if the variation of the proxies for 
corporate governance is big enough for empirical studies, such as ownership structure, 
we cannot explain that the firm’s “corporate governance” changes significantly during 
the period. This is because corporate governance is a set of economic, legal, political, 
and cultural processes. The difference in corporate governance is more significant 
between different firms than between different years within one firm. On the other hand, 
the firm clustered logistic regression has advantages in testing time-varying information, 
such as the leverage ratio, the information asymmetry theory measures, and growth. 
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Figure 3.2: Information compared by different empirical models in Chapter 3 
Figure 4Figure 3.2: Information compared by different empirical models in Chapter 3 
Sample
Conduct SEOs at least 
once during the 
sample period
Never conduct SEOs 
During the
sample period
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Non-issuing year
Cross-section analysis
Firm clustered 
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3.6.1 Model 1: firm clustered logistic model 
For the firm clustered model, firms that have conducted at least one SEO during 1994 to 
2006 constitute the sample. If t  is the year of the SEO announcement, independent 
variables are extracted from firms’ 1t  annual report. We use the lagged information 
because the information on the annual report for year t  becomes the actual result of 
SEOs (because SEOs happen during the year). We delete two years: the IPO year and 
the year after the SEO year. The main reason why we exclude those two years is that by 
regulation firms cannot conduct SEOs in the IPO year and the year after a SEO20. The 
model is estimated by firm clustered regression. 
 
itititit
itititiit
vGPSRindusLev
profitsizeYrEITIMEy






171615
141321
Re_       (3.1) 
 
1ity  if the firm i conducts a SEO within year t , and 0 otherwise.  
iTIME = 1 if the year is before 2002, and 0 if the year is during 2002 and 2006 to 
reflect the diminished amount of SEO activity in the second period.  
1itsize = the natural log of the firm’s total assets. 
itYrEI = years since the firm’s last equity issue which includes the IPO and SEOs. 
1itprofit = earnings before interest and taxes ( EBIT ) divided by total assets. 
1_ itindusLev = the firm’s leverage minus (GICS 4-digit or 2-digit) industry average; 
1itLev = the firm’s leverage. Leverage is measured by interest-bearing (short/long-term) 
loans divided by total assets. 
                                                 
20 The second restriction was removed from May 2006. 
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1itPSR = six-month share returns prior to the SEO. If there is no SEO during a year for 
a firm, this measure is the previous year’s second half year’s return. 
1Re itvG = the percentage change in operating revenue. 
 
In the above model 3.1, we use 1_ itindusLev  to proxy the trade-off theory. The 
alternative proxy of the trade-off theory is 1_ itpredLev which is equal to the residuals 
from a leverage prediction model, 1it . The leverage prediction model is used to 
provide an alternative and perhaps more accurate way than the industry average to 
estimate the optimal leverage level for each firm in each year. However, we 
acknowledge that this methodology is likely to cause a generated variable bias. There 
are many factors which can determine a firm’s leverage level. We have chosen four 
factors, which could influence firms’ leverage: size (size), tangibility (TANG), 
profitability (profit), and the percentage of non-tradable shares (NTholding) (Huang and 
Song 2006; Zou and Xiao 2006).   
ititititit NTholdingprofitTANGsizeLeverage 4321    
         0.026             0.030               -0.758            -0.056 
        (19.24)***     (3.89)***        (-44.56)***    (-5.56)*** 
ititit IndustryDYearD   65       (3.2) 
 
By pooled OLS we are able to estimate model 3.2. After obtaining all the coefficients, 
we are able to calculate the estimated leverage. The residual it is obtained by using 
actual leverage minus predicted leverage. All four coefficients are very significant and 
the R-square is 0.20. The result confirms previous studies that: larger firms will have 
higher leverage; firms with more tangible assets will have higher leverage; higher 
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profitability will lead to lower leverage; it , the residuals from the prediction model, 
will be used as the deviation from the target leverage ratio in our firm clustered models.  
 
3.6.2 Model 2: cross-section logistic model 
We do not have the data of ownership structure before 1998. Hence, the sample period 
in this model is from 1998 to 2006. We divide the sample into two sub-samples for 
cross-section regression. One sub-sample period is from 1998 to 2001, and the other is 
from 2002 to 2006. The reason we divide our sample in such a way is because we 
observe that SEO activities are low from 2002 to 2006. Furthermore, there are three 
events during the period from 2002 to 2006: (1) the introduction of public offerings in 
2001, (2) the introduction of the sponsor system in 2001, (3) the low stock market return 
since 2001. The dependent variable is equal to one if a firm has conducted at least one 
SEO during the sub-sample period, and to zero if a firm has never conducted SEOs after 
1994 (the year from when the data is available) or for its life of listing (but the firm age 
has to be larger than or equal to 3). Regarding the independent variables, we take the 
average of the independent variables across all years during the sub-sample period for 
firms who are included in the sub-sample period. Hence, our cross section model is: 
 
iavgi
avgiavgiavgiavgi
avgiavgiavgiavgii
IndustryDManHold
OwnConSDvGPSR
indusLevTANGprofitsizey






10,9
,8,7,6,5
,4,3,2,1
Re
_
           (3.3) 
 
1iy  if the firm has conducted at least one SEO during the sub-sample period, and 0 if 
the firm with the age of more than three has never conducted SEOs since 1994.  
avgisize , = the average of the natural log of the firm’s total assets 
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avgiprofit , = the average of earnings before interest and taxes ( EBIT ) divided by total 
assets. 
avgiTANG , = the average of total fixed assets divided by total assets21 
avgiindusLev ,_ = the average of the difference between firms’ leverage and their 
industry average leverage. 
avgiPSR ,  = the average of annual stock return 
avgivG ,Re = the average of revenue growth 
avgiSD . = 1 if the firm is a state-controlling list firm and 0 otherwise22. 
avgiOwnCon . = average ownership concentration. This variable includes the largest 
shareholder’s holding (LH), the sum of top 10 shareholders’ holding (TH), and non-
tradable shares (NTH).  
avgiManHold , = average managerial holding. This variable includes the holding of 
board of directors (BoDH), the chairman’s holding in board of directors (CH), and the 
CEO’s holding (CEOH). 
IndustryD  = GICS 2-digit industry dummy. 
 
3.7 Results 
Firstly, we estimate equation (3.1). In this estimation we check whether the proxies for 
the three SEO theories (the trade-off theory, the information asymmetry theory, and the 
                                                 
21 The TANG variable included in equation (3.3) is not included in equation (3.1). this is because the 
purpose of Equation (3.1) is to examine firms’ time variant effect, while tangibility is more suitable to 
measure firms’ business nature which is more distinct between different firms rather than different years 
within one firm. 
22 It is possible that some category variables might change their category during the sample period. For 
example, a state-controlled firm becomes a non-state-controlled firm. If this is the case, we use the more 
frequent category as the category for the whole (sub-) sample period.  
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theory of financing under growth) are able to predict the likelihood of the year 
conducting SEOs. The results are reported in Table 3.2. The results concerning control 
variables are in line with our prediction in all estimated regressions: (1) the positive 
significant coefficient of TIME dummy reflects the fact that there are more SEO 
activities before 2002. (2) The positive significant coefficient of the variable 
YrEI means that the longer period since last equity issue implies that firms have more 
financing demand, so are more likely to conduct SEOs. (3) The positive significant 
coefficient of the profitability means that years with more profit can lead to a higher 
chance of equity issue. This may be the result of regulation on the SEO profitability 
requirement. i.e. only firms in their profitable years are able to conduct SEOs. Columns 
2 to 5 in Table 3.2 corresponds to each of the three theories mentioned explaining the 
motivation of SEOs. In columns 6 to 9 in Table 3.2 we combine two of the mentioned 
theories in one estimated equation and in columns 10 and 11 in Table 3.2 we combine 
three of the mentioned theories in one estimated equation due to concern over that 
proxies for different theories may be correlated with each other and hence carry the 
effect of other theories. As we can see from Table 3.2, the estimated coefficient of 
1_ itindusLev  or 1_ itpredLev  is significantly positive in columns 2, 6, 7, 10 and 
columns 3, 8, 11 respectively. This means that firms are more likely to issue equity 
when their leverage is higher than the optimal level. The result is consistent with trade-
off theory’s prediction. Regarding the information asymmetry theory, the estimated 
coefficient of sec_PSR  is significantly positive in columns 4, 6, 9, 10, 11. Firms’ 
behaviour in terms of pre-issue share return is consistent with the prediction made by 
the information asymmetry theory: firms are more likely to issue equity when their pre-
issue share returns are high. Regarding the growth opportunity theory, the significant 
positive coefficient of firm’s revenue growth in columns 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 means that  
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Table 3.2: Results for firm clustered logistic regression 
Table 7Table 3.2: Results for firm clustered logistic regression 
1ity  if the firm i conducts a SEO within year t , and 0 otherwise. iTIME = 1 if the year is before 2002, and 0 if the year is during the period from 2002 and 2006 to reflect the 
decreased amount of SEO activities in the second period. itYrEI = years since firm’s last equity issue which includes the IPO and SEOs. 1itsize = the natural log of firm’s total 
assets. 1itprofit = earnings before interests and tax (EBIT) divided by total assets. 1_ itindusLev = the firm’s leverage minus (GICS 4-digit) industry average. Leverage is measured 
by interest-bearing (short/long-term) loans divided by total assets. 1_ itpredLev = the firm’s leverage minus the residuals from the prediction model. 1itPSR = six-month share returns 
prior to the SEO. If there is no SEO during a year, this measure is the previous year’s second half year’s return. 1Re itvG = the percentage change in operating revenue.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Time 2.535 2.403 2.365 2.161 2.516 1.990 2.392 2.354 2.149 1.985 1.930 
 (16.53)*** (15.48)*** (15.02)*** (13.20)*** (16.40)*** (11.96)*** (15.42)*** (14.97)*** (13.13)*** (11.94)*** (11.46)*** 
YrEI 0.361 0.362 0.346 0.282 0.351 0.282 0.354 0.340 0.276 0.278 0.258 
 (10.57)*** (10.45)*** (9.81)*** (7.84)*** (10.18)*** (7.72)*** (10.14)*** (9.58)*** (7.66)*** (7.57)*** (6.89)*** 
Size -0.228 -0.445 -0.337 -0.496 -0.304 -0.762 -0.517 -0.394 -0.540 -0.799 -0.687 
 (-2.32)** (-4.28)*** (-3.06)*** (-4.52)*** (-3.05)*** (-6.37)*** (-4.88)*** (-3.54)*** (-4.86)*** (-6.62)*** (-5.38)*** 
profit 14.011 15.535 16.397 15.553 13.299 17.292 14.778 15.671 15.127 16.819 16.957 
 (12.05)*** (12.63)*** (12.18)*** (12.14)*** (11.38)*** (12.71)*** (11.97)*** (11.50)*** (11.76)*** (12.30)*** (11.29)*** 
Lev_indus  3.215    3.703 3.145   3.645  
  (6.38)***    (6.58)*** (6.21)***   (6.46)***  
Lev_pred   4.090     3.956   4.388 
   (7.28)***     (7.01)***   (7.06)*** 
PSR_sec    1.347  1.376   1.339 1.370 1.375 
    (9.43)***  (9.46)***   (9.31)*** (9.36)*** (9.11)*** 
RevG     0.501  0.484 0.355 0.316 0.297 0.144 
     (5.05)***  (4.76)*** (3.25)*** (2.96)*** (2.67)*** (1.21) 
            
Number of obs 5,542 5,505 5,360 5,203 5,542 5,171 5,505 5,360 5,203 5,171 5,033 
LR chi square 1,063 1,096 1,117 1,344 1,088 1,381 1,118 1,127 1,352 1,388 1,384 
Log likelihood -1,224 -1,199 -1,141 -1,009 -1,211 -982 -1,188 -1,136 -1,004 -979 -934 
 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial and share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database 
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firms are more likely to issue equity when their growth is high. The result is consistent 
with the financing under growth theory’s prediction. In sum, we find support for all 
three of the theories (the trade-off theory, the information asymmetry theory, and the 
growth theory) we set out to test in this model. 
 
Secondly, we estimate equation (3.3) for the two difference periods: the period from 
1998 to 2001 and the period from 2002 to 2006. In this estimation we check whether the 
proxies for the agency theory are able to predict the likelihood of the firm conducting 
SEOs. The results are reported in Table 3.3 and 3.4. Our main interest in this model lies 
in the corporate governance mechanism variables, because the average of the different 
years’ information is taken to eliminate possible time-varying effects which is 
confirmed by the results in Table 3.2. When we include the managerial holding 
variables into the estimation, we also include the ownership concentration variables to 
control for the effect of the ownership concentration on the SEO decision. The results 
concerning control variables deliver the following information: (1) more profitable 
firms are more likely to conduct SEOs. This may be again due to the SEO profitability 
requirement. In other words, only profitable firms are able to conduct SEOs. (2) Firms 
with higher stock market return are more likely to conduct SEOs. This may also be in 
support of the information asymmetry theory. However, these results concerning firms’ 
stock return only hold for the period from 1998 to 2001. During 2002 to 2006, only the 
variable of profitability is consistently positively significant. Regarding corporate 
governance mechanisms, the results show that (1) in both periods, there is a significant 
negative relationship between ownership concentration and likelihood of SEOs 
(columns 3 to 5 in both tables). (2) The relationship between managerial holding and the 
likelihood of SEOs is not significant in the period from 1998 to 2001, but becomes 
negatively significant during the period from 2002 to 2006 except CEO holding  
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Table 3.3: Results for cross-section logistic for the period 1998 to 2001 
Table 8Table 3.3: Results for cross-section logistic for the period 1998 to 2001 
1ity  if the firm has conducted at least one SEO during the sub-sample period, and 0 if the firm has never 
conducted SEOs since 1994 or its entire life of listing. All independent variables are the average of years during the 
sub-sample period. The new variables apart from Table 3.2 include: avgiSD . = 1 if the firm is a state-controlling list 
firm and 0 otherwise. avgiOwnCon . = ownership concentration measure. This variable includes the largest 
shareholder’s holding (LH), the sum of top 10 shareholders’ holding (TH), and non-tradable shares (NTH). 
avgiManHold , = managerial holding. This variable includes the holding of board of directors (BoDH), the chairman’s 
holding in board of directors (CH), and the CEO’s holding (CEOH). 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Size 0.477 0.477 0.611 0.561 0.421 0.557 0.560 0.558 
 (4.24)*** (4.20)*** (5.13)*** (4.75)*** (3.61)*** (4.72)*** (4.74)*** (4.73)*** 
profit 14.337 14.338 15.068 15.583 17.375 15.556 15.565 15.608 
 (6.13)*** (6.13)*** (6.32)*** (6.42)*** (6.95)*** (6.41)*** (6.42)*** (6.43)*** 
TANG 0.192 0.192 0.213 0.337 0.590 0.323 0.311 0.322 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.54) (0.95) (0.52) (0.50) (0.52) 
Lev_indus -0.088 -0.088 -0.107 -0.191 0.429 -0.254 -0.234 -0.218 
 (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.16) (-0.27) (0.61) (-0.37) (-0.34) (-0.31) 
PSR 3.050 3.050 3.132 3.115 2.880 3.091 3.085 3.097 
 (7.49)*** (7.48)*** (7.57)*** (7.43)*** (6.94)*** (7.36)*** (7.35)*** (7.39)*** 
RevG 0.437 0.437 0.297 0.297 0.196 0.334 0.348 0.337 
 (1.52) (1.52) (1.02) (1.01) (0.66) (1.13) (1.17) (1.14) 
SD  0.004 0.145 0.077 0.096 0.052 0.039 0.048 
  (0.02) (0.63) (0.33) (0.42) (0.23) (0.17) (0.21) 
LH   -1.702      
   (-3.26)***      
TH    -4.919  -4.941 -4.919 -4.903 
    (-6.50)***  (-6.53)*** (-6.49)*** (-6.48)*** 
NTH     -6.284    
     (-6.64)***    
BoDH      -52.869   
      (-1.21)   
CH       -117.864  
       (-0.80)  
CEOH        -122.833 
        (-0.66) 
Constant -11.118 -11.117 -13.148 -9.834 -6.147 -9.695 -9.770 -9.764 
 (-4.75) (-4.75) (-5.41) (-4.09) (-2.48) (-4.03) (-4.06) (-4.06) 
         
Number 
of obs 844 844 837 842 844 842 842 842 
LR chi 
square 180.21 180.21 196.36 226.92 231.73 229.00 229.06 228.85 
Log 
likelihood -485.769 -485.769 -472.312 -461.005 -460.008 -459.966 -459.935 -460.042 
 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
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Table 3.4: Results for cross-section logistic for the period 2002 to 2006 
Table 9Table 3.4: Results for cross-section logistic for the period 2002 to 2006 
1ity  if the firm has conducted at least one SEO during the sub-sample period, and 0 if the firm has never 
conducted SEOs since 1994 or its entire life of listing. All independent variables are the average of years during the 
sub-sample period. The new variables apart from Table 3.2 include: avgiSD . = 1 if the firm is a state-controlling list 
firm and 0 otherwise. avgiOwnCon . = ownership concentration measure. This variable includes the largest 
shareholder’s holding (LH), the sum of top 10 shareholders’ holding (TH), and non-tradable shares (NTH). 
avgiManHold , = managerial holding. This variable includes the holding of board of directors (BoDH), the chairman’s 
holding in board of directors (CH), and the CEO’s holding (CEOH). 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Size 0.771 0.793 0.871 1.009 0.806 0.974 0.987 0.983 
 (6.65)*** (6.66)*** (7.02)*** (7.64)*** (6.48)*** (7.37)*** (7.46)*** (7.45)*** 
profit 3.090 3.030 4.174 8.760 7.577 9.558 9.270 9.465 
 (1.18) (1.16) (1.56) (2.98)*** (2.67)*** (3.20)*** (3.11)*** (3.19)*** 
TANG -0.047 -0.011 -0.110 0.031 -0.377 -0.157 -0.171 -0.029 
 (-0.07) (-0.02) (-0.17) (0.04) (-0.54) (-0.23) (-0.25) (-0.04) 
Lev_indus -0.075 -0.113 -0.283 -0.175 0.219 -0.041 -0.062 -0.134 
 (-0.09) (-0.14) (-0.35) (-0.20) (0.25) (-0.05) (-0.07) (-0.15) 
PSR 0.183 0.180 0.076 0.253 0.019 0.538 0.570 0.311 
 (0.53) (0.53) (0.22) (0.70) (0.05) (1.38) (1.43) (0.86) 
RevG 0.234 0.224 0.217 0.129 -0.035 0.010 0.017 0.092 
 (0.61) (0.59) (0.56) (0.30) (-0.08) (0.02) (0.04) (0.22) 
SD  -0.194 -0.040 -0.035 -0.032 -0.265 -0.252 -0.147 
  (-0.87) (-0.17) (-0.15) (-0.14) (-1.08) (-1.03) (-0.61) 
LH   -1.928      
   (-2.84)***      
TH    -8.075  -8.103 -8.082 -8.126 
    (-8.17)***  (-8.10)*** (-8.11)*** (-8.15)*** 
NTH     -8.133    
     (-7.67)***    
BoDH      -7.772   
      (-2.33)**   
CH       -16.736  
       (-2.07)**  
CEOH        -20.329 
        (-1.64) 
Constant -18.107 -18.439 -19.287 -18.437 -13.966 -17.391 -17.701 -17.742 
 (-7.43) (-7.45) (-7.64) (-6.92) (-5.36) (-6.50) (-6.61) (-6.64) 
         
Number of 
obs 802 802 797 801 802 801 801 801 
LR chi 
square 88.07 88.82 97.18 167.97 158.48 178.13 178.08 172.45 
Log 
likelihood -351.110 -350.737 -344.053 -310.946 -315.908 -305.868 -305.891 -308.705 
 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
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(columns 6 to 8 in both tables). (3) The state ownership dummy is not significant in all 
estimated regressions for both periods. In conclusion, a significant negative relationship 
between ownership structure and the SEO decision implies that ownership structure as a 
corporate governance mechanism has an impact on firms’ agency conflict and the 
agency conflict further affects firms’ SEO decision. In other words, the agency conflicts 
may play a role in firms’ SEO decision, so agency conflicts are one of the SEO 
motivations applicable in China.  
 
How can we explain the negative relationship between ownership concentration and the 
SEO decision? There are actually three ways to explain such a relationship. (1) A higher 
ownership concentration may improve corporate governance by enhancing manager 
monitoring. Managers understand that they cannot succeed in using SEOs as a cheap 
resource for their own perquisite, so the SEO likelihood is reduced (Friend and Lang 
1988).  (2) A higher ownership concentration (as a result of state-owned shares in China) 
may lead to worsened corporate governance. (Controlling) shareholders in firms 
understand that they cannot effectively monitor managers, so they reduce the likelihood 
of SEOs to prevent more “free cash flow” (Berger, Ofek, and Yermack 1997). (3) 
Regarding the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders, a high ownership concentration may align controlling shareholders’ 
interest with minority shareholders’ interest, meaning controlling shareholders are less 
likely to use SEO for the purpose of tunnelling. However, we cannot identify which 
type of agency conflict dominates the negative relationship or whether both of them 
apply.  
 
Regarding the negative relationship between managerial holding and the SEO decision, 
although such a negative relationship does not apply in the period from 1998 to 2001, 
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we cannot conclusively say that the agency conflict between managers and shareholders 
does not apply in this period. This is because there is a possibility that managerial 
holding may not be effective as a corporate governance mechanism, especially in China. 
For the period from 1998 to 2001, firms’ average managerial holding in terms of board 
of directors’ holding (BoDH), the chairman’s holding (CH), and the CEO’s holding 
(CEOH) is 0.054%, 0.013%, and 0.006%, respectively. These figures increase to 
0.272%, 0.090%, and 0.018% respectively during the period from 2002 to 2006. In 
other words, during the first period, managerial holding may be too low to be effective 
as a corporate governance mechanism. Along with the Chinese stock market’s transition 
and increased level of managerial holding, it began to align managers’ interests with 
shareholders’ interest. Hence, managers are less likely to conduct SEOs for their own 
perquisites. 
 
Regarding model performance, the likelihood ratio test is significant in all regressions. 
We conduct further estimations to check the robustness of the results. Appendix 5 
shows the results of a revised leverage prediction model which includes the regional 
dummy and uses fixed-effect estimation. In the literature, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Stulz (2010) use a pooled logistic model rather than a firm clustered logistics model for 
the model similar to equation (3.1). Appendix 6 shows the result of robustness test to 
equation (3.1) or Table 3.2. The model in Table 3.2 is estimated by firm clustered 
regression. The differences between the model in Table 3.2 and the model in appendix 6 
include: (1) we first use pooled logit and probit estimation, and also use fixed-effect 
logit, random-effect logit, and random-effect probit in appendix 6. We also report the 
marginal effect of these estimations which is used to show the economic significance of 
the coefficients associated with the independent variables. (2) In appendix 6, the 
residual of the optimal leverage prediction model (using pooled OLS and fixed-effect 
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panel estimation respectively) in appendix 5 is used to measure firms’ deviation from 
their optimal leverage. The model in appendix 6 also includes the regional dummy if it 
is possible. The fundamental message from appendix 6 does not change. An alternative 
estimation for our cross-section model for two periods (equation 3.3) is to estimate one 
single regression where each regressor is interacted with a dummy equal to one in the 
first period, and zero otherwise; and a dummy equal to one in the second period and 
zero otherwise. The fundamental message from such a specification for equation (3.3) 
as shown in Appendix 7 does not change either.  
 
3.8. Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter, we discussed how the four theories concerning SEO motivations could 
be applied to the Chinese stock market. It is important to discuss and test the SEO 
theories in China, because there is a lack of literature on this topic. Additionally, the 
Chinese stock market is not a mature market, so we may not be able to directly borrow 
the research results from a mature market. Empirically, we find evidence supporting the 
trade-off theory. The firm will issue equity to reduce the leverage when it deviates from 
the industry average. We also find that the firm tends to issue equity when the pre-issue 
share returns are high, which supports the information asymmetry theory. Firms choose 
SEOs when their growth is high. Regarding the agency theory, we find that there is a 
strong negative relationship between the SEO decision and the firm’s corporate 
governance in terms of ownership structure. Hence, we argue that the agency theory 
plays an important role in the SEO decision of Chinese listed firms. However, we need 
future research to explicitly distinguish between the agency conflict between managers 
and shareholders and the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
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shareholders. In short, our results support that all four theories concerning SEO 
motivations are applicable in China.  
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Chapter 4: How do Chinese firms use proceeds from SEOs23 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the introduction of this thesis, we highlighted the importance of SEO motivation 
research in China. In Chapter 3, we investigated the motivations of Chinese Seasoned 
Equity Offerings (SEOs) by examining firms’ pre-SEO characteristics. The theories 
concerned with the motivation of SEOs included the trade-off theory, the information 
asymmetry theory, the agency theory, and the financing under growth theory.  
 
In this Chapter, we aim to continue with an explicit examination on these four theories. 
To complement the study in Chapter 3, we want to move our focus from firms’ pre-
issue characteristics to firms’ post-SEO characteristics. Looking at a sample of 523 
SEOs in China over the period from 1998 to 2003, a phenomenon can be observed such 
that on average 67.7% of the actual proceeds have been used in investments; 0.6% of 
the actual proceeds have been used in debt repayment; 31.7% of the actual proceeds 
have been left as general corporate use which is any use other than investments and debt 
repayments. The question is why Chinese SEO firms display so much general corporate 
use, which is unspecified and ambiguous for investors? Where do firms spend this 
general corporate usage of proceeds? Could the use of proceeds from SEOs be the result 
of SEO motivations? Hence, if we can show that general corporate use has been used in 
a way, which could to some extent reflect SEO motivations, we might be able to 
provide evidence and draw conclusions on SEO motivations. 
 
                                                 
23 This chapter is co-authored with Dr. Hong Bo. 
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There is some existing literature on the use of proceeds from SEOs. Kim and Weisbach 
(2008) examine the impact of SEO proceeds on firms’ post-SEO investment, debt 
prepayment, and cash holding in a sample of 13,142 SEOs from 38 countries (excluding 
China) during the period from 1990 to 2003. They show that the primary use of 
proceeds have been in investment and cash holding, but not debt prepayment. Further to 
this, they show that higher firm valuation before SEOs lead to a greater cash holding 
increase after SEOs. Their conclusion is that investment and market timing motivate the 
use of SEO proceeds. However, the authors do not explicitly examine the impact of 
SEO use on firms’ post-issue performance. Regarding the post-issue performance study, 
Jeanneret (2005) examines the long-term stock performance following 232 rights issues 
in the French market during the period from 1984 to 1998. The author classifies the 
planned use of proceeds documented in issuing reports into two categories: to finance 
new investments, or to adjust firms’ capital structure. The author finds that rights issues 
used to adjust firms’ capital structure do not experience significant long-term share 
price underperformance, while rights issues used to finance new investment suffer 
significant long-term underperformance. The author interprets the long-term 
underperformance of “financing new investment” by issuers as an over-valuation of 
investment payoffs and persistent over-optimism through time. In other words, it is 
possible that managers try to make investors over-optimistic and use the SEO proceeds 
for over-investment as a result of manager-shareholder agency conflict. Autore, Bray, 
and Peterson (2009) investigate 880 public offerings made in the U.S. from 1997 to 
2003. Proceeds are classified into three categories: investment, debt repayment, and 
general corporate use. They also find that the planned use of debt repayment and 
general corporate use suffer worsened post-issue long-term stock and operating 
performance. They interpret the results as such because debt repayment and general 
corporate use might indicate that firms do not have profitable investment projects at the 
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time of SEOs. This lack of investment shows that firms might raise funds for other 
purposes such as market timing motivation (which is motivated by the information 
asymmetry theory). In other words, if firms have profitable investments, they would 
disclose the investment project and the use of proceeds. Both Jeanneret (2005) and 
Autore, Bray, and Peterson (2009) deploy pre-issue stated use of proceeds to construct 
their analysis.  
 
Walker and Yost (2008) link the stated use of proceeds prior to SEOs to those after 
SEOs with changes to some accounting variables. The sample consists of 438 public 
offerings made during the period from 1997 to 2000 in the U.S. market. The planned 
uses of proceeds are classified into three categories: investment, debt repayment, and 
general corporate use. The authors show that firms’ investment significantly increases 
after SEOs for all three categories, and firms’ leverage also increases even if the stated 
use is to repay the debt. This could be evidence of changes in the use of proceeds after 
SEOs. Further to this, the authors show that in comparison to other categories, general 
corporate use suffers worse post-issue operating performance in terms of operating cash 
inflow. Similarly, the authors argue that if firms have profitable investments, they 
would disclose investment project and use of proceeds. As the authors do not find 
evidence of market timing motivation in terms of an excessive increase in cash after 
SEOs (Greenwood 2005; Kim and Weisbach 2008), they argue that SEOs with 
adjustments from general corporate use to investment might contain over-investment 
problems due to the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. Fu (2010) 
tests the role of over-investment after SEOs further by using a sample of 2,873 U.S. 
SEOs dating from 1980 to 1999. Post-issue over-investment is measured by the 
difference between the issuing firms’ investments and the investment of the matched 
non-issuing firms. Over-investment due to the agency conflict between managers and 
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shareholders is supported by a negative relationship between over-investment and post-
issue operating performance.  
 
The literature mentioned in the two paragraphs above is summarised as follows: (1) 
Regarding the SEO motivations, Kim and Weibach (2008), Walker and Yost (2008), 
and Fu (2010) show that investments are an important use of the SEO proceeds. Both 
Kim and Weibach (2008) and Autore et. al. (2009) interpret their empirical results to 
support the market timing motivation (or the information asymmetry theory). Walker 
and Yost (2008) interpret their empirical results to support the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders. Fu (2010) explicitly focuses on the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders by providing evidence of over-investment after SEOs.  The 
trade-off theory receives no support from the research mentioned in the two paragraphs 
above. However, none of the above studies mention the agency conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders as a SEO motivation, which could 
be important in the Chinese stock market. (2) Both Autore et. al. (2009) and Walker and 
Yost (2008) explicitly focus on general corporate use and show how it can impair firms’ 
value. However, both deploy planned pre-issue use of proceeds, though Walker and 
Yost (2008) provide some evidence in changes to SEO use of proceeds.  
 
Hence, how does our research fit into and contribute to existing literature? We do so in 
three ways. (1) In our sample, as mentioned above, general corporate use and 
investment use make up 31.7% and 67.7% of actual proceeds respectively.  However, 
only 6% and 93.5% of planned proceeds24 are stated as general corporate use and 
investment use before SEOs. In other words, much planned investment usage has been 
                                                 
24 The final actual proceeds can deviate from the planned proceeds. Although the denominator of the 
percentage of general corporate use before or after SEOs is different, the difference does not change the 
message that much planned investments have changed to general corporate use.  
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altered to general corporate use. This change along with a high level of general 
corporate use after SEOs has two implications for us. (a) The general corporate use 
poses a question for investors, which is why Chinese SEO firms display a high level of 
unspecified and ambiguous general corporate use? What SEO motivations are behind 
these general corporate uses? Whether managers (or existing shareholders) can hide 
their true SEO motivation from shareholders (or new shareholders) by general corporate 
use?  By answering these questions, we can provide evidence to SEO motivations. (b) 
This phenomenon of change to SEO use is also similar to what Walker and Yost (2008) 
document in their research. To include the possible change in the use of proceeds, our 
research focuses on the actual general corporate use rather than planned general 
corporate as used in previous research (Walker and Yost 2008; Autore et. al. 2009). (2) 
We borrow Kim and Weibach’s (2008) model (KW model here after) to examine the 
impact of SEO proceeds on firms’ post-issue investment, leverage, and cash holding. 
However, we extend the KW model in three ways. (a) We examine not only the impact 
of proceeds as how the KW model does, but also examine the impact of general 
corporate use to investigate where it has been used. (b) We also examine firms’ post-
issue administrative expenses, related party transactions, and the interaction item 
between firms’ post-issue investment and growth opportunity. In other words, we aim to 
examine more types of SEO use to test the four theories (discussed in the previous 
Chapter). (c) We finish the KW model with a further test on the impact of general 
corporate use on firms’ post-issue stock and operating performance. This complements 
the KW model because the impact on post-issue performance may also reflect firms’ 
SEO motivations. (3) To our knowledge, we are the first to deploy the use of proceeds 
as a tool to study SEO motivations in China. As discussed in the introduction of this 
thesis, the Chinese stock market is huge and active, but also distinct compared to a 
mature market. Hence, we cannot directly borrow the research results from a mature 
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market and apply them to the Chinese stock market, which has a lack of literature on 
SEO motivations. Our research fills the gap in Chinese SEO motivation research. In our 
study, we also examine the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders, which is neglected in mature markets within the context of SEOs. 
However it is of particular importance in immature markets like the Chinese stock 
market.  
 
Our empirical results show that investments are still the primary destination of SEO 
proceeds. Nearly 70% of actual announced use in investments has a significant positive 
impact on firms’ post-issue investment. Also on average, issuing firms’ total assets 
almost double in the three years after SEOs, while non-issuing firms’ total assets only 
grow by 28%. General corporate use has a significant positive impact on the increase in 
cash after a SEO. This evidence gives support to the information asymmetry theory that 
firms raise cash to time the market even when there are no good investment 
opportunities. General corporate use is also spent on administrative expenses. 
Administrative expenses are financial sources that can easily be manipulated by 
mangers, so managers might use administrative expenses for their private benefits of 
control (Bai, et al. 2004; Bo et. al. 2011). Hence, we have evidence of manager-
shareholder agency conflict where managers use general corporate use to benefit 
themselves. Our further examination into investments from general corporate use shows 
that such a change is not associated with post-SEO change in investment opportunities. 
Hence, it is possible that the investments from general corporate use may include over-
investment, support for the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. With 
regards to the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders, only very weak evidence is obtained. This evidence points to the 
facilitating role of general corporate use where related party transactions may be used 
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by controlling shareholders to tunnel some benefits exclusively to themselves. 
Regarding the trade-off theory, we could not find general corporate use having any 
significant impact on the change in leverage after SEOs. Finally, a significant negative 
relationship is found between general corporate use and firms’ post-issue long-term 
operating and stock performance. This negative relationship confirms that unwise usage 
of general corporate use is prevalent. In conclusion, we believe that investments, 
information asymmetry theory and the agency conflict play important roles in SEO 
motivation.  
 
This chapter is organised as the followings: Section 2 is the hypothesis development; 
Section 3 presents our data; Section 4 examines the impact of proceeds as well as 
general corporate use on the change in some accounting variables; Section 5 links the 
general corporate use with the post-issue long-term operating and stock performance; 
Section 6 is the conclusion.  
 
4.2 Hypotheses development  
In this section, we will discuss how different theories of SEO motivations explain the 
use of proceeds and long-term performance. Please refer to the previous chapter for a 
detailed literature review regarding each SEO theory.  
 
4.2.1 Financing under growth 
A firm facing growth opportunities would prefer equity financing to debt financing to 
reduce the agency conflict between debtholders and shareholders. The other reason why 
equity financing is preferred during growth is because equity financing is better at 
dealing with the increased uncertainty of firms’ earnings during the growth period 
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(Smith 1970; Myers and Smith 1987; Smith and Watt 1992). Within the context of 
SEOs, Pilotte (1992) and Denis (1994) provide empirical evidence supporting the 
positive relationship between investment opportunities and market reaction to the SEO 
announcement by using a variety (ten) of proxies for investment opportunities. Hence, 
our hypotheses are: 
 
H1: if financing under growth theory motivates SEO proceeds/investment use/general 
corporate use, they will have a positive impact on post-SEO increases in investments.  
 
H2: if financing under growth theory is the SEO motivation, more SEO 
proceeds/investment use/general corporate use will lead to better post-issue stock 
performance.  
 
However, as documented by Walker and Yost (2008), general corporate use might also 
be used for over-investments. In other words, if there is a positive relationship between 
general use and firms’ investments after SEOs, we might not be able to identify whether 
the investments from general use is because of over-investments or good investment 
opportunities. We attempt to distinguish between over-investment and good investment 
opportunity by examining whether general corporate use is associated with a change in 
growth opportunities.  
 
H3: if the investments from general use are due to good investment opportunities, there 
should be a positive relationship between changes in investment opportunities and 
general corporate use. If we cannot find such a positive relationship, investments from 
general use are probably due to over-investments.  
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4.2.2 Agency conflict 
In the agency conflict between managers and shareholders, managers tend to use free 
cash flow for managerial perquisites. Equity becomes preferential compared to debt, 
because equity is free from the pressure of constant interest payments (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986). Within the context of SEOs, the SEO decision may be 
driven by managers’ desire to raise more free cash flow. We believe that general 
corporate use in SEOs can help managers hide their true intention of free cash flow 
from shareholders. Post-issue administrative expenses are chosen as a proxy for 
managerial perquisites, because this item may include managers’ spending for their own 
benefits (Bai, et al. 2004; Bo et. al. 2011). Hence, if we can show that administrative 
expenses have come from general corporate use, we are inclined to conclude that the 
agency conflict between managers and shareholders may be a SEO motivation for firms. 
As mentioned in H3, general corporate use might also contain an element of over-
investment, if investment has resulted from general corporate use and this switch in use 
is not associated with changes in growth opportunities. General corporate use as the 
result of the agency conflict may also impair firms’ post-issue stock/operating 
performance due unwise use of funds (Jeanneret 2005; Walker and Yost 2008). Hence, 
our hypotheses are: 
 
H4: if the agency conflict between managers and shareholders motivates general 
corporate use, then general corporate use may have a positive impact on the increase in 
administrative expenses after SEOs.  
 
H5: if the agency conflict between managers and shareholders motivates general 
corporate use, then greater general corporate use may lead to worsened post-issue 
stock/operating performance.  
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As discussed in the introduction and in Chapter 3, the agency conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders can also be an important motivation 
for the Chinese SEO decision. Related party transaction is one way for controlling 
shareholders to tunnel some benefits to themselves at the expenses of minority 
shareholders (Berkman et. al. 2010). Furthermore, it is argued that SEOs can provide 
resources for such tunnelling behaviour in China. For example, Jian and Wong (2004) 
show that there are increased related party transactions after SEOs. Hence, if we can 
show that general corporate use has been used for related party transactions, we are 
inclined to conclude that the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders may be a motivation for firms’ SEO.  
 
H6: if the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders motivates 
general corporate use, then general corporate use will have a positive impact on the 
increase in related party transactions after SEOs.  
 
H7: if the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders motivates 
general corporate use, then greater general corporate use will lead to worsened post-
issue stock/operating performance.  
 
4.2.3 Information asymmetry 
The incentive for the market timing behaviour suggests that firms tend to issue equity 
when the cost of information asymmetry of equity issue is low (Myers and Majluf 1984). 
Within the context of SEOs, Greenwood (2005) and Kim and Weibach (2008) argue 
that if firms conduct SEOs to time the market, they will hold excessive amounts of cash 
after SEOs. Greenwood (2005) demonstrates that investors are not convinced by the 
98 
 
conclusion that the purpose of SEOs is for investment, because share price does not 
react positively to SEOs until firms actually begin their investments. Kim and Weibach 
(2008) examine the impact of an interaction variable between market valuation before 
SEOs and the proceeds from the increase in cash after SEOs. They find the impact of 
pre-SEO proceeds with higher market valuation on increases in cash after SEOs is 
higher than that of pre-SEO proceeds with lower market valuation. Hence, an 
examination into the impact of general corporate use on increases in cash will be 
conducted. We believe, if firms are motivated by market timing, they may have 
incentives to hide their true motivation from new investors by masking the true use of 
proceeds as general corporate use, and holding the proceeds as cash. Furthermore, if 
firms take advantage of information asymmetry through earnings management before 
SEOs (Rangan 1998; Shivakumar 2000; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998), their post-issue 
operating performance may decline. This is because firms understand that current levels 
of profitability may be unsustainable. An underperformance will be the result of an 
inferior performance compared to pre-issue unsustainable high performance. Similarly, 
firms with stronger information asymmetry will have worse post-issue stock return. 
This is not because the information asymmetry directly impairs firms’ daily operation, 
but because of an overvaluation of firms’ current share price (for example due to 
earnings management). An underperformance will be the result of a fairer valuation25. 
Hence, our hypotheses are: 
 
H8: if information asymmetry motivates general corporate use, then general corporate 
use will have a positive impact on increases in cash.  
                                                 
25 Evidence that more market timing motivation leads to worsened post-issue stock performance includes 
Kahle (2000) who finds that SEOs with more insider (manager) stock selling before SEOs will have 
worse post-issue stock performance. Similarly, Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle (2004) find that secondary 
SEOs by insiders (managers) will have worse post-issue stock and operating performance, compared to 
secondary SEOs without selling from insiders. The rationale behind both findings is that managers 
understand that the current high share price or high operating performance cannot be sustainable, so they 
sell their shares when the price is high and SEOs reflect the marketing timing motivation.  
99 
 
 
H9: if the market timing motivates general corporate use, then more general corporate 
use will lead to worsened post-issue stock and operating performance. 
 
4.2.4 Trade-off theory 
Under the trade-off theory, firms can use SEOs to adjust their capital structure towards 
an optimal level (Modigliani and Miller 1958 and 1963). The adjustment of capital 
structure towards an optimal level should add value for shareholders. Hence, our 
hypotheses are: 
 
H10: if the trade-off theory plays a role in the motivation of SEOs, general corporate 
use will have an impact (positively or negatively) on firms’ borrowing after SEOs. 
 
H11: if the trade-off theory plays a role in the motivation of SEOs, more general 
corporate use will lead to better post-issue stock performance.  
 
4.3 Data 
Our data is retrieved from the CCER/Sinofin database, which tracks firms’ 
announcements regarding post-issue use of proceeds. We have information of use for 
523 SEOs for the period from 1998 to 2003, a period containing 681 SEOs in total. 
Table 4.1 provides the summary statistics of SEO use during our sample period. (For 
more detailed summary statistics of SEO activities, please refer to the table in Chapter 
2). With the available data in China, for each SEO we identify different types of 
proceeds use as a percentage of the total proceeds. The planned use is a percentage of 
planned total proceeds. The real use is a percentage of actual proceeds. In our regression  
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Table 4.1: Use of proceeds from SEOs: breakdown categories  
Table 10Table 4.1: Use of proceeds from SEOs: breakdown categories 
InvestUSE    stands for SEO proceeds actually used in investment; 
DebtUSE  stands for SEO proceeds 
actually used in repaying debt; GeneralUSE  stands for SEO proceeds actually used for corporate general 
purposes.  Planned ratio is the ratio of SEO proceeds planned to be used in each type to total proceeds 
planned to be raised from SEOs. Real ratio is the actual SEO proceeds used in each type as a proportion 
to total actual proceeds from SEOs. Both ratios are in percentage.  
 
 
No. of SEOs 
No. of available 
use of proceeds 
info. 
InvestUSE  DebtUSE  GeneralUSE  
 Planned Real Planned Real Planned Real 
1998 162 65 92.3 50.5 0.6 0.7 7.0 48.8 
1999 126 108 92.7 65.3 0.5 0.4 6.9 34.3 
2000 206 175 92.3 66.8 0.8 0.9 6.9 32.3 
2001 97 90 94.6 75.2 0.0 0.0 5.4 24.8 
2002 51 47 97.2 68.6 0.7 0.9 2.1 30.5 
2003 39 38 95.6 89.7 0.7 0.0 3.7 10.3 
Total 681 523 93.5 67.7 0.6 0.6 6.0 31.7 
 
Data source: SEO use data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database 
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analysis, we use the real use rather than the planned use. To be consistent with previous 
literature, we classify the use of proceeds into the following three categories: 
investments (on average 93.5% of planned proceeds and 67.7% of real proceeds), debt 
repayment (on average 0.6% of planned proceeds and 0.6% of real proceeds), and 
general corporate use (on average 6.0% of planned proceeds and 31.7% of real 
proceeds). General corporate use is any use other than investments and debt repayment, 
which also includes any unreported use after SEOs. We can see a transformation to 
general corporate use (or no disclosure regarding the final use) has occurred to a great 
proportion of planned investment use. We are interested in the destination of this 
increase in general corporate use. 
 
Table 4.2 shows the summary statistics of alternations to some accounting variables 
after SEOs. To control for the common shock during the sample period, for each year 
non-issuing firms are defined as firms who do not issue equity three years prior to or 
after the current year. In other words, accounting variable alternations in issuing firms 
may be due to both the impact of SEOs and the impact of changes in the economic 
environment and capital market. Accounting variable alterations in non-issuing firms 
during the same period only shows the impact of changes in the economic environment 
and capital market. Hence the comparison between issuing firms and non-issuing firms 
reveals the true impact of SEOs on accounting variable alterations. These accounting 
variables include the three components of the cash flow statement (i.e. net cash flow 
from operations, net cash flow for investment ( CapExp ), and net cash flow from 
financing activities), cash (Cash )(and marketable securities), working capital (which is 
current assets excluding cash minus current liabilities excluding current interest-bearing 
liabilities), fixed assets, total borrowings ( Debt )( which is the total of short-term and 
long-term interest bearing borrowings), administrative expenses ( AE ), the volume of  
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for the change in accounting variables after SEOs 
Table 11Table 4.2: Summary statistics for the change in accounting variables after SEOs 
Non-issuing firms are defined as for each year firms who do not conduct any equity issue three years 
before and after the current year. Cash flow information is the amount of cash flow of certain year rather 
than the cumulative information till time t. Working capital is current assets excluding cash minus current 
liabilities excluding current interest-bearing liabilities. Total borrowings are the total of short-term and 
long-term interest bearing borrowings. All figures except size are in percentage of total assets at year t.  
 
  Issuing firms Non-issuing firms 
  As a % of total asset at t   As a % of total asset at t 
  -1 SEO yr +1 +2 +3   -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Net cash flow from 
operations 6.0 3.9 4.4 4.6 4.5   3.8 4.1 4.2 4.6 4.9 
Net cash flow for 
investments -8.8 -9.6 -9.2 -7.1 -6.2   -3.5 -3.3 -3.2 -3.1 -3.0 
Net cash flow from 
financing activities 2.8 16.1 4.2 3.4 2.7   0.1 0.1 -0.2 -1.2 -1.7 
Cash 11.6 17.1 15.0 14.7 14.1   11.2 11.5 11.9 11.9 12.0 
Cash and marketable 
securities 12.6 18.5 16.0 15.6 14.8   12.1 12.3 12.4 12.2 12.1 
Working capital 19.6 18.0 17.0 15.4 13.8   18.2 15.0 12.1 8.9 6.9 
Fixed assets 29.4 28.2 29.6 31.1 32.1   30.4 32.0 32.3 32.3 31.6 
Total borrowings 20.8 18.8 21.6 23.6 24.8   26.2 27.9 28.5 28.5 27.8 
Adminitrative costs 3.5 3.3 3.9 4.2 4.7   5.2 6.1 6.6 7.0 6.9 
Related party transactions 14.8 13.5 15.7 17.2 20.3   13.1 15.1 18.9 22.3 25.6 
Total assets (growth from 
t-1 yr)   32.7 52.0 74.2 96.4     4.5 11.2 18.9 27.9 
Mean of total assets (bn 
RMB) 1.48 1.98 2.31 2.63 2.97   1.62 1.70 1.81 1.93 2.10 
Median of total assets (bn 
RMB) 0.98 1.39 1.60 1.82 2.02   0.95 0.98 1.00 1.03 1.05 
 
Data source: SEO, related party transactions, and financial data from the China Centre for Economic 
Research (CCER) database  
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 related party transactions ( RPT ) and total assets (TA ). Each variable is scaled by total 
assets. We exclude top and bottom 1% of observations in each variable as outliers. We 
can see that issuing firms’ total assets on average increase by 96% in three years after 
SEOs, while non-issuing firms’ total assets grow by only 27.9% for the same period. 
Issuing firms’ investment activities which are measured by cash flow for investments 
are also higher than non-issuing firms both before and after SEOs. Although we cannot 
directly link issuing firms’ investment activities with the use of proceeds, we can see 
that the event of SEOs can trigger higher growth compared to non-issuing firms.  
 
The information asymmetry theory predicts that firms have incentives to raise more 
funds than needed to take advantage of their high valuation. Previous studies believe 
that cash (or cash and marketable securities) and working capital are the channels in 
which to store these additional funds (Greenwood 2005; Kim and Weibach 2008). Table 
4.2 shows that issuing firms’ cash as well as cash and marketable securities increases 
significantly after SEOs while non-issuing firms’ cash stays relatively stable. In other 
words, we show that issuing firms hold more cash after SEOs. This supports the 
information asymmetry theory.  
 
The leverage, administrative expenses, and related party transactions of issuing firms’ 
all increase after SEOs. However, all three figures increase for non-issuing firms as well. 
Hence, further investigation is required to find the impact of SEO proceeds on the 
change in these three variables.  
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4.4 The use of proceeds 
4.4.1 The Kim and Weibach (2008) model 
As mentioned in our hypotheses, to understand firms’ SEO motivations, we need to 
examine the impact of proceeds as well as general corporate use on the change in some 
accounting variables mentioned in our hypotheses. We borrow the KW model to 
examine the relationship between proceeds as well as general corporate use and changes 
in investments, administrative expenses, related party transaction, cash, and leverage. 
The standard KW model examines the relationship between the cash inflow and cash 
outflow (or how cash inflow affects cash outflow) by setting various cash inflow as the 
independent variables, and setting cash outflow as the dependent variable. The 
dependent variables in the standard KW model include the change in total assets, 
inventory, and cash holding, and the sum of accumulated capital expenditures, 
acquisitions, R&D, and reduction in long-term debt since equity issue. Each variable in 
the KW model has log transformation of one plus the original variable to minimise the 
effect of outliers. The regression is estimated by heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors clustered by industry code.  The standard KW model is: 
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0t  is the SEO year; t=-1, 0, 1, 2, 3; TA is the total assets; Proceeds are the total actual 
proceeds; other sources of funds is equal to the sum of net cash flow from operations, 
cash inflow from investment, and cash inflow from financing activities excluding 
proceeds from current SEOs. Regarding dependent variables, for balance sheet items, 
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the dependent variable is constructed as the log of one plus the change in each variable 
normalized by total assets prior to SEOs, For the income statement and the cash flow 
statement items, the dependent variable is constructed as the log of one plus the 
accumulation in each variable since SEOs, normalised by total assets prior to SEOs. 
Hence, for our research, the dependent variables corresponding to our hypotheses are: 
 
iY    1_/ln 1,1,,   iiti assetstotalVV  for V = cash (Cash ) or borrowings ( Debt ) 
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To be more specific, for H1 and H3, the dependent variable is )1ln(
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To examine the impact of the general corporate use on post-issue change in these 
accounting variables, we replace )1ln(
1,

i
i
TA
proceeds  with )1ln(
1,

i
i
General
TA
USE . The rest of 
the model remains the same as the original KW model with the exception of where 
capital expenditure is the dependent variable. Since announced investment use is a large 
                                                 
26 Please refer to Appendix 8 for the correlation table of dependent variables in KW model.  
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part of actual proceeds, we expect that announced investment use should also have an 
impact on firms’ post-issue capital expenditure. Hence, announced investment use 
)1ln(
1,

i
i
Invest
TA
USE should be included in equation (4.1) to control for its impact on capital 
expenditure: 
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As mentioned in H3, we want to examine whether investment from general corporate 
use (if this is the case) is the result of change in firms’ growth opportunities. We add an 
interaction item between general corporate use and the change in growth to equation 
(4.2). The change in growth is measured by the change in the growth rate of 
revenue  1 tt GrowthGrowth .   
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4.4.2 Results 
Table 4.3 reports the results of estimating the empirical model (4.1) when accumulated 
capital expenditure after SEOs is the dependent variable. In this model, we want to 
check whether total proceeds from SEOs and general corporate use have been used in 
firms’ investments after SEOs. Columns (1)-(4) in Table 4.3 show the results when total 
proceeds from SEOs (Proceeds) are used as the independent variable. The estimated 
coefficient for total SEO proceeds (Proceeds) is highly positively significant in columns 
(1)-(4) in Table 4.3. This result suggests that SEO proceeds are used in capital 
107 
 
Table 4.3: The KW model: Capital expenditures 
Table 12Table 4.3: The KW model: Capital expenditures 
This table presents results of estimating the KW model for capital expenditures. The results are obtained 
by using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by industry. The sample period is from 
1998 to 2003. We define t=0 as the SEO year. The model specifications are: 
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CapExp  indicates the net cash outflow for capital expenditure. Size is measured as the logarithmic total 
assets of the firm. sourcesother _  is equal to the sum of net cash flow from operations, cash inflow from 
investment, and cash inflow from financing activities excluding current proceeds. oceedsPr  is the total 
actual proceeds from SEOs. InvestUSE  is the amount of use for investment announced after SEOs. GeneralUSE  
stands for SEO proceeds in the category of  corporate general purposes.    
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CapExp
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) 
Size  -0.001 -0.018 -0.015 -0.011 -0.001 -0.023 -0.016 -0.010 
 (-0.31) (-3.31)*** (-1.28) (-0.63) (-0.34) (-4.06)*** (-1.90)* (-0.70) 
sourcesother _  0.251 0.352 0.380 0.431 0.245 0.364 0.382 0.432 
 (11.48)*** (18.53)*** (22.37)*** (28.00)*** (8.55)*** (24.01)*** (26.78)*** (17.37)*** 
proceeds  0.469 0.518 0.607 0.590     
 (11.59)*** (6.30)*** (9.11)*** (8.05)***     
InvestUSE      0.506 0.565 0.643 0.664 
     (18.67)*** (7.47)*** (8.19)*** (7.83)*** 
GeneralUSE      0.217 0.199 0.345 0.286 
     (5.70)*** (1.74) * (2.67)** (2.21)* 
constant 0.028 0.346 0.279 0.187 0.032 0.443 0.327 0.174 
 (0.37) (3.79)*** (1.27) (0.56) (0.46) (3.90)*** (1.92)* (0.64) 
         
Number of obs 613 596 580 571 481 468 456 450 
R-squared 0.403 0.520 0.547 0.559 0.420 0.533 0.554 0.564 
 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, SEO use, and financial data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database 
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expenditures from the SEO year to three years after the SEO year. On the other hand, as 
mentioned in the hypotheses development section, we are more interested in the 
destination of general corporate use, which could reveal the true motivations behind 
SEOs. Columns (5)-(8) in Table 4.3 show the results when general corporate use 
( GeneralUSE ) is used as the independent variable. We also control for the acknowledged 
use of SEO proceeds in investment InvestUSE  since InvestUSE  as the known ultimate use 
of SEO proceeds should contribute to the accumulation of post-SEO capital 
expenditures. The estimated coefficient for both InvestUSE  and GeneralUSE  is positively 
significant in all columns (5)-(8) in Table 4.3. These results suggest that general 
corporate use ( GeneralUSE ) has been used on capital expenditures. This result seems to 
support the financing for investment theory.  
 
Based on the results from Table 4.3, we know that one destination of general corporate 
use is capital expenditures. The question is that if the firm spends some unspecified use 
of SEO proceeds within the category of general corporate use on investment, why does 
not the firm announce the use of general corporate use as investment use? According to 
Walker and Yost (2008), firms should have incentives to display investment use rather 
than hide it within the category of general corporate use, because the market reaction to 
investment use is better. However, it is possible that the firm may use additional SEO 
proceeds on investment due to emerging investment opportunities. Hence, we want to 
check whether the spending on investment which comes from the fund of general 
corporate use is related to the change in investment opportunities. The change in 
investment opportunities is measured by the firm’s change in annual growth rate in 
revenue  1 ttt GrowthGrowththChangeGrow . We then add the interactive term 
between thChangeGrow with GeneralUSE to the estimations shown in Table 4.3. If the 
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Table 4.4: The KW model for capital expenditures with the growth interaction 
Table 13Table 4.4: The KW model for capital expenditures with the growth interaction 
This table presents results of estimating the KW model for capital expenditures. The results are obtained 
by using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by industry. The sample period is from 
1998 to 2003. We define t=0 as the SEO year. The model specifications are: 
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CapExp  indicates the net cash outflow for capital expenditure. Size is measured as the logarithmic total 
assets of the firm. sourcesother _  is equal to the sum of net cash flow from operations, cash inflow from 
investment, and cash inflow from financing activities excluding current proceeds. oceedsPr  is the total 
actual proceeds from SEOs. InvestUSE  is the amount of use for investment announced after SEOs. GeneralUSE  
stands for SEO proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes.    
 
ithChangeGrow  is the changes in the growth rate of sale  1,,,  tititi GrowthGrowththChangeGrow .  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) 
Size  0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005 0.002 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 
 (0.85) (-0.81) (-0.58) (-0.24) (0.41) (-1.53) (-1.11) (-0.78) 
sourcesother _  0.135 0.218 0.221 0.276 0.140 0.224 0.228 0.287 
 (9.16)*** (6.28)*** (6.19)*** (6.94)*** (6.80)*** (9.86)*** (8.11)*** (10.79)*** 
proceeds  0.431 0.515 0.579 0.538     
 (9.04)*** (8.04)*** (9.89)*** (7.39)***     
InvestUSE      0.499 0.622 0.667 0.650 
     (7.84)*** (7.59)*** (7.60)*** (7.66)*** 
GeneralUSE      0.162 0.132 0.060 -0.143 
     (2.65)** (1.98)* (0.53) (-1.43) 
thChangeGrow
oceedsPr  0.048 -0.019 0.032 0.032     
(1.12) (-0.31) (0.50) (0.30)     
thChangeGrow
USE General       0.166 0.056 -0.237 0.207 
    (2.35)** (0.33) (-0.84) (1.36) 
constant -0.076 0.131 0.145 0.068 -0.050 0.225 0.223 0.238 
 (-1.05) (0.69) (0.54) (0.17) (-0.58) (1.44) (1.13) (0.70) 
         
Number of obs 557 574 567 556 448 453 443 440 
R-squared 0.283 0.328 0.316 0.310 0.347 0.405 0.356 0.371 
 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, SEO use, and financial data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database 
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estimated coefficient for this interactive term between thChangeGrow with GeneralUSE  
is positively significant, then we are able to claim that the firm uses GeneralUSE  to meet 
the demand for investment financing due to changes in the firm’s growth opportunity, 
which should be in line with the interest of shareholders. However, if the estimated 
coefficient for the interactive term is negatively significant or not significant, then the 
investment from general corporate use is not related to the change in the firm’s growth 
opportunity. Therefore, this type of investment could be unprofitable to the firm and the 
true purpose of this type of investment could possibly be the result of agency problems.  
In other words, this type of investment could be over-investment due to the agency 
conflict between managers and shareholders. Table 4.4 shows the results when the 
interactive terms are added to the model used in Table 4.3. The estimated coefficient for 
the interactive term between thChangeGrow with GeneralUSE  is only positively 
significant in column (5) of Table 4.4, while it is not significant in columns (6)-(8). In 
addition, the estimated coefficient for the interactive term between thChangeGrow with 
proceeds  is not significant in columns (1)-(4) of Table 4.4. These results indicate that 
the firm may use general corporate use in investment due to emerged investment 
opportunities immediately after SEOs. However, in the longer term, the investment 
from general corporate use is not related to the firm’s investment opportunity. As 
mentioned in the hypotheses development section, one possible explanation to the 
investment from general corporate use where there is no emerging investment 
opportunity is the over-investment due to the agency conflict between managers and 
shareholders.27  
 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the results when administrative expenses ( AE ) and related 
party transactions ( RPT ) is the dependent variable respectively. As discussed in the 
                                                 
27 Please refer to Appendix 11 for the inclusion of individual variables in the interaction model. 
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Table 4.5: The KW model:  Administrative expenses 
Table 14Table 4.5: The KW model:  Administrative expenses 
This table presents results of estimating the KW model for capital expenditures. The results are obtained 
by using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by industry. The sample period is from 
1998 to 2003. We define t=0 as the SEO year. The model specifications are: 
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AE  stands for administrative expenses. Size is measured as the logarithmic total assets of the firm. 
sourcesother _  is the sum of net cash flow from operations, cash inflow from investment, and cash 
inflow from financing activities excluding current proceeds. oceedsPr  is the total actual proceeds from 
SEOs. InvestUSE  is the amount of use for investment announced after SEOs. GeneralUSE  stands for SEO 
proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes.    
.    
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) 
Size  -0.003 -0.006 -0.017 -0.032 -0.005 -0.012 -0.023 -0.039 
 (-1.80) (-1.93)* (-2.79)** (-3.82)*** (-3.33)*** (-3.77)*** (-3.69)*** (-5.06)*** 
sourcesother _  0.010 0.022 0.040 0.050 0.008 0.016 0.038 0.048 
 (2.59)** (3.32)*** (4.47)*** (5.32)*** (1.72) (1.97)* (4.62)*** (4.97)*** 
proceeds  0.037 0.100 0.127 0.155     
 (3.57)*** (4.49)*** (3.24)** (3.20)**     
GeneralUSE      0.025 0.090 0.128 0.158 
     (2.19)* (3.52)*** (2.73)** (2.62)** 
constant 0.091 0.196 0.456 0.812 0.135 0.327 0.587 0.952 
 (2.67)** (2.86)** (3.45)*** (4.54)*** (4.22)*** (4.24)*** (4.19)*** (5.77)*** 
         
Number of obs 608 588 576 567 479 463 454 448 
R-squared 0.066 0.101 0.118 0.145 0.042 0.072 0.112 0.131 
 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, SEO use, and financial data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database 
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Table 4.6: The KW model:  Related Party Transactions (RPT) 
 
Table 15Table 4.6: The KW model:  Related Party Transactions (RPT) 
This table presents results of estimating the KW model for capital expenditures. The results are obtained 
by using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by industry. The sample period is from 
1998 to 2003. We define t=0 as the SEO year. The model specifications are: 
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RPT  is the total value of related party transactions. Size is measured as the logarithmic total assets of the 
firm. sourcesother _  is the sum of net cash flow from operations, cash inflow from investment, and cash 
inflow from financing activities excluding current proceeds. oceedsPr  is the total actual proceeds from 
SEOs. InvestUSE  is the amount of use for investment announced after SEOs. GeneralUSE  stands for SEO 
proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes.    
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) 
Size  0.050 0.081 0.087 0.106 0.042 0.070 0.062 0.085 
 (3.43)*** (2.71)** (1.88)* (1.95)* (2.35)** (2.43)** (1.36) (1.62) 
sourcesother _  -0.014 0.008 0.088 0.186 0.007 0.044 0.127 0.224 
 (-0.43) (0.16) (1.03) (1.99)* (0.20) (1.32) (1.27) (2.08)* 
proceeds  0.193 0.292 0.623 0.612     
 (3.09)** (2.61)** (3.29)*** (2.67)**     
GeneralUSE      0.283 0.257 0.682 0.555 
     (1.62) (1.16) (2.26)* (1.64) 
constant -0.929 -1.410 -1.577 -1.951 -0.754 -1.215 -1.089 -1.566 
 (-3.12)** (-2.41)** (-1.73) (-1.80) (-2.03)* (-2.00)* (-1.23) (-1.52) 
         
Number of obs 610 592 578 570 480 466 455 449 
R-squared 0.039 0.036 0.053 0.067 0.038 0.037 0.057 0.073 
 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, SEO use, and financial data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database 
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hypotheses development section, administrative expenses could reflect the agency 
conflict between managers and shareholders, and related party transactions could reflect 
the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
Column (5)-(8) in Table 4.5 show that the estimated coefficient for GeneralUSE  is 
positively and significantly related to administrative expenses ( AE ) from the SEO year 
to three years after the SEO year. This result suggests that managers may use general 
corporate use for their own perquisites which are hidden under administrative expenses.  
This result supports the agency conflict between managers and shareholders as a SEO 
motivation. Column (5)-(8) in Table 4.6 show that the estimated coefficient for 
GeneralUSE  is only positively and significantly related to related party transactions 
( RPT ) in the second year after the SEO year, but not in the rest three columns or years. 
Hence, the evidence that the firm may use general corporate use ( GeneralUSE ) to 
facilitate related party transactions ( RPT ) is weak. This result suggests that the agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders may only play a 
weak role in the SEO decision. It is important to notice that the estimated coefficient for 
total proceeds is highly positively significant in both Tables 4.5 and 4.6.  
 
Table 4.7 reports the results when the change to cash holding after SEOs is the 
dependent variable. Cash is considered to be the place where the firm can store their 
SEO proceeds as a result of the market timing motivation. The estimated coefficient for 
both total proceeds (column (1)-(4)) and general corporate use ( GeneralUSE ) (column (5)-
(8)) is always positively significant. This result is in line with the results of previous 
studies mentioned in the hypotheses development section with regards to the market 
timing motivation. If firms aim to take advantage of overvalued stock market returns, 
they would conduct SEOs and stockpile cash. We believe this result supports for the 
market timing motivation or the information asymmetry theory. 
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Table 4.7: The KW model:  Cash holding 
Table 16Table 4.7: The KW model:  Cash holding 
This table presents results of estimating the KW model for capital expenditures. The results are obtained 
by using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by industry. The sample period is from 
1998 to 2003. We define t=0 as the SEO year. The model specifications are: 
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Cash  stands for cash stock. Size is measured as the logarithmic total assets of the firm. sourcesother _  is 
the sum of net cash flow from operations, cash inflow from investment, and cash inflow from financing 
activities excluding current proceeds. oceedsPr  is the total actual proceeds from SEOs. InvestUSE  is the 
amount of use for investment announced after SEOs. GeneralUSE  stands for SEO proceeds in the category 
of corporate general purposes.    
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) 
Size  -0.014 -0.008 -0.024 -0.026 -0.056 -0.043 -0.045 -0.038 
 (-3.34)*** (-1.36) (-3.78)*** (-1.80) (-9.95)*** (-8.39)*** (-3.62)*** (-1.94)* 
sourcesother _  0.174 0.134 0.133 0.168 0.187 0.145 0.142 0.197 
 (8.84)*** (6.97)*** (5.31)*** (6.58)*** (7.70)*** (6.54)*** (5.70)*** (10.15)*** 
proceeds  0.587 0.545 0.401 0.354     
 (10.47)*** (7.52)*** (6.13)*** (5.33)***     
GeneralUSE      0.350 0.367 0.264 0.261 
     (5.75)*** (2.72)** (2.71)** (2.03)* 
constant 0.181 0.056 0.465 0.509 1.149 0.875 0.930 0.787 
 (1.96)* (0.45) (2.94)** (1.55) (9.71)*** (7.73)*** (3.37)*** (1.75) 
         
Number of obs 613 596 582 575 481 468 458 454 
R-squared 0.450 0.421 0.325 0.332 0.250 0.235 0.239 0.279 
 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval. 
Data source: SEO, SEO use, and financial data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database 
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Table 4.8 displays the results when the change to debt after SEOs is the dependent 
variable. The estimated coefficient for total SEOs proceeds  proceeds  is only 
positively significant in columns (1)-(2). This result suggests that SEOs could influence 
firms’ debt policy for the  SEO year and the first year after the SEO year. However, the 
estimated coefficient for GeneralUSE  is not significant in column (5)-(8). In other words, 
general corporate use which is the only unknown part of total proceeds excluding 
investment use and debt prepayment is not used to prepay debt. Hence, our study does 
not find evidence supporting the trade-off theory. Please refer to Appendix 9 for a 
discussion of economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table 4.3 to Table 
4.8. 
   
To summarize the results we have obtained so far, it is clear that unspecified SEO 
proceeds ( GeneralUSE ) in the category of general corporate use is used in (a) capital 
expenditures; (b) administrative expenses; (c) related party transactions (but the 
evidence is weak); (d) cash holding. Therefore, both the financing for investment theory 
and the agency conflict between managers and shareholders receive some support. 
However, the investment from general corporate use seems not to be related to 
emerging investment opportunities. This result weakens the financing under growth 
theory and shows the possibility of over-investment which is the result of the agency 
conflict between managers and shareholders. There is weak evidence on the agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, which predicts that 
the firm will use SEO proceeds or general corporate use to facilitate related party 
transactions in order to exploit minority shareholders. In addition, the change to cash 
holding is positively related to the size of total proceeds and general corporate use. This 
result supports the market timing motivation or the information asymmetry theory.  The 
sample firms do not show the evidence that general corporate use is used to repay debt. 
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Table 4.8: The KW model: Debt 
Table 17Table 4.8: The KW model: Debt 
This table presents results of estimating the KW model for capital expenditures. The results are obtained 
by using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by industry. The sample period is from 
1998 to 2003. We define t=0 as the SEO year. The model specifications are: 
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Debt  stands for total debt which is the sum of short-term and long-term interest bearing borrowings;. 
Size is measured as the logarithmic total assets of the firm. sourcesother _  is the sum of net cash flow 
from operations, cash inflow from investment, and cash inflow from financing activities excluding current 
proceeds. oceedsPr  is the total actual proceeds from SEOs. InvestUSE  is the amount of use for investment 
announced after SEOs. GeneralUSE  stands for SEO proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes.    
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) 
Size  -0.016 -0.031 -0.031 -0.050 -0.026 -0.054 -0.043 -0.058 
 (-3.28)** (-3.83)*** (-2.13)* (-2.70)** (-3.94)*** (-6.47)*** (-3.53)*** (-3.68)*** 
sourcesother _  0.148 0.304 0.341 0.396 0.113 0.306 0.366 0.426 
 (4.47)*** (9.81)*** (13.37)*** (17.37)*** (3.55)*** (7.74)*** (10.61)*** (14.80)*** 
proceeds  0.099 0.265 0.331 0.266     
 (1.99)* (2.33)** (1.59) (1.46)     
GeneralUSE      -0.003 0.012 0.369 0.267 
     (-0.04) (0.12) (1.00) (0.80) 
constant 0.347 0.555 0.500 0.803 0.568 1.028 0.730 0.922 
 (3.19)** (3.22)** (1.45) (1.82) (4.35)*** (6.68)*** (2.55)** (2.50)** 
         
Number of obs 613 596 582 575 481 468 458 454 
R-squared 0.099 0.288 0.355 0.436 0.071 0.268 0.337 0.426 
 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval. 
Data source: SEO, SEO use, and financial data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database 
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4.5 Post-issue long-term performance 
To summarise the results in the previous section, we show that investment remains the 
main SEO use. According to our hypotheses, the positive relationship between 
investment increase and general use might be due to over-investment (because 
investment from general corporate use is not related to investment opportunities). We 
also have support for the agency conflict and market timing theory, but not for the trade-
off theory. If our conclusion is correct, general corporate use as a result of both market 
timing motivation and agency conflict will lead to worsened post-issue operating and 
stock performance. Hence, studies in long-term performance may provide more 
evidence and robustness to our conclusion.  
 
4.5.1 Matching firms and the definition of abnormal return 
Matching firms are important in long-term performance to control for common shock in 
the market such as changes to a country’s economy situation. The principle of matching 
for operating performance is to find a matching non-issuing firm, which has the same or 
similar performance to the issuing firm, and if the issuing firm has not conducted its 
SEO. Loughran and Ritter (1997) (L&R hereafter) choose their matching non-issuing 
firms based on similar size, profitability, and industry, so that they are able to compare 
operating performance. This  builds a hypothetical situation, which allows the issuing 
firms’ performance to be examined whilst it has yet to conduct the SEO. In L&R (1997), 
non-issuing firms are matched in such a way: a group of non-issuing firms that are in 
same industry as the target issuing firm is selected. Within this industry group, a group 
of non-issuing firms, which have total assets ranging from 25% to 200% of the target 
issuing firm’s total assets, is selected. Finally, within this industry-size group, the non-
issuing firm with the most similar prior issue operation income before depreciation and 
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amortisation (OIBS) over total assets is selected. However, the L&R (1997) method is 
not actually achievable in China, because the number of non-issuing firms is very low in 
the early years from when our sample is taken. Another reason as  shown in Table 4.9 is 
the difference in EBIT/TA (ROA) between issuing firms and non-issuing firms’ 
industry average. This difference is huge and significant due to regulation in China that 
only profitable firms are allowed to conduct SEOs. In other words, the final step of 
profitability matching in the L&R (1997) model may not be achieved properly because 
of the huge profitability gap. Hence, if we use the L&R (1997) method, we will end up 
with many issuing firms matched with one non-issuing firm and their pre-issue ROA 
being very different, a situation that may lead to bias associated with non-issuing firms’ 
possible abnormal change to their accounting information. Therefore, we use non-
issuing firms’ industry average EBIT/TA as the benchmark.  Table 4.9 shows the 
summary statistics of post-SEO long-term operating performance. In China, the 
phenomenon of post-SEO operating performance is that issuing firms’ profitability 
decreases radically, but may still remain higher than average performance of non-
issuing firms. This phenomenon is distinctly different from a mature market where SEO 
firms actually underperform non-issuing firms. To control for the difference in pre-issue 
performance, the abnormal operating return will further exclude the difference in pre-
issue abnormal operating return between issuing firms and non-issuing firms. Hence, 
the calculation of abnormal return for post-issue operating performance is issuing firms’ 
ROA minus non-issuing firms’ industry average ROA minus the difference between 
issuing firms’ pre-issue ROA and non-issuing firms’ pre-issue industry average ROA: 
 
)()(_ ,1,1,, industryissuingnonissuingindustryissuingnontissuingtoperating RoARoARoARoAreturnAbnormal  
 
With regards to stock market performance, the principle of matching is to find a 
matching non-issuing firm, which has the same stock performance as the issuing firm if 
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the issuing firm has not conducted its SEO.  According to Fama and French’s (1993) 
three-factor model, size, market-to-book ratio, and market return accounts for over 95% 
of stock return. Since market return is identical for issuing firms and non-issuing firms 
during the same period, size and market-to-book ratio become the most popular factors 
within the selection process.  In Loughran and Ritter (1995), a non-issuing firm with the 
highest comparable market capitalisation to the target-issuing firm is selected as its 
matching firm. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) extend the size matching by size-
industry and size-book-to-market matching. In other words, size matching takes place 
within the same industry of the issuing firm. Lee and Loughran (1998) split non-issuing 
firms into 25 quintiles based on their market-to-book ratio, and within each quintile, 
size is then used for matching. Again, due to the small sample size of non-issuing firms 
in China, we decide to adopt the method used by Lee and Loughran (1998), but we only 
divide our non-issuing firms into three equal quintiles28 according to their market-to-
book ratio 29 . Table 4.9 shows that both issuing firms and non-issuing firms have 
negative stock performance following (matched) SEO years. This is consistent with 
Figure 2.1 which shows that Chinese listed firms’ stock index had decreased since the 
peak time in 2000 till 2006, while the post-issue performance in our sample mainly 
covers the period from 1999 to 2006. However, contrary to that in a mature market, 
issuing firms in China actually slightly outperform non-issuing firms both before and 
after SEOs rather than underperform. This is possibly because even with the decrease in 
issuing firms’ operating performance, issuing firms’ operating performance is still 
higher than that of non-issuing firms, resulting in a better stock performance. Hence, the 
abnormal stock return used in this research is defined as: 
 
                                                 
28 Fama and French (1993) use three quintiles for market-to-book ratio in their analysis.  
29 The market capitalisation is the total number of shares multiplied by prior SEO year-end market price. 
It is not adjusted for any non-tradable shares discount.  
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The alternative benchmark for issuing firms’ post-issue stock performance is the index 
return. We also use market return (Shanghai Composite Index) as an alternative 
benchmark for performance.  
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4.5.2 Model of long-term post-issue operating and stock performance 
According to our hypotheses, we need to understand the relationship between post-issue 
operating/stock performance and general corporate use. We have defined our post-issue 
operating/stock performance above. We also need some control variables to control 
other factors which could potentially determine performance. Hence, our model is: 
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The key independent variable is proceeds over total assets and general corporate use as 
a percentage of proceeds. We choose the following control variables to control for some 
other determinants of the abnormal returns. Size is the natural log of total assets at the 
year-end prior to SEO. MtoB is the natural log of issuing firms’ market capitalisation 
divided by book value of equity at the year-end prior to the SEO. Pre-issue operating 
performance (Pre-op) is issuing firms’ EBIT over total assets (ROA) at the year-end 
prior to the SEO. The sign of this control variable is the net effect of the two impacts. (1) 
As the result of information asymmetry, firms might use earnings management to 
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enhance their stock price before SEOs. Hence, more earnings management may lead to 
lower post-issue performance (Rangan 1998; Shivakumar 2000; Teoh, Welch, and 
Wong 1998). (2) According to the CSRC, better ROA might lead to improved post-
issue performance, because the profitability requirement is used to distinguish between 
“good”/”bad” firms. Both Dang and Yang (2007) and Chen and Wang (2007) argue and 
prove that firms who satisfy the stricter profitability requirement have better post-issue 
performance.  Furthermore, firms with good corporate governance, good industrial 
environment, and other favourable conditions may have higher profitability as a result. 
Hence, it is possible that better pre-issue profitability will lead to better post-issue 
operating performance. Pre-issue stock performance (Pre-stock) is the issuing firms’ 12-
month return preceding their SEOs. Higher pre-issue stock performance may mean 
higher market timing incentives (Asquith and Mullins 1986; Masulis and Korwar 1986; 
and Eckbo and Masulis 1992). Hence, we expect that higher pre-issue stock 
performance will lead to worsened post-issue stock performance.  
 
EIdumB is a dummy variable measuring whether firms conduct SEOs/IPOs in the three 
years prior to SEOs. EIdumAt is a dummy variable measuring whether firms conduct 
further SEOs in period (t) after the current SEO. The period (t) depends on the length of 
post-issue long-term performance as examined in different regressions30. These control 
variables help to control the situation where previous post-issue underperformance 
might have affected the current post-issue underperformance. In literature regarding 
mature markets, these overlapping samples are normally excluded. Table 4.9 shows the 
summary statistics for these control variables. 
                                                 
30 This variable is not applicable for the year following the SEO year, because during the sample period, 
firms are not allowed to conduct another SEO in the next calendar year following the current SEO.  
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Table 4.9: Summary statistics for post-issue long-term performance 
Table 18Table 4.9: Summary statistics for post-issue long-term performance 
Non-issuing firms are defined as for each year, firms that do not conduct any equity issue three years 
before and after the current SEO year. The return on assets is EBIT divided by the total assets. The 
sample all 681 SEOs from 1998 to 2003.   
 
Panel A: operating performance 
  t-1 SEO yr t+1 t+2 t+3 
Issuing firms’ RoA 
Mean 8.8% 6.4% 4.8% 3.4% 1.8% 
StDev 4.0% 3.3% 4.7% 5.5% 7.5% 
Median 7.9% 6.0% 4.9% 4.1% 2.9% 
      
Non-issuing firms’ average  RoA 
Mean 1.2% 0.8% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 
StDev 2.0% 2.3% 2.1% 2.5% 2.7% 
Median 1.2% 0.7% 1.0% 0.9% 1.9% 
Panel B: stock performance 
 -12m 12m 24m 36m 
Issuing firm stock return 
Mean 8.7% -4.7% -16.6% -29.2% 
StDev 32.6% 32.0% 39.0% 40.2% 
Median 4.0% -10.8% -26.8% -37.7% 
     
Benchmark non-issuing firm stock return 
Mean 1.2% -9.0% -21.8% -33.6% 
StDev 30.5% 30.8% 37.6% 38.6% 
Median 0.3% -15.2% -29.0% -41.0% 
 
Data source: SEO, financial, and share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database 
 
Regarding the independent variables, Size is the natural log of total assets at the year-end prior to SEOs. 
MtoB is the natural log of issuing firms’ market capitalisation divided by book value of equity at the 
year-end prior to SEOs. Pre-issue operating performance (Pre-op) is issuing firms’ return on total assets 
(RoA, and return is measured as EBIT) at year-end prior to SEOs. Pre-stock is firms’ 12 month stock 
return prior to SEO month. EIdumB is a dummy variable whether firms conduct SEOs/IPOs in three 
years prior to SEOs. EIdumAt is a dummy variable whether firms conduct another SEO in a period (t) 
after the current SEO. The period (t) depends on the length of post-issue long-term performance (+2, or 
+3 years). Proceeds/TA is the total actual proceeds from the current SEOs divided by pre-issue total 
assets. GeneralUSE is the total general corporate use divided by the total actual proceeds.  
 
Panel C: independent variables 
  Mean StDev Median 
Size 20.745 0.817 20.698 
MtoB 1.381 0.401 1.360 
Pre-op 0.089 0.046 0.079 
Pre-stock 0.095 0.359 0.040 
EIdumB 0.815 0.388 1 
EIdumAt+2 0.115 0.319 0 
EIdumAt+3 0.207 0.405 0 
Proceed/TA 0.308 0.295 0.235 
GeneralUSE  0.317 0.281 0.246 
 
Data source: SEO, financial, and share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database 
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 4.5.3 Results 
Table 4.10 reports the results of estimating the empirical model (4.4) for long-term 
abnormal operating performance. Apart from size and constant, pre-issue operating 
performance and the dummy variable of equity issue after SEOs are the only two 
significant control variables. The negative estimated coefficient for pre-issue operating 
performance is in line with the results of previous studies with regards to earnings 
management. In other words, the high pre-issue profitability is not sustainable. The 
positive estimated coefficient for the dummy variable of equity issue after SEOs may 
reflect regulations in China that only profitable firms are able to conduct further SEOs. 
After controlling for other factors which could determine the firm’s abnormal operating 
performance, the estimated coefficient for total proceeds from SEOs ( TAproceeds / ) is 
not significant in columns (1)-(3) in Table 4.10. In other words, the size of SEO 
proceeds does not have a significant impact on firms’ post-issue operating performance. 
However, we are more interested in impact of general corporate use ( GeneralUSE ) for the 
purpose of our research. The estimated coefficient for general corporate use ( GeneralUSE ) 
is negatively significant columns (4)-(6) in Table 4.10. This result suggests that general 
corporate use has been used in a way which impairs firms’ operating profits. This result 
is in line with the results we obtained in the previous section: general corporate use is 
motivated by the information asymmetry theory, the agency conflict between managers 
and shareholders, and weakly by the agency conflict between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders. All of these three motivations are expected to impair firms’ 
value.  
 
Table 4.11 presents the results for post-issue long-term stock performance when the 
matched non-issuing firm’s stock returns are used as the benchmark. Apart from size 
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and constant, pre-issue stock performance is the only consistently significant control 
variable. The negative estimated coefficient for pre-issue stock performance is in line 
with the results of previous studies with regards to pre-issue stock overvaluation. In 
other words, firms take advantage of pre-issue stock overvaluation. The estimated 
coefficient for total SEO proceeds ( TAproceeds / ) is only weakly negatively significant 
in column (1) in Table 4.11. The estimated coefficient for GeneralUSE  is negatively 
significant in columns (4)-(6) in Table 4.11. This result is consistent with the result in 
Table 4.10. In other words, the size of SEO proceeds does not have a (strong) 
significant impact on firms’ post-issue stock performance, and general corporate use has 
a strong negative significant impact on firms’ post-issue stock performance. Very 
similar result is also obtained from Table 4.12 when Shanghai Composite Index returns 
are used as the benchmark. These strong results support the conclusion we drew in the 
previous section that if general corporate use is motivated by either agency problems or 
market timing concerns, more general corporate use will lead to worse post-issue long-
term stock performance. Please refer to Appendix 10 for a discussion of economic 
significance of the coefficients reported in Table 4.10 to Table 4.12. 
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Table 4.10: the impact of the general corporate use of proceeds on the 1, 2, and 3 
year post-issue operating performance 
Table 19Table 4.10: the impact of the general corporate use of proceeds on the 1, 2, and 3 year post-
issue operating performance 
This table presents results of estimating the empirical model (4.4). The results are obtained by using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The sample period is from 1998 to 2003. We define t=0 as 
the SEO year. The model specifications are: 
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The abnormal return for the post-issue operating performance is issuing firms’ ROA minus non-issuing 
firms’ industry average ROA: 
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Independent variables are defined in Table 4.9. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  SEO +1yr SEO +2yr SEO +3yr SEO +1yr SEO +2yr SEO +3yr 
Size -0.003 0.007 0.010 -0.001 0.010 0.012 
  (-0.83) (2.00)** (2.44)** (-0.25) (2.68)*** (2.64)*** 
MtoB 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.011 0.011 
  (0.48) (1.18) (0.88) (0.73) (1.36) (1.11) 
Pre-op -0.680 -0.659 -0.765 -0.640 -0.636 -0.698 
  (-10.02)*** (-10.78)*** (-9.44)*** (-7.91)*** (-8.90)*** (-7.74)*** 
Pre-stock 0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 
  (0.65) (0.22) (-0.44) (-0.18) (-0.39) (-0.52) 
EIdumB 0.007 0.003 -0.004 0.007 0.001 0.000 
  (1.35) (0.50) (-0.42) (1.26) (0.14) (-0.04) 
EIdumAt  0.017 0.034  0.020 0.033 
   (2.87)*** (4.90)***  (2.56)** (3.89)*** 
Proceed/TA 0.006 0.003 -0.005    
  (0.81) (0.45) (-0.52)    
GeneralUSE     -0.032 -0.024 -0.028 
     (-3.97)*** (-2.39)** (-1.82)* 
constant 0.059 -0.164 -0.260 0.022 -0.237 -0.314 
  (0.88) (-2.26)** (-2.86)*** (0.27) (-2.78)*** (-3.02)*** 
        
Number of obs 641 640 637 494 490 485 
F-value 9.52 12.30 12.84 7.57 11.25 9.21 
R-squared 0.310 0.302 0.253 0.332 0.316 0.235 
  
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, and share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database 
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Table 4.11: the impact of the general corporate use of proceeds on the 12, 24, and 
36 month post-issue stock performance 
Table 20Table 4.11: the impact of the general corporate use of proceeds on the 12, 24, and 36 
month post-issue stock performance 
This table presents results of estimating the empirical model (4.4). The results are obtained by using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The sample period is from 1998 to 2003. We define t=0 as 
the SEO year. The model specifications are: 
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Abnormal stock return is defined as issuing firms’ buy and hold monthly returns minus matched non-
issuing firms’ buy and hold monthly returns.  
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Independent variables are defined in Table 4.9. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  +12m +24m +36m +12m +24m +36m 
Size -0.018 -0.082 -0.095 -0.024 -0.059 -0.070 
  (-0.89) (-3.61)*** (-3.78)*** (-1.03) (-2.43)** (-2.49)** 
MtoB 0.005 -0.044 0.001 0.022 -0.020 0.014 
  (0.11) (-0.87) (0.02) (0.47) (-0.36) (0.22) 
Pre-op 0.481 -0.266 -0.535 0.443 0.029 0.109 
  (1.56) (-0.65) (-1.30) (1.26) (0.06) (0.24) 
Pre-stock -0.071 -0.154 -0.131 -0.170 -0.232 -0.174 
  (-1.74) (-2.79)*** (-2.41)** (-3.71)*** (-3.91)*** (-2.73)*** 
EIdumB -0.004 -0.009 0.016 -0.017 -0.004 0.004 
  (-0.09) (-0.18) (0.28) (-0.39) (-0.07) (0.06) 
EIdumAt  0.125 0.089  0.149 0.047 
   (1.80)* (1.63)  (1.53) (0.69) 
Proceed/TA -0.086 -0.068 -0.036    
  (-1.65)* (-1.01) (-0.65)    
GeneralUSE     -0.104 -0.189 -0.222 
     (-1.82)* (-2.68)*** (-2.80)*** 
constant 0.416 1.853 1.947 0.548 1.367 1.361 
  (0.90) (3.67)*** (3.50)*** (1.03) (2.50)** (2.19)** 
        
Number of obs 639 631 596 490 483 455 
F-value 2.13 3.47 3.05 2.66 3.43 3.72 
R-squared 0.057 0.091 0.082 0.083 0.125 0.118 
 
 *, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval. 
Data source: SEO, financial, and share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database 
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Table 4.12: the impact of the general corporate use of proceeds on the 12, 24, and 
36 month post-issue stock performance (SHCI as benchmark) 
Table 21Table 4.12: the impact of the general corporate use of proceeds on the 12, 24, and 36 
month post-issue stock performance (SHCI as benchmark) 
This table presents results of estimating the empirical model (4.4). The results are obtained by using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The sample period is from 1998 to 2003. We define t=0 as 
the SEO year. The model specifications are: 
 



 
mmyindustryduyeardummyUSEEIdumA
EIdumBestockeopMtoBSizeturnsAbnormal
i
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ti
iiiiii
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1,51,41,31,21,100, PrPrRe
 
Abnormal stock return is defined as issuing firms’ buy and hold monthly returns minus market buy and 
hold monthly returns for the same period. Market return is Shanghai Composite Index.  
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Independent variables are defined in Table 4.9. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  +12m +24m +36m +12m +24m +36m 
Size -0.071 -0.082 -0.059 -0.060 -0.043 -0.020 
  (-3.95)*** (-4.38)*** (-3.00)*** (-2.94)*** (-2.12)** (-0.94) 
MtoB -0.101 -0.094 -0.091 -0.080 -0.062 -0.065 
  (-3.05)*** (-2.43)** (-2.23)** (-2.14)** (-1.46) (-1.38) 
Pre-op 0.106 -0.436 -0.446 0.204 -0.162 0.071 
  (0.40) (-1.30) (-1.33) (0.67) (-0.46) (0.18) 
Pre-stock -0.096 -0.122 -0.131 -0.153 -0.123 -0.135 
  (-2.68)*** (-2.95)*** (-3.26)*** (-3.78)*** (-2.92)*** (-2.88)*** 
EIdumB 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.001 -0.011 
  (0.17) (0.05) (0.03) (0.16) (0.04) (-0.23) 
EIdumAt  0.134 0.116  0.088 0.096 
   (2.65)*** (2.99)***  (1.26) (2.05)** 
Proceed/TA -0.070 -0.072 -0.030    
  (-1.33) (-1.04) (-0.50)    
GeneralUSE     -0.056 -0.162 -0.148 
     (-1.26) (-3.18)*** (-2.51)** 
constant 1.368 1.394 0.773 1.058 0.565 -0.032 
  (3.44)*** (3.38)*** (1.75)* (2.30)** (1.28) (-0.07) 
        
Number of obs 621 609 634 476 465 486 
F-value 4.23 6.89 7.63 3.88 4.69 5.97 
R-squared 0.117 0.190 0.184 0.130 0.191 0.168 
 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval. 
Data source: SEO, financial, and share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database 
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4.6. Conclusion  
We investigated the use of proceeds of 523 Seasoned Equity Offerings in China from 
1998 to 2003. We focused on the general corporate use of proceeds, which constitutes 
31.7% of total proceeds. Our results have shown that nearly 70% of announced use in 
investment have a highly significant positive impact on firms’ post-issue investment. 
Our results have shown that general corporate use with an unspecified destination has 
been spent on investments, administrative expenses, related party transaction (although 
the evidence is very weak), and increase in cash holding.  Our results have shown 
further that investment from general corporate use was not associated with the change in 
growth opportunities. Hence, we believe that the investment from general corporate use 
could contain an element of over-investment motivated by the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders, a result which is consistent with Walk and Yost (2008). The 
announced use for debt repayment was only less than 1% of actual proceeds. 
Furthermore, we did not find a significant relationship between changes in borrowing 
and general corporate use. Hence, we do not believe that the trade-off theory is an 
important motivation for the SEO decision. The positive impact of general corporate use 
on administrative expenses and related party transactions were also evidence supporting 
the agency conflict between managers and shareholders and the agency conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The positive impact of general 
corporate use on the increase in cash indicated market-timing motivation for firms, a 
result which was consistent with Kim and Weibach (2008). In conclusion, we have 
found evidence for the agency conflict, marketing timing theory, and financing under 
growth theory as SEO motivations. Finally, the negative relationship between the post-
issue long-term operating and stock performance and general corporate use confirmed 
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that the market timing theory and the agency theory, which impair firms’ performance, 
were the motivations behind SEOs.   
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Chapter 5: Do private placements improve shareholder 
contestability in China31 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous two Chapters, we explicitly examined SEO motivations in China from 
the perspectives of firms’ pre-issue and post-issue characteristics. In this Chapter, we 
aim to examine the relationship between Chinese shareholder contestability and Chinese 
private placements. This Chapter is linked to the previous two Chapters in two ways. (1) 
The issue of shareholder contestability is taken to mean the ability to monitor 
controlling (or largest) shareholders by non-controlling shareholders. The issue of 
shareholder contestability is important in China, because as mentioned in the previous 
Chapters, state-related shareholders as controlling shareholders in China may have the 
incentive and ability to tunnel some benefits exclusively to themselves. Monitoring over 
such a tunnelling behaviour by the other (large) shareholders is weak in China. In other 
words, shareholder contestability is a corporate governance mechanism used to control 
the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, which 
is a SEO motivation mentioned in the previous Chapters. In this Chapter, we provide 
further evidence regarding this SEO motivation. (2) The sample period in this Chapter 
is from 2006 to 2009. Since the introduction of private placements in 2006, it has fast 
become the most popular SEO method in China. One of the reasons for its popularity is 
that unlike public offerings and rights issues, private placements are not restricted by 
the profitability requirement. An examination into private placements will aid our thesis 
and provide a better and more complete knowledge of Chinese SEOs.  
 
                                                 
31 This chapter is co-authored with Dr. Hong Bo. 
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One of the distinctions between private placements and public offerings is that in 
private placements new shares are issued to a limited number of investors while in 
public offerings new shares are open to all investors in the stock market. There are two 
streams of studies which explain the difference between private placements and other 
types of SEOs in two ways. From an agency conflict perspective, private placements 
have a tendency to introduce more block shareholders or higher ownership 
concentration into firms which could strengthen firms’ corporate governance by 
stronger monitoring over managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Grossman and Hart 
1980). As a result, the market reaction to private placements is likely to be positive 
(Wruck 1989), which is better than the negative market reaction to public offerings 
(Asquith and Mullins 1986; Masulis and Korwar 1986). On the other hand, private 
placements can also help to reduce information asymmetry in the issue process, because 
potential investors in private placements are given private information on firms, which 
is confidential and not public knowledge (Hertzel and Smith 1993). Investments from 
investors who hold more information may create a signalling effect for the prospective 
of firms (Leland and Pyle 1977). As a result, the market reaction to private placements 
may be (more) positive due to this signalling effect (Wruck and Wu 2009; Barclay, 
Holderness, and Sheehan 2007).  However, all of the above literature focuses on the U.S. 
market where the ownership structure is dispersed. Potential research could shift to 
where ownership structure is more concentrated. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) consider 
controlling shareholders’ incentive in a choice of issuing methods between rights issues 
and private placements in the Swedish market. They find that private placements are 
avoided if controlling shareholders’ control over firms is threatened by new block 
shareholders introduced by private placements. The new block shareholders introduced 
by private placements not only threaten controlling shareholders’ control over the firm, 
but also increase monitoring over controlling shareholders. The (non-controlling) block 
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shareholders’ ability to monitor over controlling shareholders is considered as 
shareholder contestability (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi 1997; Bennedsen and 
Wolfenzon 2000). In other words, shareholder contestability can help to reduce the 
agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Johnson, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2000). Within a context of private placements, 
there is a lack of literature concerning either shareholder contestability or the agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.  
 
The aim of this Chapter is to provide more evidence regarding the role of the agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders within the context 
of private placements in China. To be more specific, by using the market reaction as a 
tool, we want to examine whether shareholder contestability can be improved by private 
placements, which could reduce firms’ agency conflict between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders. The Chinese stock market provides a good opportunity to 
study this topic. In the Chinese stock market, shares are highly concentrated in the 
hands of one or two shareholders who are often state-owned enterprises. The interests of 
controlling shareholders associated with the state may deviate from the interests of 
minority shareholders (Aharony, Lee, and Wong 2000; Sun and Song 2003). Therefore, 
in China block shareholding introduced by private placements can not only increase 
ownership concentration leading to stronger monitoring over managers, but also 
increase the monitoring over controlling shareholders. Hence, our hypothesis is that 
firms will have a better market reaction to private placement announcements if they 
already have severe agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders. In addition to this, firms may experience an improvement in shareholder 
contestability during the private placement process.  
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In a sample of 209 private placements from 2006 to 2009, we find that there is a 
significant positive cumulative abnormal return of 3.6%, 4.8% or 5.5% during an event 
window of [-5,5], [-10,10], and [-20,20] respectively. Market reaction for public 
offerings are also calculated during the same period. The market reaction to public 
offerings is not significant for the different event windows. This result is consistent with 
literature on mature markets, that private placements have a better market reaction 
compared to public offerings.  The top 10 shareholders’ total shareholding as a measure 
of ownership concentration increases from 56.2% to 59.2%. The largest shareholders’ 
holding as a percentage of the top 10 shareholders’ total shareholding as a measure of 
shareholder contestability decreases from 66.4% to 55.7%. In other words, shareholder 
contestability increases after private placements. Our regression analysis also shows that 
the value of firms increase if those with severe agency conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders improve their shareholder contestability during 
the private placement process. In conclusion, we find evidence to support the notion that 
private placements can improve firms’ shareholder contestability.  
 
This Chapter is constructed as follows: Section 2 is the literature review; Section 3 
introduces private placement practice in China; Section 4 describes our data and 
provides some summary statistics; Section 5 shows our empirical model and results 
including the construction of event study; Section 6 is the conclusion.  
 
5.2 Literature review 
There is some literature concerned with how private placements can improve the 
corporate governance of firms. The main channel presented by literature on this 
improvement focuses on reduced manager-shareholder agency conflict through stronger 
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monitoring after private placements (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Grossman and Hart 
1980; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). This is because when a large amount of 
shares are issued to a small number of investors, new block shareholders or more 
concentrated block shareholders are created. For example, in China, regulation restricts 
the number of investors that can buy new shares issued in private placements to ten. 
Wruck (1989) studies 128 private placements from 1979 to 1985 in the U.S. market. 
The author shows that private placements are associated with a positive 4.5% market 
reaction to the issue announcement, while ownership concentration increases from an 
average of 31% to an average of 37%. The author defines ownership concentration as 
the total ownership of managers, directors, and shareholders with more than 5% 
ownership. The relationship between the increase in ownership concentration and the 
market reaction is on average positive, support for the stronger monitoring effect as a 
result of private placements. Wruck and Wu (2009) find further support for the channel 
of private placement monitoring effect by studying 1,976 private placements in the U.S. 
market from 1980 to 1999. They find that positive market reaction to private placements 
is mainly driven by private placements which create new (governance-related) business 
relationship. The new relationship is defined as: managerial appointment, new key 
business partnership, director appointment, and a creation of a new block shareholder 
with more than 5% ownership. Private placements with new business relationship 
constitute nearly half of the sample size, and are followed by better post-issue stock 
operating performance. Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2007) find similar results in 
their sample of 594 U.S. private placements from 1979 to 1997. Private placements are 
classified as active placements or inactive placements. Active placement is defined as 
where buyers appear in issuing firms’ public news within two years after the current 
placement. In other words, issuers actively participate in firms’ operations. They find 
that active placements where buyers play a more active role in monitoring have better 
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market reactions and post-issue stock performance. However, they cast doubt on the 
monitoring motivation because active placements only account for 12% of the sample.  
 
The above literature mainly focuses on the U.S. market where ownership structure is 
dispersed. High ownership concentration in a mature market is likely to lead to better 
monitoring over managers. However, in a market where ownership is already 
concentrated, a higher ownership concentration might mean giving them even more 
power to make decisions for their own benefit and at the expenses of minority 
shareholders. For example, in order to gain such power to expropriate minority 
shareholders, new block shareholder might need to pay a premium rather than receive a 
discounted market price when they buy a large amount of a firm’s shares. This premium 
is used by Barclay and Holderness (1989) as a measurement of the private benefit of 
control.  Dyck and Zingales (2004) provide a comprehensive review over the concept of 
the private benefit of control.  Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) 
discuss in more detail about how controlling shareholders “tunnel” benefits or resources 
out of the company exclusively to themselves. This tunnelling can be achieved through 
a variety of methods, such as the expropriation of corporate opportunities, transfer 
pricing issue, using low price for deprived assets, and loan guarantees. From the 
perspective of corporate governance mechanisms, there is (theoretical) literature arguing 
that the existence of multiple block shareholders or a more equal distribution of votes 
among block shareholders can improve monitoring over block shareholders helping to 
minimise their expropriation activities (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi 1997; Bennedsen 
and Wolfenzon 2000; Bloch and Hege 2001). Empirically, Maury and Pajuste (2005) 
examine 136 Finnish listed firms during 1993-2000. They show that a more equal 
distribution of votes among large block shareholders has a positive effect on firm value. 
Gutierrez and Pombo (2009) show a similar positive relationship between shareholder 
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contestability and firm value in a sample of 233 Colombian listed firms during 1996-
2004. Bo, Sun, and Wang (2011) provide evidence regarding shareholder contestability 
in the Chinese stock market. The authors investigate the impact of the split-share reform 
(which is the reform to transfer non-tradable shares into tradable shares) on Chinese 
firms’ shareholder contestability. This is because during the reform, non-tradable 
shareholders give shares to tradable shareholders to compensate for their loss of 
privilege of being tradable before the reform. As a result, non-tradable shareholders’ 
holding are reduced significantly, and shareholder contestability increases. The results 
show that firms’ value increases due to increased shareholder contestability. 
 
5.3 Private placements in China 
Private placements were introduced to the Chinese stock market in 2006 following the 
release of relevant private placement regulations. Since then, private placements have 
become the most popular Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) method in China.  
 
The focus of this paper is not to examine the reasons behind private placement 
popularity. However, it is still worthwhile to briefly mention some institutional settings, 
which make firms choose private placements to conduct SEOs. For example, private 
placements are not restricted by the profitability requirement which is imposed on rights 
issues and public offerings. In other words, if firms’ profitability cannot meet the 
requirements necessary to conduct rights issues and public offerings, they can turn to 
private placements. The profitability requirement has been imposed since the beginning 
of SEO practice in China. The Chinese Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC) tries 
to protect minority shareholders by ensuring that new shares which flow into the stock 
market through SEOs for purchase by minority shareholders come from firms with 
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profit generating potential and good corporate governance. However, in the absence of 
market mechanisms such as the certification role of investment banking, and faced with 
a large amount of SEO applications, the CSRC is not capable of investigating each of 
the applications in great detail under the time constraint. Hence, the CSRC imposes the 
profitability requirement as one of the most important requirements, to try and restrict 
firms with inferior performance raising more money 32 from (minority) shareholders. 
The profitability requirement has been strict up until the late 1990s, and has since been 
relaxed after the introduction of the sponsor system to the Chinese stock market in 2001. 
The sponsorship system plays a similar role to the investment banking system within a 
mature market. Private placements’ exemption from the profitability requirement also 
reflects the intention of regulators for investors to investigate firms in depth themselves, 
by doing so the profitability requirement may no longer be necessary. In other words, 
private placements may help to reduce information asymmetry and filter out firms with 
bad corporate governance.  
 
We will use the market reaction to private placements in China as our empirical 
evidence, so it is important to understand the process of conducting private placements. 
In the board meeting, the board of directors approve the private placement proposal. 
The board’s approval along with details of the private placement such as the use of 
proceeds, the lower bound of the issue price33 and the higher bound of issue volume are 
announced to the market within two working days after the board meeting date. This is 
the date when the private placement plan first becomes available to the public34 . 
                                                 
32 Both Dang and Yang (2007) and Chen and Wang (2007) show that firms who could satisfy the stricter 
profitability requirement will have better post-issue performance. 
33 According to the regulation, the issue price cannot be lower than 90% of the average of 20 days’ 
market price prior to a “price setting date”. The price setting date could be boarding meeting date, 
shareholder meeting date, or a date set by the security firm after CSRC’s approval. In most of our samples, 
the price setting date is board meeting date.  
34 According to the regulation from 2005, in SEOs controlling shareholders need to disclose the number 
of newly issued shares they will buy.  
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Shareholders in a shareholder meeting would then approve the proposal. After 
shareholder approval, the private placement application would then be submitted to the 
CSRC. After the CSRC’s approval, a security firm, which has a similar role of 
certification to an investment bank in a mature market, would begin to find potential 
investors for the issuing firm. All potential investors would then make an offer of price 
and volume for the newly issued shares. Then a highest possible price (issuing the 
lowest possible volume of new shares) would be determined to raise enough funds as 
planned. There is a final announcement, which would provide the full details and a 
summary of the whole private placement process including the details of buyers and 
their quantity of subscription.  
 
5.4 Data  
A list of private placements’ final announcement date35, firms’ daily share returns, and 
firms’ financial information (total assets, revenue growth, and related party transactions) 
dating from 2006 to 2009 were retrieved from CCER/Sinofin database. We then used 
this date to search and download firms’ original announcement documents from 
www.juchao.com, an official website for announcements designated by the CSRC. 
From these documents, we hand collected the following variables: first board meeting 
date, the nature of private placements (we classified the sample into four categories 
according to the nature of private placements), the nature of the buyers, the top 10 
shareholders’ holding before and after private placements, and the dummy variable 
whether any of the pre-issue top 3 shareholders count as financial institutional investors.  
 
                                                 
35 This refers to the announcement date when all buyers’ details and a summary of the whole private 
placement are released to the market.  
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Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics of SEO activities in China from 2006 to 2009. 
We further classify private placements (PP) into four categories: private placements 
without controlling shareholders’ participation, private placements with (but not solely 
to) controlling shareholders’ participation, private placements only issued to controlling 
shareholders, and other private placements. Private placement only issued to controlling 
shareholders is a feature of Chinese private placements. In many cases the controlling 
shareholder is the only investor in the private placement and it uses its assets rather than 
cash to subscribe to the newly issued shares. Within 114 private placements only issued 
to controlling shareholders, assets/shares account for the subscription to the newly 
issued shares of 103 private placements. Because of the previous quota system in IPOs, 
the listed firm has assets which are relatively superior within a group of industrial firms 
controlled by one parent firm (Aharony, Lee, and Wong 2000). In other words, under 
one parent firm, there are subsidiaries which are listed in the stock market as well as 
subsidiaries which are not listed. The parent firm could use the private placement to 
make all their assets listed in the stock market. This process is also known as a reversed 
acquisition from a listed firm’s perspective. We exclude this type of private placements 
from our empirical analysis because the purpose of this type of private placements is 
different from the purpose of a normal private placement, which is to raise more funds 
(or cash). The other private placement category includes the use for: acquisitions that 
involve the exchange of shares (with outsiders), the restructuring of SOEs, and the cases 
of missing data. The other private placement category shall also be excluded from our 
analysis, because the market reaction to these private placements might include the 
reaction to some other corporate decisions separate to a standard SEO activity. Hence, 
our analysis has a sample of 209 private placements36 where the main objective is to 
raise cash via equity financing. 209 private placements with 259 bn of proceeds make 
                                                 
36 All of our sample 209 private placements happened after their issuing firms’ reform of transferring 
non-tradable shares into tradable shares.  
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private placements the most popular SEO method during the period from 2006 to 2009, 
as compared to 109 rights issues and public offerings raising 245 bn of proceeds during 
the same period. 
 
We exclude top and bottom 1% of observations in each variable as outliers. Table 5.2 
shows some corporate governance characteristics of private placement firms. As shown 
in Panel A of Table 5.2, 62% (130/209) of private placement firms are state-owned. 
Table 2.4 in Chapter 2 shows that during the period from 2006 to 2009, of all listed 
firms there are around 60% which are state-owned. Hence, we can see that the 
percentage of state-owned firms conducting private placements each year is in line with 
the total number of state-owned firms as a percentage of the total number of listed firms. 
In other words, state-owned firms are not particularly more active in the private 
placement market. Panel B of Table 5.2 shows the subscription by different types of 
investors to the number of new shares in private placements. Foreign investors who on 
average subscribe to 2.4% of new shares are still very rare in Chinese private 
placements. There are two types of foreign investors: foreign financial investors who 
participate in Chinese private placements as Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
(QFII) and foreign enterprises who make strategic investment (such as strategic alliance) 
in Chinese firms via private placements. On average 5.8% of new shares are subscribed 
under the name of individuals. These individual investors include both wealthy 
individuals who simply want to use private placements as a method to invest into a firm 
and current top management in the issuing firm. In general, state-owned enterprises’ 
participation (15%) in private placements is low. The 31.7% subscription by state-
owned enterprises shows that state-owned enterprises only occasionally participate in 
private placements when they are controlling shareholders of issuing firms.  
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of private placements in China from 2006 to 2009 
Table 22Table 5.1: Summary statistics of private placements in China from 2006 to 2009 
We classify private placements (PP) into four categories: private placements without controlling 
shareholders’ participation, private placements with (but not solely to) controlling shareholders’ 
participation, private placements only issued to controlling shareholders, and other private placements. 
Other private placements are used for: acquisitions where involves the exchange of shares, the 
restructuring of SOEs, and the cases of missing data.   
 
Number of issues: 
  Rights issues  Public offerings  
 PP - no 
controlling 
SH 
participation  
 PP - 
controlling 
SH 
participation 
 PP - only 
controlling 
SH 
participation 
 PP - other  
2006 - 
              
7  
             
25  
             
4  
             
10  
              
3  
2007 
              
7  
              
32  
             
49  
             
33  
             
30  
              
24  
2008 
              
8  
              
27 
             
20  
             
23  
             
38  
              
25 
2009 
              
13  
              
15  
             
39  
             
16  
             
36  
              
13 
Total 
             
28  
              
81 
             
133  
             
76  
             
114  
              
65 
 
Funds raised in billion RMBs: 
   Rights issues  Public offerings  
 PP - no 
controlling 
SH 
participation 
 PP - 
controlling 
SH 
participation 
 PP - only 
controlling 
SH 
participation 
 PP - other  
2006 - 
              
11  
             
21  
             
3  
             
37  
              
18  
2007 
              
23  
              
100  
             
59  
             
44  
             
60  
              
52  
2008 
              
14  
              
52 
             
16  
             
34  
             
65  
              
42  
2009 
              
12  
              
33  
             
61  
             
20  
             
107  
              
21  
Total 
              
49  
              
196  
             
157  
             
102  
             
269  
              
134  
 
Data source: SEO data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database; firm 
announcement from www.juchao.com 
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Table 5.2: Corporate governance characteristics of private placement firms 
Table 23Table 5.2: Corporate governance characteristics of private placement firms 
Panel A: Ownership type 
  PP - no controlling SH involved 
PP - controlling SH 
involved Total 
State-Owned 71 59 130 
Non-State-Owned 60 17 77 
Missing data 2 - 2 
Total 133 76 209 
 
Data source: SEO data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database; firm 
announcement from www.juchao.com 
 
Panel B: Shares subscribed by different types of buyers as a percentage of total new 
shares 
  PP - no controlling SH involved 
PP - controlling SH 
involved Total 
Foreign enterprises 2.8% 1.6% 2.4% 
Individuals 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% 
SOE 5.5% 31.7% 15.0% 
Non-financial institutions 14.9% 16.2% 15.4% 
Financial institutions 71.0% 44.6% 61.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Data source: firm announcement from www.juchao.com 
 
Panel C: Change in ownership structure after private placements 
Top1/total Top10 is Top1 shareholder’s holding as a percentage of the total of top 10 shareholders’ 
holding. The rest holdings are scaled by the total number of shares.  
 
  Before private placements After private placements 
  
PP - no 
controlling 
SH 
involved 
PP - 
controlling 
SH 
involved 
Total 
PP - no 
controlling 
SH 
involved 
PP - 
controlling 
SH 
involved 
Total 
Top1 SH's holding 38.0% 37.5% 37.8% 32.5% 35.8% 33.7% 
Top2 SH's holding 7.4% 7.0% 7.3% 8.0% 7.5% 7.8% 
Top3 SH's holding 3.5% 2.6% 3.2% 4.5% 3.9% 4.3% 
Top4 SH's holding 1.6% 1.3% 1.5% 3.0% 2.5% 2.8% 
Top5 SH's holding 2.1% 1.7% 2.0% 2.5% 2.1% 2.4% 
Top6 SH's holding 1.3% 1.0% 1.2% 2.3% 1.9% 2.2% 
Top7 SH's holding 1.1% 0.9% 1.0% 1.9% 1.6% 1.8% 
Top8 SH's holding 0.9% 0.8% 0.9% 1.7% 1.4% 1.6% 
Top9 SH's holding 0.8% 0.7% 0.8% 1.5% 1.3% 1.4% 
Top10 SH's holding 0.7% 0.6% 0.7% 1.4% 1.1% 1.3% 
Total of top 10 SHs' holding 57.4% 54.1% 56.2% 59.3% 59.2% 59.2% 
Total of SHs' holding over 5% 45.4% 43.4% 44.7% 42.3% 43.8% 42.9% 
Top1/total Top10 65.7% 67.6% 66.4% 54.0% 58.7% 55.7% 
 
Data source: firm announcement from www.juchao.com 
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The participation by Chinese non-financial firms in private placements (15.4%) is also 
low. Finally, we can see that Chinese financial institutions subscribe to a large amount 
financial institutional investors. Hence, we can see that investors in private placements 
(most of which are institutional investors) have the incentive and the ability to monitor 
controlling shareholders and are helpful for firms to improve shareholder contestability. 
  
Panel C of Table 5.2 shows the change in ownership structure after private placements. 
We can see that before private placements the largest shareholder holds on average 
37.8% of firms’ shares, and there is a large gap between the largest shareholder and 
second largest to the top10 shareholders. On average the largest shareholder’s holding is 
66.4% of the top 10 shareholders’ total holding. From the perspective of shareholder 
contestability, the largest shareholder may face little challenge and monitoring from 
other block shareholders. After private placements, the total of top 10 shareholders’ 
holding as a measure of ownership concentration increases by 3% to 59.2%, but the 
total of shareholders with more than 5% ownership as another measurement of 
ownership concentration actually decreases by 1.8%.   This means that in China the size 
of private placements may not be big enough to generate many new block shareholders 
with more than 5% ownership. If existing shareholders do not subscribe to newly issued 
shares, existing shareholders with more than 5% ownership would experience dilution 
due to the increased total number of shares. However, the concept of ownership 
concentration should not be restricted to the number of shareholders with more than 5% 
ownership. In China, the alternative proxy of ownership concentration could be the total 
holding of the top 10 shareholders. Additionally, even with a decrease in the largest 
shareholder’s holding to 33.7%, the holding is still far greater than the other block 
shareholders. The message is that private placements may not fundamentally change the 
situation of a highly concentrated ownership structure in China, or the situation of the 
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largest shareholders’ dominating position. However, by slightly increasing the second 
largest to the tenth largest shareholders’ holdings, the largest shareholder’s holding as a 
(61.4%) of new shares in private placements. Even when state-owned enterprises as 
controlling shareholders participate, financial institutions still subscribe to the highest 
level of new shares (44.6%) among all types of percentage of the top 10 total holding 
decreases by 10.7% to 55.7%. This decease may signify an increase in shareholder 
contestability where other block shareholders have more incentive and power to monitor 
the controlling/largest shareholder in China, resulting in better corporate governance.   
 
5.5 Empirical model and results 
5.5.1 Market reaction 
We choose the market reaction to private placement announcements as a tool to 
construct our empirical evidence because the market can give an immediate assessment 
to the private placement decision regarding issuing firms’ prospective future. The event 
study of market reaction relies on the assumption of the semi-strong form of the market 
efficiency hypothesis. This means that the current share price should reflect all past and 
new public information. The challenge is that in the Chinese stock market the semi-
strong form market efficiency model might not hold. For example, both Groenewold 
et.al. (2004) and Ma (2004) demonstrate that there is some predictability of share return 
in the Chinese stock market. This is evidence against even weak form market efficiency 
where the current price reflects all past public information. However, both Groenewold 
et.al. (2004) and Ma (2004) comment that there are improvements to the Chinese stock 
market efficiency. For example, Ma (2004) shows that some predictability power has 
disappeared with time. Additionally, Ma (2004) also finds that there are significant 
market responses to some corporate announcements. This is evidence supporting semi-
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strong form market efficiency. In conclusion, if we can find a significant market 
reaction to private placement announcements, and a significant relationship between 
market reaction and corporate governance proxy, we are inclined to conclude that the 
event study of market reaction is a reliable tool in private placement announcement 
studies.   
 
For the market reaction study, we follow the Wruck (1989) method which is also the 
standard model 37 .  We first estimate the market model by OLS for each SEO 
announcement based on the estimation period from day -200 to -60 38  (the 
announcement day is day 0). The market model is a statistical model which relates the 
return of any given security to the return of the market portfolio. For any security i  the 
market model is: itmtiiit RR   . We use the Shanghai Composite Index as 
market return. t  is from -200 to -60 prior to the announcement date. We obtain the 
coefficients for the market model: 

i and 

i . We then can calculate the predicted daily 
return for the event window (which is within [-20,20]) by using the market model with 
the coefficients obtained from the OLS estimation of the market model (

i and 

i ) 
which is based on the daily return [-200,-60] for each SEO event. The abnormal return 
(AR) for each stock during the event window is defined as daily return minus the 
predicted return derived from the market model. 
  miiii RRAR
   )()( 22 iiAR     when the estimation period is large. 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from 1  to 2  for each stock is the sum of the 
daily abnormal returns. 

 2
1
),( 21


 ii ARCAR  )()1(),( 212212 ii   when the 
estimation period is large. 
                                                 
37 Please refer to MacKinlay (1997) for a comprehensive review of the event study method.  
38 The window period of [-200,-60] is also used by Wruck (1989) and MacKinlay (1997). 
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Figure 5.1: Cumulative abnormal return to private placement announcements 
during day -20 to 20 
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No controlling 
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Data source: SEO and daily share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database; firm announcement from www.juchao.com 
 
Figure 5Figure 5.1: Cumulative abnormal return to private placement announcements during day -
20 to 20 
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Table 5.3: Market reaction to the private placement announcement 
Table 24Table 5.3: Market reaction to the private placement announcement 
  CAR [-5,5] CAR [-10,10] CAR [-20,20] 
PP - no controlling SH involved 3.06% 3.76% 5.19% 
Z statistics 2.70*** 2.49*** 3.06*** 
PP - controlling SH involved 4.60% 6.69% 5.98% 
Z statistics 3.73*** 4.31*** 2.68*** 
    
All placements 3.58% 4.81% 5.46% 
Z statistics 4.17*** 4.30*** 4.32*** 
    
Public offerings -0.51% -0.99% -4.01% 
Z statistics -0.35 -0.51 -1.50 
 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval. 
Data source: SEO and daily share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) 
database; firm announcement from www.juchao.com 
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Figure 5.1 shows the CAR from day -20 to 20. We can see a clear upward shift of share 
price during the event window. Table 5.3 shows the statistics of different event 
windows. Private placements have a significant positive market reaction of 3.6%, 4.8% 
or 5.5% during an event window of [-5,5], [-10,10], and [-20,20] respectively 39 . 
Additionally, market reactions to private placements in which controlling shareholders 
subscribe are slightly better than private placements without controlling shareholders’ 
participation. This supports the possible role of information asymmetry in private 
placements. In other words, investors believe that controlling shareholders’ participation 
is a good signal for firms’ prospective future since controlling shareholders have more 
information. The market reaction for public offerings is also calculated for the same 
period. The market reaction to public offerings is not significant for the different event 
windows. This result is consistent with literature on mature markets that private 
placements have a better market reaction compared to public offerings.  
 
5.5.2 Empirical model 
To examine the relationship between the market reaction and the change in 
contestability, we also control for other possible factors which might influence the 
market reaction: 
 








dumIndus
dumyearLoSCAgencyLoSCAgency
dumgControllinPSRTALnreactionMarket
veiiveii
iiii
_
_
_)(_
7
6,1,5,1,4
321,10
           (5.1)
 
 
                                                 
39 The reaction in a window of [-30,30] is no longer significant.  
There is a reason why we might not be able to use a short event window such as [-3,0] or [-1,1]. This is 
because in China firms’ stocks might stop trading around the announcement date of important corporate 
decision under the guidance from the CSRC. We exclude the samples where non-trade days are more than 
half of the length of the event window. If we use a short event window, we will lose many samples, and 
the result might be biased. 
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Market reaction is equal to [-5,5], [-10,10], or [-20,20] CAR. The natural log of total 
assets prior to private placements ( )(TALn ) is used to control firms’ size. In the study of 
the stock market reaction to the SEO announcement, Asquith and Mullins (1986), 
Masulis and Korwar (1986), and Eckbo and Masulis (1992) use the pre-issue stock 
return as the proxy for the information asymmetry theory. They show that higher pre-
issue stock return will lead to worsened market reaction to the SEO announcement.  
PSR  is firms’ 6 month share return prior to the board meeting date. According to 
Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2007) and Wruck and Wu (2009), private 
placements that involve “active” buyers and “pre-issue governance related” buyers 
(respectively) can create a signalling effect due to information asymmetry and would 
have a better market reaction. Hence, we choose controlling shareholders’ subscription 
to control for this signalling effect. Controlling shareholder subscription dummy 
( dumgControllin _ ) is equal to one if controlling shareholder subscribes to new shares 
in the private placement, and zero otherwise. Year dummies and industry dummies are 
used. The model is estimated by heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors OLS.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, our hypothesis is that firms will have a better market 
reaction to their private placement announcements if firms have more severe agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Firms should 
experience an improvement of shareholder contestability during the process of private 
placement. For our hypothesis, we choose an interaction term ( LoSCAgency  ) 
between the pre-issue agency conflict ( Agency ) and two dummy variables of the 
improvement of shareholder contestability ( veLoSC  and veLoSC ). veLoSC  is equal to 
one if firms’ lack of shareholder contestability increases after private placement (i.e. a 
positive change in the measurement means a worse shareholder contestability after 
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private placements), and zero otherwise. veLoSC  is equal to one if firms’ lack of 
shareholder contestability decreases after private placement (i.e. a negative change in 
the measurement means a better shareholder contestability after private placements), 
and zero otherwise. The lack of shareholder contestability is measured in two ways: the 
largest shareholder’s holding divided by the second largest to tenth largest shareholders’ 
total holding ( 102/1 toTopTop ) and the traditional Herfindahl index measurements of 
difference ( diffHI _ ). HI_difference = (Vote1-Vote2)2+(Vote2-Vote3)2. In other words, 
the Herfindahl index measurements of difference is the sum of the square of the 
difference between the largest shareholder’ holding and the second largest shareholder’s 
holding and the square of the difference between the second largest shareholder’ 
holding and third largest shareholder’s holding.40  
 
Regarding the pre-issue agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders, it is measured by firms’ pre-issue related party transactions and the 
dummy variable of an absence of financial institutional investors in the largest three 
shareholders. It was mentioned in the previous Chapter that related party transactions 
could be used by controlling shareholders to tunnel some benefits exclusively to 
themselves (Berkman et. al. 2010; Jian and Wong 2004). We use the total amount of 
related party transactions scaled by total assets in the year prior to private placements 
( RPT ) as the proxy for the level of the agency conflict faced by firms. The higher the 
measurement, the worse the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. The absence of financial institutional investors in the largest 
three shareholders ( AoFII ) is a dummy variable and is equal to one if there are no 
financial institutional investors in the top 3 shareholders, and zero otherwise. The 
                                                 
40 Please refer to Appendix 12 for a summary statistics of independent variables.  
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absence of financial institutional investors indicates worsened agency conflict between 
controlling and minority shareholders (Bo, Sun, and Wang 2011).  
 
Hence, according to our hypothesis, we expect the coefficient of veLoSCAgency   to 
be significant positive. In other words, if firms facing more severe agency conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholders experience an improvement in 
shareholder contestability during private placements, this will add more value to firms 
than lower agency conflict firms. On the other hand, we expect a significant negative 
coefficient (or a non-significant coefficient) for veLoSCAgency  .  
 
5.5.3 Results 
Table 5.4 reports the results from estimating the empirical model (5.1) when pre-issue 
related party transaction is used as a proxy of firms’ pre-issue agency conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Regarding the control variables, the 
significant negative relationship between market reaction and firms’ pre-issue stock 
return in all columns in Table 5.4 is consistent with previous literature stating that firms 
may want to time the market when the cost associated with information asymmetry is 
low, and investors react negatively to such behaviour. On the other hand, controlling 
shareholders’ participation in China does not have a significant impact on the market 
reaction in all columns in Table 5.4. In other words, controlling shareholders’ 
participation does not have a signalling effect, which could reduce information 
asymmetry. Columns (1)-(3) in Table 5.4 show the results when the largest 
shareholder’s holding divided by the second largest to tenth largest shareholders’ total 
holding ( 102/1 toTopTop ) is used as the measurement for the lack of shareholder 
contestability. As we can see, the estimated coefficient for the interaction term  
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Table 5.4: The impact of the interaction term between pre-issue related party 
transactions and the change in shareholder contestability on the market reaction 
 






dumIndusdumyearLoSCAgencyLoSCAgency
dumgControllinPSRTALnreactionMarket
veiiveii
iiii
__
_)(_
76,1,5,1,4
321,10
 
Market reaction is equal to [-5,5], [-10,10], or [-20,20] CAR as our dependent variable. )(TALn  = the 
natural log of total assets prior to private placements; PSR = firm’s 6 month share return prior to board 
meeting date; dumgControllin _  = a dummy variable of whether controlling shareholders will 
participate private placements; issuepreLoSC  =pre-issue the top1 shareholder’s holding divided by the total 
of top2 to top10 shareholders’ holding ( 102/1 toTopTop ) or the traditional Herfindahl index 
measurements of difference ( diffHI _ ); veLoSC  is equal to one if firms’ lack of shareholder 
contestability increases after private placement and zero otherwise; veLoSC  is equal to one if firms’ 
lack of shareholder contestability decreases after private placement and zero otherwise; The lack of 
shareholder contestability is measured by related party transactions ( RPT ); Year dummies and industry 
dummies are used. The model is estimated by heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors OLS.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] 
)(TALn  0.019 0.022 0.040 0.019 0.023 0.041 
(2.080)** (1.720)* (2.040)** (2.060)** (1.800)* (2.070)** 
PSR  
-0.043 -0.076 -0.090 -0.043 -0.076 -0.090 
(-2.020)** (-2.830)*** (-2.150)** (-2.020)** (-2.850)*** (-2.160)** 
dumgControllin _  0.002 0.028 0.006 -0.002 0.030 0.010 
(0.110) (0.870) (0.130) (-0.110) (1.030) (0.230) 
vetoTopTop
RPT
 102/1
 0.105 0.187 0.127    
(1.180) (1.550) (0.880)    
vetoTopTop
RPT
 102/1
 0.126 0.108 0.119    
(3.180)*** (1.860)* (1.320)    
vediffHI
RPT
 _
    0.177 0.119 0.070 
   (1.530) (0.640) (0.400) 
vediffHI
RPT
 _
    0.118 0.113 0.126 
   (3.070)*** (2.160)** (1.420) 
Constant 
-0.371 -0.418 -0.847 -0.359 -0.439 -0.855 
(-1.840)* (-1.480) (-2.000)** (-1.820)* (-1.580) (-2.040)** 
       
Number of obs 179 179 179 179 179 179 
F-value 9.78 2.05 2.81 9.88 1.98 2.63 
R-squared 0.172 0.106 0.108 0.175 0.104 0.109 
 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, and daily share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research 
(CCER) database; firm announcement from www.juchao.com 
Table 25Table 5.4: The impact of the interaction term between pre-issue related party transactions 
and the change in shareholder contestability on the market reaction 
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( vetoTopTopRPT  102/1 ) is positively significant in columns (1) and (2) in Table 5.4. 
Columns (4)-(6) in Table 5.4 show the results when the Herfindahl index measurements 
of difference ( diffHI _ ) is used as the measurement for the lack of shareholder 
contestability. As we can see, the estimated coefficient for the interaction term 
( vediffHIRPT  _ ) is positively significant in columns (4) and (5) in Table 5.4. The 
results in Table 5.4 suggest that the firm with severe agency conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders benefit from private placements 
when they are able to improve the firm’s shareholder contestability. 
 
Table 5.5 reports the results of estimating the empirical model (5.1) when the absence of 
financial institutional investors in the largest three shareholders ( AoFII ) is used as a 
proxy for firms’ pre-issue agency conflict between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. Regarding the control variables, the negative relationship 
between the market reaction and firms’ pre-issue stock return is only significant in 
column (2), (3), and (5) in Table 5.5. Controlling shareholders’ participation in China is 
still not significant for market reaction in all columns in Table 5.5. Columns (1)-(3) in 
Table 5.5 show the results when the largest shareholder’s holding divided by the second 
largest to tenth largest shareholders’ total holding ( 102/1 toTopTop ) is used as the 
measurement for the lack of shareholder contestability. As we can see, the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term ( vetoTopTopAoFII  102/1 ) is only positively 
significant in column (3) of Table 5.5. Columns (4)-(6) in Table 5.5 show the results 
when the Herfindahl index measurements of difference ( diffHI _ ) is used as the 
measurement for the lack of shareholder contestability. As we can see, the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term ( vediffHIAoFII  _ ) is only positively significant in 
column (6) of Table 5.5. The result is weaker when AoFII  is used to measure firms’  
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Table 5.5: The impact of the interaction term between pre-issue absence of 
financial institutional investors and the change in shareholder contestability on the 
market reaction 
 



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

dumIndusdumyearLoSCAgencyLoSCAgency
dumgControllinPSRTALnreactionMarket
veiiveii
iiii
__
_)(_
76,1,5,1,4
321,10
 
Market reaction is equal to [-5,5], [-10,10], or [-20,20] CAR as our dependent variable. )(TALn  = the 
natural log of total assets prior to private placements; PSR = firm’s 6 month share return prior to board 
meeting date; dumgControllin _  = a dummy variable of whether controlling shareholders will 
participate private placements; issuepreLoSC  =pre-issue the top1 shareholder’s holding divided by the total 
of top2 to top10 shareholders’ holding ( 102/1 toTopTop ) or the traditional Herfindahl index 
measurements of difference ( diffHI _ ); veLoSC  is equal to one if firms’ lack of shareholder 
contestability increases after private placement and zero otherwise; veLoSC  is equal to one if firms’ 
lack of shareholder contestability decreases after private placement and zero otherwise; The lack of 
shareholder contestability is measured by the absence of financial institutional investors 
( AoFII ); AoFII is a dummy variable and is equal to one if there is no financial institutional investors in 
top 3 shareholders, and zero otherwise. Year dummies and industry dummies are used. The model is 
estimated by heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors OLS.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] 
)(TALn  0.017 0.024 0.048 0.017 0.024 0.049 
(1.700)* (1.740)* (2.290)** (1.730)* (1.800)* (2.460)** 
PSR  
-0.033 -0.066 -0.072 -0.033 -0.064 -0.064 
(-1.590) (-2.580)** (-1.880)* (-1.550) (-2.470)** (-1.640) 
dumgControllin _  0.011 0.047 0.031 0.010 0.049 0.040 
(0.490) (1.550) (0.740) (0.480) (1.600) (0.940) 
vetoTopTop
AoFII
 102/1
 -0.007 -0.030 -0.014    
(-0.120) (-0.390) (-0.180)    
vetoTopTop
AoFII
 102/1
 0.024 0.035 0.127    
(1.270) (1.260) (2.800)***    
vediffHI
AoFII
 _
    0.004 -0.035 -0.094 
   (0.090) (-0.500) (-1.010) 
vediffHI
AoFII
 _
    0.023 0.037 0.141 
   (1.210) (1.320) (3.140)*** 
Constant 
-0.290 -0.429 -1.023 -0.293 -0.438 -1.054 
(-1.360) (-1.440) (-2.260)** (-1.380) (-1.500) (-2.410)** 
       
Number of obs 184 184 184 184 184 184 
F-value 26.65 2.55 10.86 28.34 2.60 10.27 
R-squared 0.097 0.092 0.148 0.096 0.093 0.165 
 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, and daily share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research 
(CCER) database; firm announcement from www.juchao.com 
Table 26Table 5.5: The impact of the interaction term between pre-issue absence of financial 
institutional investors and the change in shareholder contestability on the market reaction 
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agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. This is probably 
because AoFII  is a discrete variable which may be less able to capture the variation of 
dependent variable compared to a continuous variable such as RPT. The results in Table 
5.5 also suggest that firm with server agency conflict between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders benefit from private placements when they are able to 
improve the firm’s shareholder contestability.41  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we first provide evidence regarding the market reaction to private 
placements. We show that there is a significant positive reaction to private placements 
while the reaction to public offerings is not significantly different from zero. Our result 
is consistent with literature on mature markets, which also show a better market reaction 
to private placements. Literature on mature markets tends to use the information 
asymmetry theory and the agency conflict between managers and shareholders to 
explain the better market reaction to private placements. As discussed in the previous 
Chapters, the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders may be severe in China due to the institutional environment of dominant 
state shareholders. We hypothesise that private placements may bring more block 
shareholders into firms who can help monitor controlling shareholders and their 
tunnelling behaviour. In other words, private placements can improve firms’ 
shareholder contestability. Our empirical results show the evidence of firms with more 
severe agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders can 
gain in firm value (i.e. a better market reaction) if they experience an improvement in 
                                                 
41 For robustness test, please refer to Appendix 13 for the inclusion of interaction variable for Table 5.4 
and Table 5.5 as well as the economic significance of independent variables. Please refer to Appendix 14 
for a nested RPT and AoFII model for Table 5.4 and 5.5 as well as the economic significance of 
independent variables. Please refer to Appendix 15 for an alternative measurement of firms’ pre-issue 
agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. The results of three robustness tests do 
not change our conclusion.  
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shareholder contestability during private placements. In conclusion, we show that 
Chinese investors are concerned with the agency conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. More generally, we are also able to fill a 
research gap in the relationship between private placements and the agency conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholders.  
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Chapter 6: Summary of the thesis 
 
6.1 Summary of results 
In this thesis, we completed three empirical works regarding Chinese SEOs. The aim of 
the thesis was to empirically examine Chinese SEOs’ practice, motivations, and their 
implications to corporate governance. In the following paragraphs, we will briefly 
summarise the method and results of these three empirical works.  
 
Chinese SEOs as a financing activity have been very frequent in the last 15 years. The 
existing literature focuses on using the agency conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders to explain the popularity of SEOs in China. In other words, controlling 
shareholders are motivated to use SEOs as cheap resource to raise some funds which 
will be used for controlling shareholders’ benefits later. This argument of SEO 
motivation could be valid because as mentioned in the introduction chapter, the Chinese 
stock market has features of high state ownership, heavy regulations, and unsound 
market mechanisms and a weak legal system to protect minority shareholders. Our 
research is particularly interested in the question that apart from the agency conflict 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, whether there are other 
theories, which can explain SEO motivations. After a literature review, we became 
interested in four mainstream theories, which presented explanations to SEO 
motivations. These four theories are the trade-off theory, the information asymmetry 
theory, the agency theory, and the financing under growth theory. In Chapter 3, we test 
these four theories by investigating how they determine firms’ SEO decision. If the four 
theories are proven to have an impact on firms’ SEO decision, we have evidence that 
these four theories can be applied in the Chinese stock market. Firms’ SEO decision is 
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empirically measured in two ways in Chapter 3: (1) at what time firms conduct their 
SEOs; (2) which type of firms conduct SEOs and which types do not conduct any SEOs. 
The two measurements of firms’ SEO decision are used in two separate logit models. 
All issuing firms (who have conducted at least one SEO from 1994 to 2006) are used as 
the sample used in the first logit model. The issuing year is defined to be one as the 
dependent variable and the non-issuing year is defined as zero. The regression results 
show that compared to non-issuing years, firms are more likely to conduct SEOs when 
(1) their pre-issue leverage is higher than their optimal leverage ratio; (2) their pre-issue 
stock return is high; (3) their revenue growth is high. The results are consistent with the 
predictions made by the trade-off theory, the information asymmetry theory, and the 
financing under growth theory respectively. All issuing firms (who have conducted at 
least one SEO from 1998 to 2006) and non-issuing firms (who have never conducted 
any SEO from 1994 to 2006) are used as the sample in the second logit model. The 
issuing firm is defined to be one as the dependent variable and the non-issuing firm is 
defined as zero. The regression results show that firms with higher ownership 
concentration and higher managerial ownership are less likely to conduct SEOs. Based 
on the assumption that ownership concentration and managerial ownership as corporate 
governance mechanisms have an impact on firms’ agency conflict, we are inclined to 
conclude that the agency conflict has an impact on firms’ SEO decision.  However, we 
cannot identify the channel of impact of the agency conflict on the SEO decision. There 
are three possible ways to explain the negative relationship between SEO likelihood and 
ownership concentration as well as managerial holding. (1) A higher ownership 
concentration reduces the agency conflict between managers and shareholder, and SEOs 
as a result of managers’ rent-seeking behaviour are reduced. (2) A higher ownership 
concentration as a result of state ownership in China may lead to worsened monitoring 
over managers. As a result, SEO likelihood is reduced to prevent free cash flow from 
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managers. (3) Higher ownership concentration aligns controlling shareholders’ interest 
with minority shareholders’ interest, and controlling shareholders are less likely to use 
SEOs for the purpose of tunnelling. In conclusion, the empirical work in Chapter 3 
shows evidential support for all four theories concerning SEO motivations.  
 
In Chapter 4, we start our research from another interesting phenomenon of Chinese 
SEOs. Within a sample of 523 SEOs taken from 1998 to 2003, 31.7% of actual 
proceeds have remained as general corporate use. This encompasses all use other than 
investments and debt repayments. The feature of general corporate use is that the 
destination of proceeds remains unclear and unknown. Our question is, where have 
these proceeds gone? Why do firms have such a large percentage of proceeds as general 
corporate use? Is there a relationship between general corporate use and SEO 
motivations?  For example, regarding the agency conflict between controlling and 
minority shareholders, related party transactions are considered as a way for controlling 
shareholders to tunnel some benefits exclusively to themselves at the expenses of 
minority shareholders. All other things being equal, if it can be proven that general 
corporate use is employed in related party transactions, it provides supporting evidence 
that the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
exists. We are interested in testing the same four theories concerning SEO motivations 
as in Chapter 3. The following potential destinations of general corporate use reflecting 
firms’ SEO motivations are chosen after a literature review: the movement in cash as a 
reflection of the information asymmetry theory (Greenwood 2005; Kim and Weibach 
2008), administrative expenses as a reflection of the agency conflict between managers 
and shareholders (Bai et al. 2004; Bo et al. 2011), related party transactions as a 
reflection of the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (Jian and Wong 2004), Capital expenditure as a reflection of the financing 
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under growth theory, and the movement in leverage as a reflection of the trade-off 
theory. Empirically, we borrow Kim and Weibach’s (2008) model to examine the 
destination of general corporate use. The regression results show that general corporate 
use are spent in investments, cash, administrative expenses, and very weakly in related 
party transactions. In a further investigation on the impact of general corporate use on 
investments, we show that the change of investments use from general corporate use is 
not due to the change in the investment opportunity. Hence, it is possible that 
investments from general corporate use contain over-investment, which is the reflection 
of the agency conflict between managers and shareholders (Walker and Yost 2008). In 
conclusion, in Chapter 4 we find evidence supporting the information asymmetry theory 
and the agency conflict between managers and shareholders, and very weak evidence 
supporting the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between general corporate 
use and firms’ post-issue long-term stock and operating performance. The significant 
negative impact of general corporate use on both firms’ long-term stock and operating 
performance confirms that the utilisation of general corporate use impairs firms’ value 
which may be motivated by the information asymmetry theory and the agency theory.  
 
Private placements have become the most popular SEO method in the Chinese stock 
market since its introduction in 2006, which is the focus of Chapter 5. A study on such a 
popular SEO method is essential to provide a more complete knowledge of Chinese 
SEOs. A distinct feature of private placements is that the number of investors of new 
shares is low. For example, in Chinese private placements, the number of investors of 
new shares is capped to ten investors by regulations. As a result, issuing firms have 
more block shareholders or more concentrated ownership structure after private 
placements. We identify a research gap not only in the Chinese stock market, but also in 
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mature markets. In mature markets, private placements are considered to improve the 
agency conflict between managers and shareholders by introducing more block 
shareholders or more concentrated ownership structure. However, there is no research 
concerning how private placements could affect the agency conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. This is probably because in mature markets, 
minority shareholder protection is already relatively well addressed and ownership 
structure is dispersed. In the Chinese stock market, ownership structure is concentrated. 
Additional (non-state) block shareholders can improve monitoring over not only 
managers but also controlling shareholders who are in many cases the state. In other 
words, private placements can improve firms’ shareholder contestability (Burkart, 
Gromb, and Panunzi 1997; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2000), which is beneficial to 
improve the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
The relationship between private placements and shareholder contestability is our 
research objective in Chapter 5. Data from firms’ private placement announcements is 
hand collected. We first show that the market reaction to private placement 
announcements is significantly positive while the market reaction to public offering 
announcements is not significantly different from zero. The result of a better market 
reaction to private placements is consistent with literature in connection to mature 
markets. We then use the market reaction to private placement announcements as a tool 
to investigate shareholder contestability. Our empirical results show that the market 
reaction is better for firms with more severe pre-issue agency conflict and those who 
experience an improvement in shareholder contestability during the private placement 
process. The volume of firms’ pre-issue related party transactions and a dummy variable 
of the pre-issue absence of institutional investors in the firms’ top 3 shareholders 
measure the pre-issue agency conflict. In conclusion, our results show that the agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is an important 
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concern among investors in China. Private placements can improve firms’ shareholders 
contestability, which is beneficial to improve firms’ agency conflict between controlling 
and minority shareholders.   
 
6.2 Implications of the thesis 
We are able to make contributions to the existing literature by testing four standard 
theories concerning the SEO motivation in China and examining Chinese private 
placements. The fundamental message from this thesis is that Chinese listed firms’ SEO 
behaviour is not hugely different from that of firms in a mature market, although there 
are still some distinctions. The similarity between the Chinese stock market and a 
mature stock market is that the mainstream theories concerning SEO motivation in a 
mature market also apply in China. Other similarities include SEO firms’ post-issue 
long-term underperformance and better market reaction to private placements than 
public offerings. Regulators and investors should understand that SEOs could be 
beneficial for firms’ value if SEOs are motivated by, for example, growth and/or capital 
structure optimisation. Similarly to that in mature markets, SEOs should always be 
under scrutiny because firms’ value will be impaired if SEOs are motivated by, for 
example, the agency conflict. The difference between the Chinese stock market and a 
mature stock market is that due to the Chinese institutional environment, the agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders plays a role in the 
SEO decision while such an agency conflict is not a concern in mature market SEOs. 
The agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is an 
important issue in some eastern European and eastern Asian countries where ownership 
structure is concentrated (La Porta, et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). The 
concentrated ownership could be the result of family control or state control which is 
163 
 
the case in China. Hence, this discrepancy means that the agency conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders might not be severe in a mature 
market, but could be an important issue in some countries like China. 
 
One implication from our empirical work in Chapter 3 is that managerial shareholding 
as a corporate governance mechanism has an impact on firms’ SEO decision from 2002 
to 2006 but does not have an impact from 1998 to 2001. In other words, the 
development or the increase in managerial holding might improve firms’ corporate 
governance in China over the years. However, managerial holding in China is still very 
low. For example, from 2002 to 2006, the average holding by board of directors, 
chairman, and the CEO is represented by 0.27%, 0.09%, and 0.02% respectively. Hence, 
regulators and society should continually encourage managerial holding in the future.  
 
Our empirical work in Chapter 4 shows that general corporate use is motivated by the 
information asymmetry theory and the agency theory, and is negatively related to firms’ 
post-issue long-term performance. We think that general corporate use may help 
managers (or existing shareholders) hide their agency conflict motivation (or the market 
timing motivation). In other words, investors and regulators should scrutinise either 
general corporate use before SEOs or the announcement to increase general corporate 
use after SEOs. As a matter of fact, the current regulation already mentions that firms 
cannot change the use of proceeds without appropriate and plausible explanation. Hence, 
regulators need to strengthen the implementation of this regulation in the future.  
 
Our empirical work in Chapter 5 shows that the market reaction to private placement 
announcements is significant positive on average. Private placements can help to 
improve firms’ shareholder contestability by introduction of more (non-state) block 
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shareholders. The result justifies regulators’ release over the exemption of private 
placements from profitability requirement. In other words, heavy administrative 
regulations are not required for private placements, which are better investigated by 
institutional investors. In the future, regulators and society should not only continuously 
encourage private placements but also other alternative mechanisms to strengthen 
corporate governance and due diligence by firms. 
 
6.3 Future research 
There is a phrase, which is used to describe the Chinese economic reform since 1978: 
“crossing the river by groping for stones”. We think that the regulators’ behaviour on 
SEOs is consistent with the idea of gradualism behind this phrase. For example, the 
conduction of SEOs could only be completed through rights issue at the start. After a 
trial period for public offerings, it became officially introduced in 2001, and then in 
2006, the launch of private placement occurred after the split-share reform.  
 
Regarding the profitability requirement, it can be seen that public offerings suffer the 
most severe profitability requirement, whilst private placements are exempt from the 
profitability requirement. The strictness of the overall profitability requirement has been 
reduced with time.  Therefore, the first aspect of future research could be SEO 
regulations. Questions asked could include: whether the profitability requirement was 
effective as a corporate governance mechanism in the last decade? Whether the 
profitability requirement remains a necessity? And if a profitability requirement is still 
required, if so, what other approaches could regulators adopt in order to remove the 
rigorous requirement in the near future? Dang and Yang (2007) and Chen and Wang 
(2007) provide an example to examine the issue of the suitability of the profitability 
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requirement as an alternative mechanism for firm quality certification. The sample 
period of Chen and Wang (2007) and Dang and Yang (2007) is from 1996 to 1998 and 
from 2000 to 2004 respectively. The impact of recent developments in Chinese stock 
market such as the implementation of the sponsor system in 2004, the split-share reform, 
and private placements are of particular interest to us. The question is whether the 
empirical result will be different from that in Dang and Yang (2007) and Chen and 
Wang (2007). If the result shows that the quality of firms is indistinguishable by the 
profitability requirement then this probably means that the profitability requirement 
may no longer be necessary. If the result shows that the profitability requirement still 
plays a role, we could probably extend the research method to more qualitative research 
such as a case study and survey to find what could be done to remove the profitability 
requirement. Interviewing a reasonably large number of managers, shareholders, and 
security firms may provide useful information and suggestions to regulators. It may help 
to shape their SEO policy in the future to achieve a trade-off between heavy or 
administrative regulations and market mechanisms in order to facilitate a flexible SEO 
process while maintaining an essential level of corporate governance.  
 
Another aspect of future research could be on the topic of private placements. Private 
placements are not negligible in mature markets. This is because private placements are 
considered to be more capable of reducing agency conflict and information asymmetry 
compared to public offerings or rights issues. Our research adds new evidence to private 
placement literature from the perspective of private placement impacts on the agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Future research 
could focus more on whether Chinese private placements can reduce information 
asymmetry compared to other issuing methods. In China, private placements 
(introduced in 2006) are relatively new to the market. Since its introduction, it has 
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become the most popular SEO method. One possible reason of this popularity is that 
private placements are exempt from the profitability requirement. Future research could 
test whether the popularity of private placements is really the result of the profitability 
requirement. More generally, we also want to understand what other reasoning is given 
behind the popularity of private placements apart from the profitability requirement. 
Economically, we want to understand the rational behind private placements and 
whether it is out of firms’ choice. For example, is it out of the need to reduce 
information asymmetry cost or to improve corporate governance that firms choose 
private placements or whether it is the profitability requirement that has forced firms to 
conduct private placements? If we can provide evidence that firms do not passively 
choose private placements but proactively decide to conduct private placements over 
their concern for information asymmetry and agency conflict, we are able to say that 
Chinese SEO behaviour is converging to that of a mature market. Additionally, if 
private placements are able to help firms improve corporate governance, we would 
expect the long-term stock or operating performance of private placements to be better 
than that of rights issues or public offerings. 
 
6.4 Limitations of the study 
The first limitation of the study is in relation to H shares in the Hong Kong stock market 
and American Depositary Receipts (ADRs)42. H share firms contain two types of firms: 
(1) firms which are incorporated in China mainland and conduct their IPOs in the Hong 
Kong stock market; (2) firms which are incorporated in China mainland and conduct 
their IPOs in the China mainland stock exchanges but raise more equity through SEOs 
in the Hong Kong stock market. Chinese ADR stocks also contain two types of firms: (1) 
firms which are incorporated in China mainland and conduct their IPOs in the U.S. 
                                                 
42 Special thanks to Dr Yothin Jinjarak for comments on H shares and ADRs.  
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stock exchanges; (2) firms which are incorporated in China mainland and conduct their 
IPOs in the China mainland stock exchanges but raise more equity through SEOs in the 
U.S. stock exchanges. Unfortunately, we have limited data access to Chinese firms’ H 
shares and ADRs. We admit that these China mainland listed firms who raise more 
equity or conduct SEOs in the Hong Kong stock market and U.S. stock market could be 
particularly relevant to our research. The study on H shares and ADRs is a limitation of 
this research but could be an interesting topic of future research.  
 
Secondly, we acknowledge that there could be endogeneity problem in our estimations43. 
An independent variable is considered to be endogenous if it is correlated to the error 
term. Without considering endogeneity problem, we may not be able to safely conclude 
a causal relationship between independent variables dependent variables. The main 
causes of endogeneity which could be relevant to our estimations in the thesis include 
the followings. (1) Endogeneity is caused by omitted variables. This means even though 
we find a significant relationship between independent variables and dependent variable, 
we may not be able to safely conclude a causal relationship. This is because there could 
be an omitted variable which affects both independent variables and dependent variable. 
In other words, the true causal relationship could be between the omitted variable and 
dependent variable. (2) Endogeneity is caused by simultaneity. This means that 
dependent variable and independent variables are jointly determined. An example of 
this is price and quantity in supply and demand model.  
 
In panel data models with a continuous dependent variable, endogeneity can be dealt 
with the Arellano and Bond’s (1991) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) first-
difference estimator or Blundell and Bond’s (1998) system-GMM estimator. 
                                                 
43 Special thanks to Professor Alessandra Guariglia for comments on endogeneity.  
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Unfortunately, none of our main estimation has a panel data structure with a continuous 
dependent variable. In Chapter 3, our dependent variable is binary which is the SEO 
decision. Our estimations in Chapter 4 and 5 are all cross-sectional estimations. In the 
case of cross-sectional models and panel data models with a discrete dependent variable, 
one way to deal with endogeneity is to use instrumental variables for endogenous 
independent variables. An instrumental variable may, to some extent, be able to solve 
the endogeneity problem if it is selected in a way that it only affects dependent variable 
only through its effect on the endogenous independent variable. An instrumental 
variable needs to be correlated with the endogenous independent variable but not 
correlated with the error term. The potential problem of the method of instrumental 
variables is that it is not easy to select an appropriate instrumental variable and 
sometimes an appropriate instrumental variable might not be available. 
 
Hence, the question is to what extent estimations in this thesis suffer from the 
endogeneity problem. In general, many of our regressions might not suffer seriously 
from the ambiguous causality between dependent variable and independent variables. In 
Chapter 5, our dependent variable is the market reaction to the private placement 
announcement. The window period is [-5,5], [-10,10], and [-20,20]. Independent 
variables include 6 month share return prior to the issue, controlling shareholders’ 
participation, pre-issue related party transactions, and pre-issue ownership feature in 
term of the absence of financial institutional investors within top 3 shareholders. We 
think it is very hard to conclude that firms’ pre-issue share return, related party 
transactions, and ownership feature are determined by the market reaction to an event 
which is absolutely uncertain to happen in the future. 
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In Chapter 4, our key independent variable is proceeds or general corporate use. Our 
dependent variable is either post-issue spending or post-issue performance. Again, it is 
hard to conclude that either the amount of proceeds or general corporate use raised in 
SEOs is determined by firms’ post-issue performance in the future which is absolutely 
uncertain at the time of the SEO decision. In other words, the causality between post-
issue performance and proceeds or general corporate use does not seem to be 
ambiguous. Regarding post-issue spending estimation, we think the problem of omitted 
variable should be at a least extent. This is because the estimation is not a normal 
determination model, but a model to check the sensitivity between cash inflow and cash 
outflow. The right hand side of the equation includes all cash inflow into the business 
(so no cash inflow is omitted) and the left hand side of the equation presents different 
type of spending. Regarding simultaneity problem, to a weak extent, we could argue 
that, for example, firms may use their future investment plans to determine how much 
they need to raise during SEOs. However, our conclusion is not affected by the 
direction of the causality between dependent variable and independent variables. Our 
conclusion on SEO motivation is based on where firms spend their proceeds or general 
corporate use. It does not matter whether proceeds or general corporate use determines 
post-issue spending or whether post-issue spending determines proceeds or general 
corporate use. Both of the directions could support our conclusion on SEO motivations. 
However, endogeneity problem may still lead to inconsistent estimations. Even if we 
aim to deal with endogeneity problem, we may still face the difficulty of a lack of 
instrumental variable for the endogenous variable. Our key independent variable is 
proceeds or general corporate use. It may be difficult to find an instrument variable 
which could be correlated to proceeds or general corporate use, but not the error term. 
This is because proceeds or general corporate use is a very isolated feature which only 
belongs to the event of SEOs.  
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In Chapter 3, Equation (3.1) is a panel data model with a discrete dependent variable to 
test the trade-off theory, the information asymmetry theory, and the growth theory 
which is proxied by firms’ time-variant measurement of pre-issue leverage (deviation 
from an optimal level), stock return, and growth. Equation (3.3) is a cross-sectional 
model with a discrete dependent variable to test the agency conflict which is measured 
by ownership structure. In Equation (3.3), we take average of independent variables, so 
post-issue ownership structure will be included into the estimation as well. Hence, the 
question is whether SEOs can significantly change ownership structure. As we 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, private placements could change ownership structure in a 
more dramatic way. However, in our sample in Chapter 3, private placements are rare, 
and the impact of public offerings and rights issues on firms’ ownership structure is 
very limited. In general, the agency conflict or corporate governance is a set of 
economic, legal, political, and cultural processes, and will not be easily changed by a 
single event like the SEO. Hence, we think ownership structure is an exogenous 
variable. Regarding the independent variables in Equation (3.1), the variable of the 
deviation from the optimal leverage level which is used to proxy the trade-off theory 
might be endogenous. This is because if the estimation for Equation (3.2) is endogenous, 
the independent variables in Equation (3.2) will be correlated to the error term which is 
termed as the deviation from firms’ optimal leverage. We use the error term from 
Equation (3.2) as an independent variable in Equation (3.1). Some of independent 
variables in Equation (3.1) are also the independent variables in Equation (3.2). Hence, 
it is possible that the error term as an independent variable in Equation (3.1) is 
correlated to other independent variables in Equation (3.1). To deal with the potential 
endogeneity problem, we choose the lagged error term for Equation (3.1) as an 
instrumental variable to the original variable. In other words, the original variable to 
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proxy the trade-off theory is the pre-issue error term which is termed as the deviation 
from firms’ optimal leverage. The lagged error term is the error term two or three years 
prior to issues. Appendix 16 shows the results of using lagged error term as the 
instrumental variable which are similar to the results of original estimations.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: H shares and American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) 
According to Hong Kong stock exchange fact book, by the end of 2009, there are 116 H 
share companies in the main board, and 40 H share companies in the Growth Enterprise 
Market (GEM). H share firms contain two types of firms: (1) firms which are 
incorporated in China mainland and conduct their IPOs in the Hong Kong stock market; 
(2) firms which are incorporated in China mainland and conduct their IPOs in the China 
mainland stock exchanges but raise more equity through SEOs in the Hong Kong stock 
market.  
 
By the end of 2010, there are 185 Chinese ADR stocks traded on the U.S. organised 
exchanges (i.e. NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX)44. Chinese ADR stocks also contain two 
types of firms: (1) firms which are incorporated in China mainland and conduct their 
IPOs in the U.S. stock exchanges; (2) firms which are incorporated in China mainland 
and conduct their IPOs in the China mainland stock exchanges but raise more equity 
through SEOs in the U.S. stock exchanges.  
 
Both H shares and ADRs present Chinese firms’ effort to raise equity when the 
domestic stock markets are not able satisfy their financing demand. For example, before 
Chinese Small and Medium Enterprise board was established in 2004 and Chinese 
Growth Enterprise Market board was established in 2009, high growth but low profit 
and size firms are not able to go public under Chinese main boards. Another example is 
that Chinese firms could go aboard for equity when the domestic stock market is at a 
low point. On the other hand, some Chinese firms believe that raising equity in a non-
domestic market is a signal for a better quality firm. This is because the regulation and 
                                                 
44 Source: http://chinamarketpro.com 
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the disclosure requirement which Chinese firms face abroad is stricter than that in the 
domestic Chinese stock market. Hence, Chinese firms’ willingness to face a more 
challenging stock market in term of financial transparency could indicate firms’ quality.  
 
Unfortunately, we have limited data access to Chinese firms’ H shares and ADRs. We 
admit that these China mainland listed firms who raise more equity or conduct SEOs in 
the Hong Kong stock market and U.S. stock market could be particularly relevant to our 
research. The study on H shares and ADRs is a limitation of this research but could be 
an interesting topic of future research.  
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Appendix 2: timeline of major stock market regulation changes mentioned in Chapter2 
This appendix summarises major stock market regulation changes mentioned in Chapter2. 
 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009  
                                    
                                         > Fixed PE ratio of 12 to 14 for IPO
 pricing 
  > Public offerings first introduced 
> Fixed PE ratio m
ethod for IPO
 pricing 
b
d
d
  > B
 shares opened to dom
estic investors 
> Sponsor system
 first introduced 
> IPO
 quota allocated to security com
panies 
> M
ax PE ratio of 20 for IPO
 pricing 
> Public offerings form
ally introduced 
    > SM
E board established 
> Sponsor system
 form
ally introduced 
> M
ax PE ratio of 20 for IPO
 pricing abandoned 
> Split-share reform
 began 
> A
 shares opened to Q
FIIs 
> Private placem
ents introduced 
    > G
EM
/C
hiN
ext board established 
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Appendix 3: definition of variables 
Panel A: variables in Chapter 3 
Symbol Definition 
Eq. (3.1) ity  =1, if the firm i conducts a SEO within year t , and 0 otherwise 
iTIME  =1, if the year is before 2002, and 0 if the year is during 2002 and 2006 to reflect the diminished amount of SEO activity in the 
second period 
1itsize  the natural log of the firm’s total assets 
itYrEI  years since the firm’s last equity issue which includes the IPO and SEOs 
1itprofit  earnings before interest and taxes ( EBIT ) divided by total assets 
1_ itindusLev  the firm’s leverage minus (GICS 4-digit or 2-digit) industry average 
1itLev  firm’s leverage is measured by interest-bearing (short/long-term) loans divided by total assets 
1itPSR  six-month share returns prior to the SEO. If there is no SEO during a year for a firm, this measure is the previous year’s second 
half year’s return 
1Re itvG  the percentage change in operating revenue 
  
Eq. (3.3) iy  =1, if the firm has conducted at least one SEO during the sub-
sample period, and 0 if the firm with the age of more than three 
has never conducted SEOs since 1994 
avgisize ,  the average of the natural log of the firm’s total assets 
avgiprofit ,  the average of earnings before interest and taxes ( EBIT ) divided by total assets 
avgiTANG ,  the average of total fixed assets divided by total assets 
avgiindusLev ,_  the average of the difference between firms’ leverage and their industry average leverage 
avgiPSR ,  the average of revenue growth 
avgiSD .  = 1 if the firm is a state-controlling list firm and 0 otherwise 
avgiLH .  the average of the largest shareholder’s holding 
avgiTH .  the average of the sum of top 10 shareholders’ holding 
avgiNTH .  the average of non-tradable shares holding 
avgiBoDH .  the average of the holding of board of directors 
avgiCH .  the average of the chairman’s holding in board of directors 
avgiCEOH .  the average of the CEO’s holding 
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Appendix 3: definition of variables (continued) 
Panel B: variables in Chapter 4 
Symbol Definition 
Cash  firm’s cash balance 
Debt  firm’s leverage is measured by interest-bearing (short/long-term) 
loans divided by total assets 
CapExp  firm’s capital expenditure (retrieved from cash flow statement) 
AE  firm’s administrative expenses 
RPT  firm’s related party transactions 
sourcesOther _  the sum of net cash flow from operations, cash inflow from 
investment, and cash inflow from financing activities excluding 
proceeds from current SEOs (retrieved from cash flow statement 
proceeds  SEO proceeds 
GeneralUSE  general corporate use of SEO proceeds 
InvestUSE  investment corporate use of SEO proceeds 
thChangeGrow  the change in the growth rate of revenue  1 tt GrowthGrowth  
  
1,iSize  the natural log of total assets at the year-end prior to SEO 
1,iMtoB  the natural log of issuing firms’ market capitalisation divided by 
book value of equity at the year-end prior to the SEO 
1, ioppre  issuing firms’ EBIT over total assets (ROA) at the year-end prior 
to the SEO 
1, istockpre  the issuing firms’ 12-month return preceding their SEOs 
1,iEIdumB  a dummy variable measuring whether firms conduct SEOs/IPOs in 
the three years prior to SEOs. 
tiEIdumA ,  a dummy variable measuring whether firms conduct further SEOs 
in period (t) after the current SEO 
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Appendix 3: definition of variables (continued) 
Panel C: variables in Chapter 5 
Symbol Definition 
iSize  the natural log of total assets 
iPSR  firms’ 6 month share return prior to the board meeting date 
idumgControllin _  =1, if controlling shareholder subscribes to new shares in the private placement, and zero otherwise 
1,iAgency  pre-issue agency conflict 
RPT  the total amount of related party transactions scaled by total 
assets in the year prior to private placements 
AoFII  =1, if there are no financial institutional investors in the top 3 
shareholders, and zero otherwise 
veiLoSC ,  =1, if firms’ lack of shareholder contestability increases after private placement (i.e. a positive change in the measurement 
means a worse shareholder contestability after private 
placements), and zero otherwise 
veiLoSC ,  =1, if firms’ lack of shareholder contestability decreases after private placement (i.e. a negative change in the measurement 
means a better shareholder contestability after private 
placements), and zero otherwise 
102/1 toTopTop  the largest shareholder’s holding divided by the second largest 
to tenth largest shareholders’ total holding 
diffHI _  (Vote1-Vote2)2+(Vote2-Vote3)2. In other words, the Herfindahl 
index measurements of difference is the sum of the square of 
the difference between the largest shareholder’ holding and the 
second largest shareholder’s holding and the square of the 
difference between the second largest shareholder’ holding and 
third largest shareholder’s holding 
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Appendix 4: the structure of data 
The sample period for Equation (3.1) in Chapter 3 is from 1994 to 2006. This is a period 
from when Chinese SEO data is available in the CCER database to the last financial 
year before this research began. The structure of the panel of the sample firm-year 
observations used in Equation (3.1) is shown in the following table.  
year No. of obs. 
1994 140 
1995 160 
1996 177 
1997 347 
1998 457 
1999 470 
2000 539 
2001 477 
2002 588 
2003 640 
2004 651 
2005 647 
2006 676 
Total 5969 
 
The sample period for Equation (3.3) in Chapter 3 is from 1998 to 2006. The sample 
from 1994 to 1997 is missing because corporate governance data used in Equation (3.3) 
is not available for Chinese listed firms before 1998.  
 
The sample period in Chapter 4 is from 1998 to 2003. The sample from 1994 to 1997 is 
missing because neither cash flow statement nor use data of SEO proceeds is available 
for Chinese list firms before 1998. The sample from 2004 to 2006 is missing because 
we need three years’ financial information of firms after SEOs to study firms’ post-issue 
spending of their SEO proceeds and firms’ post-issue performance.  
 
The sample period in Chapter 5 is from 2006 (when private placements became 
available to Chinese listed firms) to 2009 (the last financial year before the research on 
Chapter 5 began).  
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Appendix 5: revised leverage prediction model 
Apart from the leverage prediction model in the main text, we also use different 
prediction models and estimation for robustness. The revised leverage prediction 
models include new independent variables such as regional dummy. The new method of 
estimation is fixed-effect panel data.  
 
Pooled OLS: 
itit
ititit
itititit
regionD
IndustryDYearDNTholdingretyearFull
vGprofitTANGsizeLeverage






9
8765
43210
__
Re
 
 
Fixed-effect panel data: 
itiitit
itititit
uYearDNTholdingretyearFull
vGprofitTANGsizeLeverage




8765
43210
__
Re
 
 
itLeverage = the firm’s leverage. Leverage is measured by interest-bearing 
(short/long-term) loans divided by total assets. 
itsize = the natural log of the firm’s total assets. 
itTANG = the average of total fixed assets divided by total assets 
itprofit = earnings before interest and taxes ( EBIT ) divided by total assets. 
itvGRe = the percentage change in operating revenue. 
itretyearFull __ = the firm’s full year stock return. 
itNTholding = the firm’s non-tradable shares holding. 
itYearD  = year dummy. 
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itIndustryD  = GICS 2-digit industry dummy. 
itregionD = region dummy. 
it = pooled OLS error term 
it = firm’s fixed effect 
itu  = firm’s fixed effect error term 
 
The place of firms’ incorporation is used to identify which provincial unit the firm 
belongs to. The distribution of these provincial units across regions is as follows 
(Guariglia, Liu, and Song 2011): 
 
Table A5.1: classification of Chinese provincial units 
Coastal region  Central region  Western region 
Beijing  Shanxi  Chongqing 
Tianjin  Inner Mongolia  Sichuan 
Hebei  Jilin  Guizhou 
Liaoning  Heilongjiang  Yunnan 
Shanghai  Anhui  Tibet 
Jiangsu  Jiangxi  Shaanxi 
Zhejiang  Henan  Gansu 
Fujian  Hubei  Qinghai 
Shandong  Hunan  Ningxia 
Guangdong  Xinjiang 
Hainan 
Guangxi       
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Table A5.2: results for revised leverage prediction model: 
  Pooled FE 
Size 0.022 0.076 
(13.58)*** (27.62)*** 
TANG 0.033 0.050 
(3.62)*** (5.10)*** 
Profit -0.657 -0.439 
(-29.33)*** (-26.00)*** 
RevG 0.015 0.005 
(4.66)*** (2.05)** 
Full_year_ret 0.007 0.002 
(1.78)* (0.78) 
NTSH -0.058 0.128 
(-4.76)*** (6.64)*** 
Constant -0.144 -1.446 
(-4.06) (-23.27) 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes No 
Region dummy Yes No 
Number of obs 10,031 10,031 
F-value 48.70 108.61 
R-squared 0.120 
Adj R-squared 0.118   
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: financial and share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER)  
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Appendix 6: revised model for Equation (3.1) 
In order to add robustness test to the results of equation (3.1), we use different 
estimation methods to estimate equation (3.1). The model in equation (3.1) or Table 3.2 
is estimated by firm clustered regression. The differences between the model in 
equation (3.1) or Table 3.2 and the model in this appendix include: (1) regarding the 
estimation method, we first use pooled logit and probit estimation, and then fixed-effect 
logit, random-effect logit, and random-effect probit in this appendix. We also report the 
marginal effect of these estimations which is used to show the economic significance of 
the coefficients associated with the independent variables. (2) In this appendix, the 
residual of the optimal leverage prediction model (using pooled OLS and fixed-effect 
panel estimation respectively) in appendix 5 is used to measure firms’ deviation from 
their optimal leverage. The model in this appendix also includes the regional dummy if 
it is possible.  
 
it
itit
ititititit
regionD
IndustryDYearDvGPSR
indusLevprofitsizeYrEIy








9
871615
1413121
Re
_
        
 
We first estimate the model by pooled logit and probit regression and report the 
marginal effect in Table A6.1 and A6.2 respectively. As shown in Table 6.1, the 
coefficient for the measurement of growth becomes not significant when the residual of 
a pooled OLS leverage prediction model is used. This result is consistent with the result 
shown in column (11) of Table 3.2, where the coefficient for the measurement of 
growth is also not significant when the residual from the original leverage prediction 
model is in the regression. The possible reason is that the leverage prediction model 
may absorb some effect of firms’ growth. Compared to the economic significance of the  
coefficients associated with the measurement of the trade-off theory and the information 
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Table A6.1: result for revised Equation (3.1) estimated by pooled logit and probit  
1__ itpooledresLev = the residual of the leverage prediction model estimated by 
pooled OLS in Appendix 5. 
1__ itFEresLev = the residual of the leverage prediction model estimated by fixed-
effect panel data in Appendix 5. 
  Pooled logit Pooled probit 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
YrEI -0.100 -0.119 -0.085 -0.049 -0.059 -0.043 
(-3.45)*** (-3.57)*** (-2.57)** (-3.13)*** (-3.31)*** (-2.43)** 
Size 0.090 0.133 -0.364 0.055 0.076 -0.205 
(1.69)* (2.16)** (-1.69)* (1.82)* (2.21)** (-1.73)* 
Profit 14.723 18.122 18.043 8.466 10.462 10.439 
(13.95)*** (14.71)*** (12.13)*** (14.35)*** (15.11)*** (12.57)*** 
Lev_indus 1.877 1.031 
(5.51)*** (5.45)*** 
Lev_res_pooled 2.853 1.601 
(7.20)*** (7.28)*** 
Lev_res_FE 6.594 3.712 
(2.37)** (2.42)** 
PSR_sec 1.662 2.357 2.449 0.910 1.325 1.374 
(11.40)*** (12.70)*** (13.30)*** (11.81)*** (13.24)*** (13.88)*** 
RevG 0.320 0.165 0.207 0.193 0.096 0.121 
(3.38)*** (1.53) (1.96)** (3.55)*** (1.57) (2.01)** 
Constant -2.984 -3.916 4.848 -1.817 -2.291 2.689 
(-2.61) (-2.97) (1.26) (-2.82) (-3.10) (1.27) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs 5,473 4,770 4,781 5,473 4,770 4,781 
LR chi square 1,475 1,451 1,407 1,487 1,465 1,421 
Log likelihood -1,824 -1,427 -1,451 -1,818 -1,420 -1,444 
Pseudo R2 0.288 0.337 0.327 0.290 0.340 0.330 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
Table A6.2: marginal effect for the result in Table A6.1 
  Pooled logit Pooled probit 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
YrEI -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 
Size 0.006 0.007 -0.021 0.008 0.009 -0.026 
Profit 1.046 0.969 1.038 1.294 1.233 1.323 
Lev_indus 0.133 0.158 
Lev_res_pooled 0.153 0.189 
Lev_res_FE 0.379 0.470 
PSR_sec 0.118 0.126 0.141 0.139 0.156 0.174 
RevG 0.023 0.009 0.012 0.030 0.011 0.015 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
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asymmetry theory, the economic significance of the coefficients associated with the 
growth is low according to Table A6.2, ranging from 0.01 to 0.03 which is relatively 
low. The result is, to some extent, consistent with the result in Chapter 4 that firms’ 
post-issue investment is not correlated to the change in firms’ growth opportunity. In 
other words, the validation of growth theory in SEO motivation is weakened. 
 
As shown in Table 6.2, the economic significance of the coefficients associated with 
firms’ pre-issue profitability ranges from 0.97 to 1.32. This means a 1% increase in 
profitability will lead to 0.97% – 1.32% increase in the probability that a firm will 
conduct a SEO. This result reflects the rigorous impact of SEO profitability regulation. 
The economic significance of the coefficients associated with firms’ deviation from 
their optimal leverage level which is the proxy of the trade-off theory ranges from 0.13 
to 0.47. This means a 10% deviation will lead to 1.3% –  4.7% increase in the 
probability that a firm will conduct a SEO. The economic significance of the 
coefficients associated with the pre-issue share return which is the proxy of the 
information asymmetry theory ranges from 0.12 to 0.17. This means a 10% share return 
will lead to 1.2% –  1.7% increase in the probability that a firm will conduct a SEO.  
 
To provide more robustness test, we estimate the model by fixed-effect or random-
effect panel data regression. We noted that fixed-effect panel estimation is not available 
to a probit estimation, and the marginal effect calculation is not available to a fixed-
effect logit estimation. Hence, we use fixed-effect and random-effect logit estimation 
and random-effect probit estimation, and report marginal effect for random-effect 
logit/probit estimation.  
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Table A6.3: result for revised Equation (3.1) by panel estimation 
  Fixed-effect logit Random-effect logit Random-effect probit 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
YrEI 1.133 1.454 1.513 -0.100 -0.119 -0.085 -0.049 -0.059 -0.043 
(14.21)*** (13.71)*** (14.45)*** (-3.45)*** (-3.57)*** (-2.57)** (-3.14)*** (-3.31)*** (-2.43)** 
Size 0.886 1.485 1.461 0.091 0.133 -0.366 0.055 0.076 -0.207 
(4.77)*** (5.63)*** (2.53)** (1.70)* (2.17)** (-1.70)* (1.83)* (2.22)** (-1.74)* 
Profit 12.821 16.262 17.074 14.722 18.123 18.056 8.466 10.463 10.447 
(8.57)*** (7.18)*** (4.59)*** (13.95)*** (14.71)*** (12.15)*** (14.35)*** (15.11)*** (12.59)*** 
Lev_indus 1.811 1.875 1.030 
(2.69)*** (5.50)*** (5.44)*** 
Lev_res_pooled 2.264 2.849 1.599 
(2.53)** (7.19)*** (7.27)*** 
Lev_res_FE 3.022 6.627 3.732 
(0.40) (2.39)** (2.44)** 
PSR_sec 1.421 2.412 2.370 1.662 2.357 2.449 0.910 1.326 1.374 
(8.35)*** (9.44)*** (9.37)*** (11.39)*** (12.71)*** (13.31)*** (11.81)*** (13.25)*** (13.88)*** 
RevG 0.218 -0.012 -0.030 0.320 0.165 0.207 0.193 0.096 0.121 
(1.83)* (-0.08) (-0.19) (3.38)*** (1.52) (1.97)** (3.55)*** (1.57) (2.01)** 
Constant -2.758 -3.814 5.108 -1.708 -2.243 2.830 
(-2.45) (-2.94) (1.32) (-2.70) (-3.09) (1.33) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs 5,171 4,008 4,016 5,473 4,770 4,781 5,473 4,770 4,781 
LR chi square 1,708 1,608 1,605 820 744 744 950 858 855 
Log likelihood -819 -503 -507 -1,824 -1,427 -1,451 -1,818 -1,420 -1,444 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database 
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Table A6.4: marginal effect for the result in Table A6.3 
  Random-effect logit Random-effect probit 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
YrEI -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 
Size 0.006 0.007 -0.021 0.008 0.009 -0.026 
Pro 1.046 0.969 1.038 1.294 1.233 1.324 
Lev_indus 0.133 0.157 
Lev_res_pooled 0.152 0.188 
Lev_res_FE 0.381 0.473 
PSR_sec 0.118 0.126 0.141 0.139 0.156 0.174 
RevG 0.023 0.009 0.012 0.030 0.011 0.015 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
The results based on the panel estimation in Table A6.3 are similar to the results based 
on the pooled estimation in Table A6.1. The coefficients for the measurement of the 
trade-off theory and the information asymmetry theory are positively significant, and 
the economics significance of the coefficients is also high (ranging from 0.13 to 0.47 for 
the proxies of the trade-off theory and ranging from 0.12 to 0.17 for the information 
asymmetry proxy). The coefficient for growth is significant in columns 4, 6, 7 and 9 
columns in Table A6.3. The economic significance of the coefficients associated with 
growth is also low, ranging from 0.009 to 0.030. Although the impact of growth on SEO 
decision could be positively significant as shown in Table 3.2, compared to the impact 
of other theories, the impact of growth becomes weakened.  
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Appendix 7: revised model for Equation (3.3) 
In the revised model, we aim to verify whether the results are robust to using the 
medians instead of the means of the independent variables across all available years. 
Using medians would enable us to minimize the effects of outlying observations. 
Additionally, instead of estimating Equation (3.3) separately for two time periods 
(Tables 3.3 and 3.4), we estimate one single regression where each regressor is 
interacted with a dummy equal to 1 in the first period, and 0 otherwise; and a dummy 
equal to 1 in the second period, and 0 otherwise. This would enable us to gain degrees 
of freedom and to test whether the effect of each of our regressors is indeed statistically 
different in the two time periods. Hence, our revised model is: 
i
medimedimedi
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medimedimedi
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medimedimedi
medimedimedii
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
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0206,129801,110206,10
9801,90206,89801,7
0206,69801,50206,4
9801,30206,29801,1
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__
 
9801dum = 1 if the period is from 1998 to 2001, and 0 otherwise. 
0206dum = 1 if the period is from 2002 to 2006, and 0 otherwise.  
Region dummy variables ( regionDum ) are the same as defined in Appendix 5. The 
rest variables are the same as defined in Equation (3.3).  
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Table A7.1: results for revised model for Equation (3.3) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Size_9801 0.634 0.739 0.740 0.577 0.718 0.723 0.725 
(7.80)*** (8.67)*** (8.40)*** (6.68)*** (8.13)*** (8.20)*** (8.20)*** 
Size_0206 0.566 0.669 0.733 0.579 0.717 0.723 0.721 
(6.95)*** (7.83)*** (8.32)*** (6.70)*** (8.14)*** (8.20)*** (8.18)*** 
Profit_9801 13.862 14.788 15.252 16.114 15.077 15.112 15.204 
(5.43)*** (5.65)*** (5.74)*** (6.04)*** (5.68)*** (5.69)*** (5.73)*** 
Profit_0206 6.314 7.549 11.345 10.809 11.561 11.500 11.624 
(2.37)** (2.72)*** (3.82)*** (3.69)*** (3.91)*** (3.88)*** (3.92)*** 
TANG_9801 0.298 0.336 0.454 0.559 0.432 0.422 0.460 
(0.53) (0.59) (0.79) (0.98) (0.75) (0.74) (0.80) 
TANG_0206 0.011 -0.091 -0.040 -0.281 -0.168 -0.177 -0.074 
(0.02) (-0.16) (-0.07) (-0.47) (-0.28) (-0.30) (-0.13) 
Lev_indus_9801 -0.052 -0.035 -0.191 0.211 -0.254 -0.227 -0.208 
(-0.08) (-0.05) (-0.30) (0.33) (-0.40) (-0.36) (-0.33) 
Lev_indus_0206 0.243 0.006 0.038 0.352 0.034 0.050 0.015 
(0.34) (0.01) (0.05) (0.46) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) 
PSR_9801 2.130 2.115 2.200 2.023 2.160 2.155 2.175 
(5.74)*** (5.61)*** (5.74)*** (5.36)*** (5.62)*** (5.62)*** (5.68)*** 
PSR_0206 -0.574 -0.799 -0.665 -0.896 -0.399 -0.411 -0.585 
(-1.40) (-1.86)* (-1.50) (-1.93)* (-0.87) (-0.89) (-1.34) 
RevG_9801 0.468 0.307 0.334 0.261 0.401 0.409 0.388 
(1.43) (0.93) (1.01) (0.78) (1.19) (1.22) (1.16) 
RevG_0206 0.144 0.185 0.301 0.130 0.262 0.275 0.299 
(0.33) (0.42) (0.59) (0.26) (0.52) (0.55) (0.60) 
State_dum_9801 -0.229 -0.095 -0.159 -0.116 -0.185 -0.198 -0.188 
(-0.98) (-0.39) (-0.65) (-0.48) (-0.75) (-0.80) (-0.76) 
State_dum_0206 -0.126 -0.001 0.038 -0.008 -0.120 -0.111 -0.033 
(-0.59) (0.00) (0.17) (-0.03) (-0.51) (-0.48) (-0.14) 
LH_9801 -1.541 
(-3.02)*** 
LH_0206 -1.690 
(-2.74)*** 
TH_9801 -4.696 -4.731 -4.719 -4.685 
(-6.25)*** (-6.29)*** (-6.27)*** (-6.24)*** 
TH_0206 -7.285 -7.284 -7.274 -7.299 
(-7.89)*** (-7.85)*** (-7.86)*** (-7.88)*** 
NTH_9801 -5.287 
(-6.07)*** 
NTH_0206 -7.999 
(-8.03)*** 
BoDH_9801 -57.148 
(-1.39) 
BoDH_0206 -5.961 
(-1.91)* 
CH_9801 -130.745 
(-0.89) 
CH_0206 -12.798 
(-1.67)* 
CEOH_9801 -111.645 
(-0.76) 
CEOH_0206 -11.283 
(-1.22) 
Constant -13.942 -15.441 -13.297 -9.531 -12.740 -12.867 -12.956 
(-8.24)*** (-8.85)*** (-7.53)*** (-5.32)*** (-7.18)*** (-7.26)*** (-7.30)*** 
Number of obs 1,628 1,616 1,625 1,628 1,625 1,625 1,625 
LR chi square 471.73 497.92 586.68 589.18 595.74 596.07 590.98 
Log likelihood -852.891 -832.520 -793.487 -794.166 -788.956 -788.793 -791.339 
Pseudo R2 0.217 0.230 0.270 0.271 0.274 0.274 0.272 
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Table A7.2: marginal effect for the result in Table A7.1 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Size_9801 0.146 0.170 0.167 0.130 0.161 0.161 0.163 
Size_0206 0.131 0.154 0.165 0.131 0.160 0.161 0.162 
Profit_9801 3.196 3.400 3.442 3.640 3.373 3.372 3.419 
Profit_0206 1.456 1.736 2.560 2.442 2.586 2.566 2.614 
TANG_9801 0.069 0.077 0.103 0.126 0.097 0.094 0.103 
TANG_0206 0.002 -0.021 -0.009 -0.064 -0.038 -0.040 -0.017 
Lev_indus_9801 -0.012 -0.008 -0.043 0.048 -0.057 -0.051 -0.047 
Lev_indus_0206 0.056 0.001 0.009 0.079 0.008 0.011 0.003 
PSR_9801 0.491 0.486 0.497 0.457 0.483 0.481 0.489 
PSR_0206 -0.132 -0.184 -0.150 -0.202 -0.089 -0.092 -0.131 
RevG_9801 0.108 0.071 0.075 0.059 0.090 0.091 0.087 
RevG_0206 0.033 0.043 0.068 0.029 0.059 0.061 0.067 
State_dum_9801 -0.053 -0.022 -0.036 -0.026 -0.041 -0.044 -0.042 
State_dum_0206 -0.029 0.000 0.009 -0.002 -0.027 -0.025 -0.007 
LH_9801 -0.354 
LH_0206 -0.389 
TH_9801 -1.060 -1.058 -1.053 -1.054 
TH_0206 -1.644 -1.629 -1.623 -1.642 
NTH_9801 -1.194 
NTH_0206 -1.807 
BoDH_9801 -12.783 
BoDH_0206 -1.333 
CH_9801 -29.170 
CH_0206 -2.855 
CEOH_9801 -25.108 
CEOH_0206             -2.538 
 
The results shown in Table A7.1 are very similar to that in Table 3.3 and 3.4. The 
measurements of ownership concentration as the proxy of the agency conflict are 
significantly negative in both periods. Although the coefficient for board of directors’ 
holding and chairman’s holding is still significantly negative in the period from 2002 to 
2006, they are only significant at 10% confidence level, while they are significant at 5% 
confidence level in the original estimation. The marginal effect of variables shows that 
the effect of profitability is very strong which ranges from 3.29 to 3.64 in the first 
period and ranges from 1.46 to 2.61 in the second period. The next high marginal effect 
variables are corporate governance variables whose marginal effects are all over 1. This 
means a 10% increase in, for example, ownership concentration, will lead to over 10% 
increase in the probability that a firm will conduct a SEO. Although the marginal effect 
for managerial ownership is high in the first period, the coefficients for these are not 
significant at all.   
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Appendix 8: correlation table of dependent variables in KW model 
This appendix shows the correlation between different dependent variables used in KW model.  
      Mean  St.Dev.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20) 
(1)  ΔCash t0  0.13  0.15  1 
(2)  ΔCash t1  0.13  0.14  0.65  1 
(3)  ΔCash t2  0.14  0.16  0.48  0.64  1 
(4)  ΔCash t3  0.16  0.20  0.33  0.44  0.67  1 
(5)  Σ Capex t0  0.12  0.12  0.09  0.11  0.16  0.16  1 
(6)  Σ Capex t1  0.24  0.19  0.29  0.15  0.24  0.25  0.79  1 
(7)  Σ Capex t2  0.33  0.24  0.30  0.22  0.26  0.32  0.70  0.90  1 
(8)  Σ Capex t3  0.42  0.29  0.26  0.19  0.31  0.30  0.60  0.80  0.92  1 
(9)  Σ Admin t0  0.05  0.03  0.15  0.14  0.14  0.11  0.05  0.08  0.05  0.05  1 
(10)  Σ Admin t1  0.10  0.06  0.26  0.20  0.18  0.13  0.09  0.13  0.09  0.09  0.93  1 
(11)  Σ Admin t2  0.17  0.09  0.30  0.27  0.23  0.15  0.11  0.16  0.12  0.11  0.86  0.94  1 
(12)  Σ Admin t3  0.24  0.13  0.32  0.29  0.30  0.19  0.12  0.18  0.15  0.15  0.81  0.89  0.95  1 
(13)  Σ RPT t0  0.14  0.19  ‐0.08  ‐0.05  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.06  0.04  0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.03  1 
(14)  Σ RPT t1  0.28  0.33  ‐0.09  ‐0.05  0.00  ‐0.01  0.12  0.11  0.08  0.07  ‐0.06  ‐0.07  ‐0.07  ‐0.05  0.87  1 
(15)  Σ RPT t2  0.42  0.44  ‐0.07  ‐0.03  0.04  0.03  0.12  0.11  0.10  0.10  ‐0.06  ‐0.08  ‐0.08  ‐0.05  0.79  0.93  1 
(16)  Σ RPT t3  0.58  0.54  ‐0.04  ‐0.01  0.10  0.08  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.12  ‐0.08  ‐0.09  ‐0.08  ‐0.04  0.70  0.84  0.95  1 
(17)  ΔDebt t0  0.04  0.12  0.18  0.10  0.17  0.12  0.25  0.23  0.22  0.22  0.00  0.06  0.11  0.13  ‐0.01  0.03  0.04  0.05  1 
(18)  ΔDebt t1  0.12  0.18  0.23  0.21  0.25  0.20  0.37  0.54  0.49  0.42  ‐0.01  0.06  0.14  0.17  ‐0.04  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.64  1 
(19)  ΔDebt t2  0.19  0.24  0.24  0.15  0.36  0.31  0.35  0.49  0.54  0.53  ‐0.07  ‐0.02  0.06  0.11  ‐0.03  0.02  0.09  0.13  0.55  0.79  1 
(20)  ΔDebt t3  0.25  0.29  0.20  0.17  0.36  0.43  0.30  0.46  0.57  0.60  ‐0.06  ‐0.01  0.02  0.09  ‐0.05  ‐0.03  0.04  0.09  0.40  0.62  0.82  1 
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The correlations highlighted in grey are between the same variables but only for 
different periods. This is the reason why the correlations are high. In the rest of the table, 
there is a high correlation between the change in debt and accumulated capital 
expenditure. The possible explanation is that firms borrow more to fund their 
investments.  
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Appendix 9: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table 4.3 to 
Table 4.8 
In this Appendix, we calculate the economic significance of the coefficients reported in 
Table 4.3 to Table 4.8. The economic significance is a useful statistical tool to examine 
the magnitude of impact of independent variable on dependent variable to avoid 
misleading conclusion.  
 
Table A9.1: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table 4.3 (Capex) 
  t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) 
Size 0.006 0.059 0.035 0.020 0.006 0.075 0.037 0.018 
Other source 0.502 0.481 0.459 0.463 0.490 0.497 0.461 0.464 
Proceeds 0.593 0.347 0.290 0.221
Known invest 0.538 0.318 0.258 0.210 
General use         0.188 0.091 0.113 0.074 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
Table A9.2: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table 4.4 (Growth 
interaction) 
  t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) 
Size 0.019 0.026 0.019 0.009 0.012 0.043 0.026 0.024 
Other source 0.270 0.298 0.267 0.296 0.280 0.306 0.275 0.308 
Proceeds 0.545 0.345 0.276 0.202
Known invest 0.531 0.350 0.268 0.205 
General use 0.023 0.018 0.008 0.020 
Proceeds interaction 0.057 0.011 0.015 0.009
General use interaction         0.066 0.013 0.035 0.023 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
Table A9.3: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table 4.5 (Admin 
expenses) 
  t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) 
Size 0.055 0.048 0.083 0.108 0.092 0.095 0.112 0.131 
Other source 0.059 0.073 0.100 0.098 0.048 0.053 0.095 0.094 
Proceeds 0.139 0.162 0.126 0.106
General use         0.064 0.100 0.087 0.074 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
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Table A9.4: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table 4.6 (RPT) 
  t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) 
Size 0.267 0.212 0.150 0.136 0.224 0.183 0.107 0.109 
Other source 0.024 0.009 0.078 0.140 0.012 0.048 0.113 0.168 
Proceeds 0.210 0.156 0.219 0.161
General use         0.211 0.094 0.164 0.100 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
Table A9.5: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table 4.7 (Cash) 
  t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) 
Size 0.094 0.052 0.125 0.119 0.377 0.278 0.234 0.175 
Other source 0.379 0.361 0.357 0.451 0.407 0.391 0.381 0.529 
Proceeds 0.807 0.719 0.425 0.332
General use         0.330 0.332 0.192 0.168 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
Table A9.6: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table 4.8 (Debt) 
  t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) 
Size 0.235 0.179 0.120 0.149 0.383 0.312 0.166 0.173 
Other source 0.704 0.732 0.682 0.692 0.538 0.737 0.732 0.744 
Proceeds 0.298 0.313 0.262 0.162
General use         0.006 0.010 0.200 0.112 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
Economic significance of the coefficients is calculated as the coefficient of independent 
variable multiplied by one standard deviation of independent variable divided by the 
mean of dependent variable. In Table 4.3 to Table 4.8, the results show that general 
corporate use has a significant impact on Capex, administrative expenses, and cash, and 
has a weak impact on related party transactions. Table A9.1 shows that one standard 
deviation increase in general corporate use will lead to an 18.8% increase in Capex at 
the year of SEO. If we take out the effect of the log transformation, the effect will 
increase to 20.7%. This effect reduces to 7.4% in three years after SEOs. Table A9.3 
shows that one standard deviation increase in proceeds will lead to a range from 6.4% to 
10% increase in administrative expenses. According to Table A9.5, the impact of 
general corporate use is most significant on the change in cash, which ranges from 33% 
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to 16.8%. The overall level of the economic significance of the coefficients confirms the 
impact of general corporate use on firms’ post-issue Capex, administrative expenses, 
and cash.  
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Appendix 10: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table 4.10 to 
Table 4.12 
In this Appendix, we calculate the economic significance of the coefficients reported in 
Table 4.10 to Table 4.12. 
 
Table A10.1: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table 4.10 
(operating performance) 
  SEO +1yr SEO +2yr SEO +3yr SEO +1yr SEO +2yr SEO +3yr 
Size 0.061 0.099 0.109 0.020 0.142 0.130 
MtoB 0.030 0.056 0.043 0.049 0.077 0.059 
Pre-op 0.770 0.525 0.466 0.725 0.507 0.425 
Pre-stock 0.036 0.012 0.024 0.009 0.019 0.029 
EIdumB 0.067 0.020 0.021 0.067 0.007 0.000 
EIdumAt 0.094 0.183 0.111 0.178 
Proceed/TA 0.044 0.015 0.020 
      0.139 0.073 0.065 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
Table A10.2: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table 4.11 (stock 
performance against matched non-issuing firms) 
  SEO +12m SEO +24m SEO +36m SEO +12m SEO +24m SEO +36m 
Size 0.376 1.176 1.777 0.501 0.846 1.309 
MtoB 0.051 0.309 0.009 0.225 0.141 0.128 
Preop 0.563 0.214 0.561 0.518 0.023 0.114 
Prestock 0.651 0.971 1.077 1.560 1.463 1.431 
EIdumB 0.040 0.061 0.142 0.168 0.027 0.036 
EIdumAt 0.701 0.825 0.835 0.436 
Proceed/TA 0.648 0.352 0.243 
      0.466 0.582 0.891 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
GeneralUSE
GeneralUSE
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Table A10.3: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table 4.12 (stock 
performance against index) 
  SEO +12m SEO +24m SEO +36m SEO +12m SEO +24m SEO +36m 
Size 0.532 0.284 0.151 0.450 0.149 0.051 
MtoB 0.371 0.160 0.114 0.294 0.105 0.082 
Preop 0.045 0.085 0.064 0.086 0.031 0.010 
Prestock 0.316 0.186 0.148 0.504 0.187 0.152 
EIdumB 0.021 0.003 0.001 0.021 0.002 0.013 
EIdumAt 0.181 0.147 0.119 0.122 
Proceed/TA 0.189 0.090 0.028 
 
      0.090 0.120 0.081 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
Table A10.1 shows that one standard deviation increase in general corporate use as a 
percentage of total proceeds will lead to a 13.9% increase in the operating performance 
in one year after SEOs. This effect reduces to 6.5% in three years after SEOs. Table 
A10.2 shows that one standard deviation increase in general corporate use as a 
percentage of total proceeds will lead to a 46.6% increase in the stock performance 
where matched non-issuing firms are used as benchmark in one year after SEOs. This 
effect increases to 89.1% in three years after SEOs. A10.3 shows that one standard 
deviation increase in general corporate use as a percentage of total proceeds will lead to 
a 9% increase in the stock performance where index returns are used as benchmark in 
one year after SEOs. The economic significance of the coefficients is lower when index 
returns are used as benchmark compared to that when matched non-issuing firms are 
used as benchmark. This is probably because matched non-issuing firms are better to be 
used as benchmark for issuing firms’ performance.  
 
GeneralUSE
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Appendix 11: inclusion of individual variables in the interaction model (Table 4.4) 
In the interaction model, we include the individual variable of the interaction model to 
examine whether the result will be different.  
 )1ln(
1,
0 



i
t
i
i
i TA
CapExp
Y  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) t(0) t(1) t(2) t(3) 
Size  0.005 -0.006 0.000 0.003 0.004 -0.010 -0.005 0.005 
 (0.91) (-0.56) (-0.02) (0.18) (0.63) (-1.03) (-0.43) (0.28) 
sourcesother _  0.132 0.222 0.227 0.278 0.137 0.227 0.232 0.289 
 (8.81)*** (6.45)*** (7.02)*** (6.78)*** (7.04)*** (10.68)*** (7.95)*** (9.56)*** 
proceeds  0.421 0.518 0.613 0.637     
 (8.52)*** (8.24)*** (7.65)*** (5.02)***     
InvestUSE      0.497 0.642 0.710 0.753 
     (7.76)*** (7.46)*** (8.14)*** (7.97)*** 
GeneralUSE      0.133 0.149 0.096 0.225 
     (2.51)** (2.14)* (0.88) (1.08) 
thChangeGrow
oceedsPr  0.162 -0.218 -0.269 0.342     
(1.77) (-2.11)* (-1.71) (1.37)     
thChangeGrow
USE General       0.097 -0.057 -0.791 0.924 
    (0.75) (-0.32) (-2.33)** (2.83)** 
ChangeGrowth -0.035 0.065 0.105 -0.082 0.013 0.022 0.090 -0.085 
 (-1.59) (1.70) (2.42)** (-1.46) (0.73) (1.01) (2.70)** (-3.33)*** 
constant -0.114 0.090 -0.017 -0.121 -0.084 0.152 0.077 -0.189 
 (-1.05) (0.43) (-0.05) (-0.31) (-0.75) (0.85) (0.36) (-0.48) 
         
Number of obs 559 576 569 555 451 455 444 439 
R-squared 0.271 0.335 0.369 0.352 0.334 0.405 0.365 0.405 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
We include the change in growth in the regression of Table 4.4. In the Table 4.4, the 
interaction variable between general corporate use and change in growth is only 
significantly positive at the year of SEOs while not significant for the rest three periods. 
In the new result presented above, the same interaction variable is negatively significant 
in the two and three years after SEOs. This negative relationship does not support that 
the change from general use to Capex is associated with the change in growth.  
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 Appendix 12: summary statistics of independent variables in Chapter 5 
This appendix shows the summary statistics of independent variables used in Chapter 5.  
  Mean StDev Median 
Size 21.67 0.95 21.59 
PSR 0.34 0.47 0.30 
Controlling_dum 0.36 0.48 0.00 
LoSC_dum ( 102/1 toTopTop ) 0.91 0.29 1.00 
LoSC_dum ( diffHI _ ) 0.86 0.34 1.00 
RPT before issue 0.25 0.27 0.18 
AoFII_dum before issue 0.42 0.49 0.00 
HI_diff before issue 0.13 0.12 0.10 
Top1/Top2-10 before issue 4.67 8.79 2.28 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
The sample is 209 private placements from 2006 to 2009 (after excluding private 
placements where the controlling shareholder is the only buyer). The natural log of total 
assets prior to private placements ( )(TALn ) is used to control firms’ size.  PSR  is firms’ 
6 month share return prior to the board meeting date. On average, issuing firms have 
34% positive stock return 6 months before the boarding meeting date. Controlling 
shareholder subscription dummy ( dumgControllin _ ) is equal to one if controlling 
shareholder subscribes to new shares in the private placement, and zero otherwise. On 
average, controlling shareholders are involved in 36% of all 209 private placements as 
the buyer of newly issued shares. LoSC  stands for lack of shareholder contestability. 
LoSC  is a dummy variable which is equal to one if firms’ shareholder contestability 
improves after private placement (i.e. a negative change in the lack of shareholder 
contestability after private placements), and zero otherwise. As shown in the table above, 
on average, firms’ shareholder contestability improves during the private placement 
process in 91% of 209 private placements when top 1 shareholder’ holding divided by 
the sum of top 2-10 shareholders’ holding is used to measure shareholder contestability. 
When Herfindahl index of difference is used to measure shareholder contestability, 86% 
of private placement firms could improve shareholder contestability during the private 
208 
 
placement process. We use the total amount of related party transactions scaled by total 
assets in the year prior to private placements ( RPT ) as the proxy for the level of the 
agency conflict faced by firms. The absence of financial institutional investors in the 
largest three shareholders ( AoFII ) is a dummy variable and is equal to one if there are 
no financial institutional investors in the top 3 shareholders, and zero otherwise. The 
absence of financial institutional investors indicates worsened agency conflict between 
controlling and minority shareholders. On average, 42% of private placement firms do 
not have any financial institutional investors who have enough shares to become top 3 
shareholders.  We will also pre-issue Herfindahl index of difference and top1 
shareholder’s holding divided by the sum of top2-10 shareholders’ holding as 
alternative measurement of firms’ pre-issue agency conflict between controlling and 
minority shareholders for robustness test later.  
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Appendix 13: inclusion of interaction variable for Table 5.4 and 5.5 
In the interaction model, we include the individual variable of the interaction model to 
examine whether the result will be different. Additionally, we also report the economic 
significance of the coefficients associated with the independent variables.  
 
Table A13.1: inclusion of interaction variable for Table 5.4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] 
Size 
0.023 0.029 0.045 0.021 0.029 0.045 
(2.310)** (2.100)** (2.000)** (2.170)** (2.110)** (2.040)** 
PSR 
-0.052 -0.094 -0.106 -0.049 -0.089 -0.103 
(-2.300)** (-3.410)*** (-2.370)** (-2.200)** (-3.170)*** (-2.280)** 
Controlling_dum 
0.004 0.036 0.013 -0.004 0.030 0.011 
(0.170) (1.060) (0.270) (-0.180) (0.950) (0.230) 
LoSC_dum 
( 102/1 toTopTop ) 
0.017 0.082 0.076 
(0.370) (1.190) (0.820) 
LoSC_dum 
( diffHI _ ) 
-0.016 0.004 0.022 
(-0.370) (0.060) (0.210) 
vetoTopTop
RPT
 102/1
 0.141 0.340 0.274 
(1.270) (2.100)** (1.430) 
vetoTopTop
RPT
 102/1
 0.136 0.120 0.127 
(3.260)*** (2.030)** (1.340) 
vediffHI
RPT
 _
 0.161 0.155 0.133 
(1.120) (0.630) (0.530) 
vediffHI
RPT
 _
 0.132 0.136 0.141 
(3.330)*** (2.590)** (1.530) 
Constant 
-0.459 -0.619 -0.995 -0.394 -0.550 -0.951 
(-2.030)** (-1.950)* (-1.960)* (-1.800)* (-1.800)* (-1.930)* 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs 173 173 173 173 173 173 
F-value 9.15 2.16 2.48 9.42 2.10 2.28 
R-squared 0.180 0.138 0.119 0.183 0.128 0.116 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
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Table A13.2: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table A14.1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CAR[-
5,5] 
CAR[-
10,10] 
CAR[-
20,20] 
CAR[-
5,5] 
CAR[-
10,10] 
CAR[-
20,20] 
Size 0.576 0.551 0.707 0.526 0.551 0.707 
PSR 0.050 0.339 0.101 0.050 0.282 0.086 
Controlling dummy 0.051 0.347 0.104 0.051 0.289 0.088 
LoSC_dum 
( 102/1 toTopTop ) 0.129 0.473 0.363    
LoSC_dum ( diffHI _ )    0.145 0.028 0.125 
vetoTopTop
RPT
 102/1
 1.011 1.849 1.231    
vetoTopTop
RPT
 102/1
 0.975 0.652 0.571    
vediffHI
RPT
 _
 
   1.154 0.843 0.598 
vediffHI
RPT
 _
 
   0.946 0.739 0.634 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
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Table A13.3: inclusion of interaction variable for Table 5.5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] 
Size 
0.017 0.025 0.048 0.015 0.024 0.048 
(1.530) (1.630) (2.010)** (1.360) (1.550) (2.050)** 
PSR 
-0.037 -0.072 -0.076 -0.031 -0.062 -0.054 
(-1.650) (-2.650)*** (-1.810)* (-1.360) (-2.250)** (-1.300) 
Controlling_dum 
0.014 0.046 0.028 0.005 0.039 0.024 
(0.570) (1.420) (0.630) (0.250) (1.290) (0.520) 
LoSC_dum 
( 102/1 toTopTop ) 
0.018 -0.018 -0.030 
(0.410) (-0.250) (-0.330) 
LoSC_dum 
( diffHI _ ) 
-0.038 -0.068 -0.107 
(-0.800) (-1.010) (-1.500) 
vetoTopTop
AoFII
 102/1
 0.009 -0.043 -0.036 
(0.140) (-0.430) (-0.320) 
vetoTopTop
AoFII
 102/1
 0.023 0.036 0.132 
(1.110) (1.220) (2.810)*** 
vediffHI
AoFII
 _
 -0.027 -0.089 -0.184 
(-0.420) (-0.980) (-1.650) 
vediffHI
AoFII
 _
 0.030 0.047 0.161 
(1.440) (1.590) (3.390)*** 
Constant 
-0.323 -0.424 -0.989 -0.235 -0.361 -0.921 
(-1.230) (-1.210) (-1.800)* (-0.900) (-1.040) (-1.770)* 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs 178 178 178 178 178 178 
F-value 22.89 2.55 8.12 17.67 2.93 6.13 
R-squared 0.096 0.103 0.152 0.100 0.114 0.180 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
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Table A13.4: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table A14.3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CAR[-
5,5] 
CAR[-
10,10] 
CAR[-
20,20] 
CAR[-
5,5] 
CAR[-
10,10] 
CAR[-
20,20] 
Size 0.426 0.475 0.754 0.376 0.456 0.754 
PSR 0.174 0.433 0.218 0.062 0.367 0.187 
Controlling dummy 0.178 0.443 0.223 0.064 0.376 0.191 
LoSC_dum 
( 102/1 toTopTop ) 0.137 0.104 0.143    
LoSC_dum ( diffHI _ )    0.345 0.468 0.609 
vetoTopTop
AoFII
 102/1  
0.117 0.426 0.295    
vetoTopTop
AoFII
 102/1  
0.300 0.356 1.080    
vediffHI
AoFII
 _     
0.352 0.881 1.506 
vediffHI
AoFII
 _     
0.392 0.465 1.318 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
We did not include pre-issue related party transactions or the dummy of the absence of 
financial institutional investors although they are part of the interaction variable. This is 
because as shown in Appendix 12, 91% and 86% of firms’ shareholder contestability 
improves after private placements when different measurements of shareholder 
contestability are used. This means 91% or 86% of the observations in 
veLoSCRPT  or veLoSCAoFII   are exactly same as the observations in RPT and 
AoFII. The correlation between veLoSCRPT  and RPT and between 
veLoSCAoFII  and AoFII is very high. If we include RPT and AoFII into the 
regression, they will have multicollinearity problem. 
 
The results shown in Table A13.1 and A13.3 are similar to that in Table 5.4 and 5.5. 
The coefficient veLoSCRPT   for is positively significant when CAR [-5,5] and CAR 
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[-10,10] are dependent variable. The coefficient veLoSCAoFII   for is positively 
significant only when CAR [-20,20] is dependent variable. The result is weaker when 
AoFII is used to measure firms’ agency conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders. This is probably because AoFII is a discrete variable which may be less 
able to capture the variation of dependent variable compared to a continuous variable 
such as RPT.  
 
Regarding the economic significance of the coefficients associated with the independent 
variables, one standard deviation increase in RPT will lead to an increase in the average 
CAR ranging from 65.2% to 97.5%. One standard deviation increase in AoFII will lead 
to an 108% or 131.8% increase in the average CAR ranging when veLoSCAoFII   is 
positively significant for CAR [-20,20].  
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Appendix 14: a nested RPT and AoFII model for Table 5.4 and 5.5 
We nest RPT and AoFII as different measurements of the agency conflict between 
controlling and minority shareholders into one model in order to provide more 
robustness to our results. 
 
Table A14.1: a nested RPT and AoFII model for Chapter 5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] 
Size 0.025 0.031 0.056 0.023 0.032 0.057 (2.410)** (2.080)** (2.320)** (2.290)** (2.160)** (2.430)** 
PSR -0.048 -0.085 -0.079 -0.040 -0.071 -0.051 (-2.100)** (-3.010)*** (-1.740)* (-1.810)* (-2.440)** (-1.150) 
Controlling_dum 0.006 0.039 0.025 -0.001 0.033 0.023 (0.270) (1.170) (0.530) (-0.070) (1.080) (0.500) 
LoSC_dum 
( 102/1 toTopTop )
0.008 0.043 -0.002 
(0.160) (0.510) (-0.020) 
LoSC_dum 
( diffHI _ )
-0.041 -0.055 -0.126 
(-0.860) (-0.770) (-1.290) 
vetoTopTop
RPT
 102/1
 0.134 0.338 0.246 
(1.200) (2.160)** (1.250)   
vetoTopTop
RPT
 102/1
 0.140 0.126 0.149 
(3.470)*** (2.200)** (1.680)*   
vediffHI
RPT
 _
 0.158 0.144 0.113 
 (1.120) (0.600) (0.480) 
vediffHI
RPT
 _
 0.136 0.143 0.163 
 (3.590)*** (2.820)*** (1.910)* 
vetoTopTop
AoFII
 102/1
 0.004 -0.074 -0.065 
(0.050) (-0.770) (-0.540)   
vetoTopTop
AoFII
 102/1
 0.024 0.037 0.136 
(1.200) (1.240) (2.800)***   
vediffHI
AoFII
 _
 -0.036 -0.116 -0.236 
 (-0.530) (-1.280) (-2.100)** 
vediffHI
AoFII
 _
 0.031 0.050 0.168 
 (1.560) (1.670)* (3.440)*** 
Constant -0.513 -0.640 -1.229 -0.437 -0.582 -1.153 (-2.110)** (-1.830)* (-2.200)** (-1.880)* (-1.770)* (-2.220)** 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs 173 173 173 173 173 173 
F-value 18.39 2.57 8.40 20.27 2.58 8.17 
R-squared 0.187 0.148 0.171 0.193 0.149 0.198 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
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Table A14.2: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table A15.1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CAR[-
5,5] 
CAR[-
10,10] 
CAR[-
20,20] 
CAR[-
5,5] 
CAR[-
10,10] 
CAR[-
20,20] 
Size 0.626 0.589 0.880 0.576 0.608 0.895 
PSR 0.074 0.367 0.194 0.012 0.310 0.179 
Controlling dummy 0.076 0.376 0.199 0.013 0.318 0.183 
LoSC_dum 
( 102/1 toTopTop ) 0.061 0.248 0.010    
LoSC_dum ( diffHI _ ) 0.372 0.379 0.718 
vetoTopTop
RPT
 102/1
 0.960 1.838 1.106    
vetoTopTop
RPT
 102/1
 1.003 0.685 0.670    
vediffHI
RPT
 _
 
   1.133 0.783 0.508 
vediffHI
RPT
 _
 
   0.975 0.778 0.733 
vetoTopTop
AoFII
 102/1  
0.052 0.733 0.532    
vetoTopTop
AoFII
 102/1  
0.313 0.366 1.113    
vediffHI
AoFII
 _     
0.470 1.149 1.931 
vediffHI
AoFII
 _     
0.405 0.495 1.375 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
The results of the nested model are consistent with that in Table 5.4 and 5.5. The 
coefficient for the interaction between pre-issue RPT and the improvement in 
shareholder contestability is primarily positively significance for CAR[-5,5] and CAR[-
10,10]. The coefficient for the interaction between pre-issue AoFII and the improvement 
in shareholder contestability is only positively significance for CAR[-20,20]. The 
economic significance of the coefficients associated with the independent variables is 
also strong. One standard deviation increase in the interaction regarding RPT leads to an 
increase in the average CAR ranging from 67% to 100.3%. One standard deviation 
increase in the interaction regarding AoFII leads to a 111.3% or 137.5% increase in 
CAR[-20,20] when different proxies of shareholder contestability are used.  
216 
 
Appendix 15: a robustness test for the model in Chapter 5 
For robustness, we consider firms’ pre-issue shareholder contestability as an alternative measurement of firms’ pre-issue agency conflict between 
controlling and minority shareholders.  
Table A15.1: a robustness test for the model in Chapter 5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] 
Size 0.010 0.018 0.027 0.005 0.015 0.034 0.005 0.013 0.029 (0.870) (1.160) (1.220) (0.470) (0.980) (1.480) (0.420) (0.820) (1.240) 
PSR -0.042 -0.079 -0.099 -0.041 -0.075 -0.094 -0.041 -0.074 -0.085 (-1.920)* (-3.010)*** (-2.370)** (-1.890)* (-2.860)*** (-2.220)** (-1.860)* (-2.820)*** (-2.090)** 
Controlling_dum 0.009 0.040 0.012 -0.005 0.025 0.007 -0.002 0.024 0.000 (0.370) (1.160) (0.270) (-0.260) (0.800) (0.140) (-0.090) (0.810) (0.000) 
LoSC_dum ( 102/1 toTopTop ) -0.006 0.001 -0.017 -0.025 -0.013 0.005 (-0.110) (0.010) (-0.190) (-0.460) (-0.170) (0.060) 
LoSC_dum ( diffHI _ ) -0.018 0.030 0.084 (-0.410) (0.450) (1.010) 
ve
issuepre
toTopTop
toTopTop


 102/1
102/1  -0.004 0.006 -0.003 -0.033 -0.033 -0.029 
(-0.250) (0.340) (-0.170) (-0.970) (-0.920) (-1.000) 
ve
issuepre
toTopTop
toTopTop


 102/1
102/1  0.003 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.009 
(3.500)*** (1.790)* (2.810)*** (2.060)** (1.770)* (3.010)*** 
ve
issuepre
diffHI
diffHI


 _
_  0.472 0.979 0.960 0.873 1.167 0.802 
(0.650) (1.130) (1.470) (1.100) (1.200) (1.170) 
ve
issuepre
diffHI
diffHI


 _
_  0.213 0.113 -0.015 0.104 0.007 -0.362 
(3.030)*** (1.060) (-0.080) (1.140) (0.050) (-1.540) 
Constant -0.149 -0.294 -0.536 -0.044 -0.253 -0.736 -0.029 -0.177 -0.579 (-0.580) (-0.840) (-1.060) (-0.180) (-0.750) (-1.440) (-0.110) (-0.500) (-1.100) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 
F-value 25.07 2.08 4.16 22.10 1.64 2.87 21.03 1.75 4.13 
R-squared 0.130 0.109 0.129 0.135 0.125 0.113 0.168 0.145 0.157 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database 
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Table A15.2: economic significance of the coefficients reported in Table A16.1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-20,20] 
Size 0.251 0.342 0.424 0.125 0.285 0.534 0.125 0.247 0.455 
PSR 0.112 0.376 0.093 0.062 0.235 0.054 0.025 0.226 0.000 
Controlling dummy 0.114 0.385 0.096 0.064 0.241 0.056 0.025 0.231 0.000 
LoSC_dum ( 102/1 toTopTop ) 0.046 0.006 0.081  0.190 0.075 0.024 
LoSC_dum ( diffHI _ )  0.163 0.207 0.478    
ve
issuepre
toTopTop
toTopTop


 102/1
102/1  
0.929 1.057 0.437    7.664 5.814 4.223 
ve
issuepre
toTopTop
toTopTop


 102/1
102/1  
0.697 0.529 0.728    0.465 0.529 1.311 
ve
issuepre
diffHI
diffHI


 _
_  
   1.547 2.434 1.973 2.862 2.902 1.648 
ve
issuepre
diffHI
diffHI


 _
_  
   0.698 0.281 0.031 0.341 0.017 0.744 
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database 
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The lack of shareholder contestability is measured in two ways: the largest 
shareholder’s holding divided by the second largest to tenth largest shareholders’ total 
holding ( 102/1 toTopTop ) and the traditional Herfindahl index measurements of 
difference ( diffHI _ ). A higher 102/1 toTopTop  or diffHI _  means more lack of 
shareholder contestability which leads to worse agency conflict. Hence, similar to RPT 
and AoFII, to support our hypothesis in Chapter 5, we expect a significant positive 
coefficient for the interaction variable between firms’ pre-issue shareholder 
contestability and the dummy variable of the improvement in shareholder contestability 
after private placements.  
 
The result in Table A15.1 shows that the coefficient for the interaction variable between 
firms’ pre-issue shareholder contestability in term of 102/1 toTopTop  and the dummy 
variable of the improvement in shareholder contestability after private placements is 
significantly positive. The economic significance of the coefficients associated with this 
variable is strong which ranges from 46.5% to 131.1%. However, the coefficient when 
HI_diff is used is not significant in 5 out of 6 regressions. This result might mean 
HI_diff might not be a good proxy for the agency conflict between controlling and 
minority shareholders.  
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Appendix 16: instrumental variables for the proxy of the trade-off theory 
As discussed in Section 6.4, the deviation from firms’ optimal leverage level which is 
measured by the error term of Equation (3.2) might be an endogenous variable in 
Equation (3.1).  In this appendix, we aim to use instrument variable to deal with the 
endogenous variable.  
  1 2 3 4 
YrEI -0.046 -0.008 -0.022 0.012 
(-2.74)*** (-0.44) (-1.14) (0.60) 
Size 0.078 0.167 0.150 0.215 
(2.37)** (4.51)*** (3.72)*** (4.72)*** 
Profit 8.983 8.579 11.507 11.161 
(13.43)*** (11.02)*** (13.56)*** (12.01)*** 
Lev_indus (t-2) 0.689 
(2.71)*** 
Lev_indus (t-3) 0.245 
(0.73) 
Lev_res_pooled (t-2) 1.932 
(6.34)*** 
Lev_res_pooled (t-3) 1.386 
(3.50)*** 
PSR_sec 1.169 1.029 1.359 1.275 
(13.35)*** (10.32)*** (11.16)*** (9.09)*** 
RevG 0.161 0.112 0.040 -0.042 
(2.82)*** (1.76)* (0.57) (-0.51) 
Constant -2.351 -4.378 -4.070 -5.679 
(-3.32) (-5.50) (-4.68) (-5.78) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs 5,070 4,505 4,102 3,699 
Log likelihood 4,031 2,652 3,695 2,532 
*, **, and *** stand for 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval.  
Data source: SEO, financial, corporate governance and share return data from the China Centre for 
Economic Research (CCER) database 
 
We choose lagged deviation from firms’ optimal leverage level as the instrumental 
variable to the original variable. In the above table, two or three period lagged 
measurement of firms’ deviation from their optimal leverage level is chosen to be the 
instrumental variable to one period legged measurement in Equation (3.1). The 
regression is estimated by the probit instrumental variable specification in stata (since 
the probit instrumental variable specification is the only available option for discrete 
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dependent variable instrumental estimation in stata). The pooled OLS leverage 
prediction model is the model in Appendix 5.  
 
The results show that when the instrumental variable is used, the coefficients for the 
proxy of trade-off theory are still significantly positive in three out of four columns. The 
coefficients for the pre-issue share return which is the proxy of the information 
asymmetry are still significantly positive. However, the impact of the pre-issue growth 
on the SEO decision is not significant when the instrumental variable of the residual of 
the leverage prediction model is used. This is probably because the new leverage 
prediction model includes growth compared to Equation (3.2), so it may absorb the 
effect of growth.  
 
